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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
GAME-THEORETIC AND MACHINE-LEARNING TECHNIQUES FOR
CYBER-PHYSICAL SECURITY AND RESILIENCE IN SMART GRID
by
Longfei Wei
Florida International University, 2018
Miami, Florida
Professor Arif I. Sarwat, Major Professor
The smart grid is the next-generation electrical infrastructure utilizing Information and
Communication Technologies (ICTs), whose architecture is evolving from a utility-centric
structure to a distributed Cyber-Physical System (CPS) integrated with a large-scale of
renewable energy resources. However, meeting reliability objectives in the smart grid becomes increasingly challenging owing to the high penetration of renewable resources and
changing weather conditions. Moreover, the cyber-physical attack targeted at the smart
grid has become a major threat because millions of electronic devices interconnected via
communication networks expose unprecedented vulnerabilities, thereby increasing the
potential attack surface. This dissertation is aimed at developing novel game-theoretic
and machine-learning techniques for addressing the reliability and security issues residing at multiple layers of the smart grid, including power distribution system reliability
forecasting, risk assessment of cyber-physical attacks targeted at the grid, and cyber attack detection in the Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) and renewable resources.
This dissertation first comprehensively investigates the combined effect of various
weather parameters on the reliability performance of the smart grid, and proposes a multilayer perceptron (MLP)-based framework to forecast the daily number of power interruptions in the distribution system using time series of common weather data. Compared
with traditional statistical models, the proposed framework can reduce the Mean Squared

vii

Error (MSE) by 8.77% and 61.37% for sustained and momentary power interruption forecasting, respectively. Regarding evaluating the risk of cyber-physical attacks faced by the
smart grid, a stochastic budget allocation game is proposed to analyze the strategic interactions between a malicious attacker and the grid defender. A reinforcement learning
algorithm is developed to enable the two players to reach a Nash equilibrium, and the
risk of the cyber-physical attack can be assessed based on the game equilibrium. Simulation results on the IEEE 9-bus and 118-bus systems have shown that the attacker and the
defender should take different strategies corresponding to the resources owned.
Furthermore, this dissertation develops a multimodal data-driven framework for the
cyber attack detection in the power distribution system integrated with renewable resources. This approach introduces the spare feature learning into an ensemble classifier for improving the detection efficiency, and implements the spatiotemporal correlation analysis for differentiating the attacked renewable energy measurements from fault
scenarios. Numerical results based on the IEEE 34-bus system show that the proposed
framework achieves the most accurate detection of cyber attacks reported in the literature.
To address the electricity theft in the AMI, a Distributed Intelligent Framework for Electricity Theft Detection (DIFETD) is proposed, which is equipped with Benford’s analysis
for initial diagnostics on large smart meter data. A Stackelberg game between utility and
multiple electricity thieves is then formulated to model the electricity theft actions. Finally, a Likelihood Ratio Test (LRT) is utilized to detect potentially fraudulent meters,
where, for each smart meter, the successful detection rate is achieved more than 95% and
the false alarm is controlled beyond 10%, when the electricity is stolen in 50%.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
The electric grid is one of the nation’s most critical technological infrastructures, whose
reliability and resilience are essential for the continuous grid operation and control, and
also critical for the other interdependent infrastructures, such as communication networks,
water supply systems, and transportation networks [1]. The critical and networked nature
of the electric grid renders it susceptible to system disturbances from natural and manmade hazards, including, for instance, hurricanes, wildfires, ice storms, earthquakes, and
malicious cyber and physical attacks [2]. These disturbances may not only lead to the
failure of one electrical element, but also may cascades to other networks and cause the
failure of other independent elements, resulting in a catastrophic widespread failure.
The major goal of this dissertation is to propose new mathematical methods and analytical tools for addressing the reliability and resilience aspects of the electric grid. A
summary of the research background, literature review, and novel contributions of this
dissertation will be included in the following sections of this chapter, which are organized
as follows. Section 1.1 presents the power interruption problems caused by the various
weather conditions, and describes the cyber-physical security issues introduced by the
integration of the Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs). Section 1.2 reviews the current application of game-theoretic tools and machine-learning techniques
for modeling and analyzing the reliability and resilience problems faced by the electric
grid. In Section 1.3, the main contributions of this dissertation are summarized from the
research areas, including system reliability forecasting, risk assessment of cyber-physical
attacks targeted at the electric grid, and cyber attack detection in the Advanced Metering
Infrastructure (AMI) and renewable energy resources. Finally, Section 1.4 outlines the
general organization of this dissertation.
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1.1

Research Background and Motivation

The smart grid is the next generation electrical infrastructure utilizing ICTs, which incorporates an advanced communication network into the traditional electric grid of generation, transmission and distribution components that enables the bidirectional communication between the electric utility and its customers [3]. A conceptual model proposed by
the National Institute of Standards & Technology (NIST) of the United States in [4] defines seven important domains for the smart grid including bulk generation, transmission,
distribution, customers, service provider, operations and markets, as shown in Figure 1.1.
The ICTs facilitate the smart grid with effective operation, monitoring and control, enable predictive maintenance and self-healing responses to system disturbances, automate
maintenance and operation, and encourage expanded deployment of renewable energy
resources. However, the high penetration of renewable resources, a growing in electricity demands, and adverse weather conditions make meeting the reliability objectives in
the smart grid increasingly challenging. According to the Lawrence Berkeley National
Laboratory’s (LBNL) report in 2016 [5, 6], the annual cost for power interruptions to
the electricity customers of the United States is estimated to be $110 billion, which has
increased more than 30% since 2004.
The power interruptions in the smart grid can be caused by a wide range of factors,
such as adverse weather conditions, equipment failures, animals, trees, wildfires, and
human errors [7, 8]. However, adverse weather conditions are usually the most important
causes of the power interruptions in the current electric grid [9–13]. According to the
reliability data collected by the United States Department of Energy (DOE) [14] from
1992 to 2011, adverse weather conditions contributed more than 64% of the total number
of power interruptions. Extreme weather events have become more frequent and costly in
recent decades. Especially, over the past three decades, the number of recorded extreme
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Figure 1.1: The smart grid conceptual model proposed by the United States NIST.
weather events in the world has increased from around 200 a year to over 400 per year
[15]. The extreme weather events, such as hurricanes, wind storm, lightning, ice storm,
and high/low temperatures, often can cause large-scale power interruptions. For example,
hurricane Irma caused about 65% of the Florida state containing 6.5 million homes and
businesses to lose power in 2017 [16]. Despite the potential for frequently changing
weather conditions, the aging electric grid infrastructure has also resulted in an increasing
number of intermittent power interruptions and an observed decrease in system reliability
performance.
Furthermore, the large-scale, interconnected nature of smart grid renders the system
susceptible to a range of cyber and physical attacks owing to a dramatic increase in its attack surface. This has raised serious concerns about security, as summarized in Table 1.1.
It is important to note that attacks on one realm, say physical, have definite impacts on
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Table 1.1: Physical and Cyber Attacks Targeted at the Smart Grid
Attack Vector
Year Target
Impact
Stuxnet (CP)
Flame (C)
Shamoon (C)
Red October (C)
Snipers (PC)
BlackEnergy3 (CP)
Mirai Botnet (C)
WannaCry (C)

2010
2012
2012
2012
2013
2015
2016
2017

PLCs
Microsoft Windows
Microsoft Windows
Computer Networks
Power Substation
Information Systems
Computer Networks
Microsoft Windows

Damage to nuclear SCADA
Cyber espionage
Cyber espionage
Cyber espionage
Power outages in the substation
Power outages of 225,000 customers
Disruption of Internet services
200,000+ computers affected

the other (cyber), and vice versa. Accordingly, each attack vector (malware, worm or
some form of physical assault) is labeled as PC to signify an attack on the Physical realm
causing Cyber implications; CP to signify an attack on the Cyber realm causing Physical implications; and C to signify an attack on the Cyber realm alone. Additionally, the
importance of human behavior in the proliferation and strength of attacks is irrefutable.
Physical attacks may disrupt the power plants, transmission lines, and substations of the
power grid. For instance, the Metcalf Sniper Attack on California’s Pacific Gas & Electric (PG&E) in April 2013 by unidentified gunmen led not only to power outages, but also
underscored the vulnerability of the grid [17]. Moreover, the emergence of cyber-attacks
may seek accessibility to the Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA) or
AMI, thereby gaining remote access and/or control, and effectively compromising important electronic resources. The Stuxnet worm [18] was first discovered in 2010, which
infected numerous industrial control systems and was responsible for causing substantial
damage to power systems. The fear of such acts has peaked after the success of a coordinated cyber-attack, which used the infamous BlackEnergy3 malware to target networks
serving several Ukirainian cities, eventually affecting 225,000 customers [19]. Such a
malicious attack on critical Cyber-Physical System (CPS) infrastructure such as the smart
grid can have a debilitating impact on every person’s life and on national security.
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1.2

Literature Review: Game-Theoretic and Machine-Learning Approaches

In order to design a resilient and secure smart grid against changing weather conditions
and cyber-physical attacks, it will have to build on the solid mathematical methods and
analytics tools. Game theory provides a mathematical framework for analyzing and implementing security solutions, and machine learning introduces an analytical approach
to transform the high-dimensional data produced by the smart grid into meaningful representations, such as system operation patterns, fault detection, and control commands.
Especially, game-theoretic methods and machine-learning techniques have been applied
at multiple layers of the smart grid for addressing the reliability and security issues.

Smart Grid Reliability Analysis Based on Weather Conditions
For evaluating the effect of various weather conditions on the smart grid reliability performance, a wealth of researchers have investigated the effect of extreme weather conditions, such as floods, hurricanes, and ice storms, on the electric grid reliability performance [20–26] in the last decades. In [20], a three-state weather model was formulated
for the predictive reliability assessment of the electric distribution systems, where the system failure rate was analyzed based on extreme weather conditions. The potential effects
of extreme weather conditions and climate changes on power system components’ operation and reliability were reviewed in [21], and the mitigation framework was outlined
for boosting the resilience of electrical networks. In [22], a mathematical framework was
presented to assess the risk of extreme weather cases on the power systems, in which
the performances of system protection devices were evaluated under extreme events. Additionally, a risk-based defensive islanding algorithm was proposed in [23] for boosting
the power grid resilience to extreme weather events. However, all of these works only
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consider extreme weather conditions. Although severe weather events can cause a large
number of power interruptions, it is not common to consider these events under normal
operation conditions. The major of electric customers’ interruptions happen under normal
weather conditions.
Recently, statistical analysis techniques were introduced in [27, 28] to analyze the
relationship between the number of power interruptions on electric distribution networks
and common weather parameters, such as temperature, wind, air pressure, and lightning.
The number of power interruptions was predicted based on the total sum of the statistical
model of each weather parameter. However, the power interruptions related with common
weather conditions are essentially the result of combined action of many factors. The
power interruption prediction only based on statistical models might be compromising
due to the various effects of different weather parameters.

Smart Grid Protection Against Cyber-Physical Attacks
A series of research [29–34] based on game-theoretic methods has been proposed for defending the smart grid from various types of cyber and physical attacks. Especially, a
zero-sum static game model was proposed in [29] to compute optimal defense strategies
that seek to protect physical infrastructures of the power grid against physical attacks. In
order to protect the communication network of the power grid, a game equilibrium obtained from a zero-sum static game model between an intentional attacker and a fusionbased defender was introduced and studied in [30]. In [31], a zero-sum game-theoretic
framework was formulated to investigate the interactive decision-making process between
a sensor node and an attacker who can launch denial-of-service (DoS) attacks. For defending against false data injection (FDI) attacks on power grid state estimation, in [32],
the least-budget defense strategy in the game equilibrium was proposed to render power
grids immune to FDI attacks. In [33], a general-sum game-theoretic framework was pro-

6

posed to explore and evaluate optimal defense strategies for the power grid operator to
protect the grid against a combination of cyber and physical attacks.
However, the works in [29–33] rely on a static game formulation in which the dynamics of the power grid are ignored and the interactions between the attacker and the
defender are assumed to be one-shot events. In [34], a zero-sum stochastic game was
proposed for modeling single transmission line attack-defense scenarios while focusing
on deriving the probabilistic strategies of the involved players. While interesting, the
stochastic game model of [34] focused only on a single attack (e.g. physical or cyber).
Traditionally, power grid planning techniques have accommodated N − 1 contingency in
their scope. Even if the attacker successfully compromises a part of the cyber-physical
power grid system, it is quite possible that no load shedding will be caused. However,
great power failures could be triggered if the attacker launches coordinated attacks to
compromise multiple parts or functions of the power grid in cyber and physical aspects.
Compared with single attacks, coordinated attacks, when smartly structured, cannot only
have severe physical impacts, but can also potentially nullify the effect of system redundancy and other defense mechanisms. In a recent report by North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC), the coordinated attack was identified as one of the
three representative high-impact, low-frequency (HILF) threats [35]. Indeed, devising
new defense mechanisms against such coordinated attacks is both challenging and desirable. In [36], a stochastic budget allocation game theory was introduced for modeling
the attack-defense scenarios in the power grid while factoring in the coordinated cyberphysical attacks. The Nash equilibrium of the formulated dynamic game was derived for
guiding the defender to optimally protect power grid elements at different system states.
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Smart Grid Cyber-Physical Attack Detection:
Recently, a wealth of efforts have been proposed for the cyber attack detection in the
power grid using the machine leaning techniques, such as supervised learning, unsupervised learning, and statistics-based learning approaches [37–41]. In [38], a decision
tree-based anomaly detection approach was presented to secure the power grid communication network from distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks. A malware infection
detection using Kernel Fisher discriminant analysis was proposed in [39] by comparing
malware traffic with normal traffic. An intrusion detection system was developed in [40]
for early detection of threats in AMI of the smart grid, where a multi-support vector machine (SVM) classifier was trained. In [41], a Sybil attack detection method based on
k-Nearest Neighbours (kNN) classification was introduced for the vehicle-to-grid (V2G)
networks. However, all of these machine learning methods need to be evaluated to guide
the selection of mechanisms that are most suitable for the Distributed Energy Resource
(DER) cyber attack detection. Moreover, techniques should be developed to handle the
complex and high-dimensional DER measurement data.
Feature learning is a key to improve the performance of existing machine learningbased attack detection mechanisms, which consists of feature extraction and selection.
Feature extraction transforms the original features into a more meaningful representation
by reconstructing its inputs and involves reducing the amount of resources required to
describe a large dataset. There are two broad categories for feature extraction algorithms,
including linear and nonlinear. Linear feature extraction algorithms, such as principal
component analysis (PCA) [42], multidimensional scaling [43], and principal coordinates
analysis [44], assume the data lies on a lower-dimensional linear subspace and project
them on this subspace using matrix factorization. However, nonlinear feature extraction
algorithms like self organizing maps (SOMs) [45] and Kohonen maps [46] create a lower
dimensional mapping of an input by preserving its topological characteristics.
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Performance of attack detection mechanisms is heavily dependent on the choice of
applied features, and feature selection is to identify the most informative features from
the original and extracted feature sets. Typically, feature selection is partitioned into three
classes: filters, wrappers, and embedded methods. Filter methods analyze intrinsic properties of the dataset, ignoring the type of classifier. Conversely, wrappers use classifiers
to score a given subset of features, and embedded methods inject the selection process directly into the classification learning process. In this paper, the filter methods are utilized
to evaluate different types of classifiers for the DER attack detection. Among the most
used filter-based strategies, Relief algorithm [47] estimates the quality of features according to how well their values distinguish between instances that are closer to each other.
Another effective yet fast filter method is the Fisher method [48], which computes a score
for a feature as the ratio of inter-class separation and intra-class variance, where features
are evaluated independently. In [49], a mutual information (MI)-based approach is proposed, and the quality of a given feature is evaluated by the MI between the distribution
of the values of this feature and the membership to a particular class.

1.3

Research Objectives and Original Contributions

The research reported in this dissertation is aimed at developing novel game-theoretic
models and machine-learning algorithms for solving the smart grid reliability and resilience problems, such as power distribution system reliability forecasting, risk assessment of cyber-physical attacks targeted at the grid, and cyber attack detection in the AMI
and renewable resources. Specifically, the main body of the dissertation has been published in several IEEE and other reputed journals and conferences [33, 36, 50–56]. In
total, the dissertation has completed the following five major activities:
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1) Hybrid integration of multilayer perceptrons and parametric model for power
distribution system reliability forecasting using common weather data
The main contribution of this objective is to comprehensively investigate the combined effect of various weather parameters on the reliability performance of power system distribution networks. Especially, a multilayer perceptron (MLP)-based framework is
proposed to forecast the daily numbers of sustained and momentary power interruptions
in one distribution management area using time series of common weather data. Based
on the real-time reliability data from the local utility, Florida Power & Light (FPL), and
common weather data from National Climatic Data Center (NCDC), a modified extreme
learning machine (ELM)-based hierarchical learning algorithm is then introduced to train,
validate, and test the proposed framework. Essentially, compared with traditional statistical models, the proposed framework can reduce the mean squared error (MSE) by 8.77%
and 61.37% for sustained and momentary power interruption forecasting, respectively. In
addition, the sensitivity of each common weather parameter can be derived with respective to the daily numbers of power interruptions.
2) A survey on application of noncooperative game-theoretic methods to address
cyber-physical security threats and challenges in the smart grid
Noncooperative game theory provides a mathematical framework for analyzing and
implementing the smart grid cyber-physical security solutions. However, there is little
research in the literature that comprehensively reviews and evaluates the application of
noncooperative game theory to the security issues in the smart grid. In this effort, a
systematic survey of existing game-theoretic approaches for mitigating security threats is
proposed for three main smart grid zones: the power system network infrastructure, AMI,
and state estimation. For each zone, the emerging threats and vulnerabilities are identified
and summarized, and the potential attacks targeted on both cyber and physical realms are
addressed. The current game-theoretic approaches for addressing these security threats
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are evaluated and compared. Future opportunities and extension of these approaches in
the realistic smart grid cyber-physical security problems are also discussed.
3) Risk assessment of coordinated cyber-physical attacks against the smart grid:
a stochastic game approach
In this approach, to address the dynamic nature of the smart grid protection, a stochastic budget allocation game is proposed to analyze the strategic interactions between a malicious attacker and the grid defender while factoring in the attack and defense budget
limitations. At the game equilibrium, the optimal budget allocation strategies of the two
players, in terms of attacking/protecting the critical elements of the grid, can be obtained.
The information about the successful attack probability to various elements is used to
evaluate the risk of the corresponding attack faced by the whole grid at various power
system states. Simulation results on the IEEE 9-bus and 118-bus systems have shown that
different risks are derived as the attack/defense budget is varied.
4) Spare feature learning and spatiotemporal correlation for attack detection in
power distribution systems integrated with DERs
This objective presents a multimodal data-driven framework for the attack detection
in power distribution systems integrated with DERs. Unlike previous works using only
one machine learning classifier, this approach first introduces the spare feature learning
techniques into an ensemble classifier to identify the abnormal events including faults
and cyber attacks within DER implementations. Finally, the spatiotemporal correlation
analysis is utilized for each DER measurement toward the differentiation of the attacked
measurements from fault scenarios in the generated abnormal event list. A modified IEEE
34-bus distribution system modeled with photovoltaics (PV) farm, wind turbine generator
(WTG), battery energy system, and diesel generator is implemented to simulate the normal, fault, and attack system scenarios, and the numerical results show that the proposed
framework achieves the most accurate DER attack detection reported in the literature.
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5) A distributed intelligent framework for electricity theft detection using Benford’s law and Stackelberg game
A Distributed Intelligent Framework for Electricity Theft Detection (DIFETD) is proposed and implemented in this effort. It is equipped with Benford’s law for initial but
powerful diagnostics on large smart meter data. A Stackelberg game is formulated to analyze the strategic interactions between one utility and multiple electricity thieves, which
is applied to data flagged suspicious by Benford’s law. Finally, the Stackelberg equilibrium provides sampling rate and threshold to conduct a Likelihood Ratio Test (LRT) to
detect potentially fraudulent meters. The capability of the proposed framework was validated against four intelligent theft scenarios with the real consumer power consumption
data from FPL. For each smart meter, the successful detection rate is achieved more than
95% and the false alarm is controlled beyond 10%, when the electricity is stolen in 50%.

1.4

Dissertation Organization

The listed contributions in Section 1.3 will be discussed in detail in the remaining chapters, which are structured as follows:
Chapter 2 presents an overview of fundamental game theoretic concepts and current
machine learning techniques applied to the reliability and resilience areas of the smart
grid. Section 2.1 outlines the classification of game theory, and briefly introduces the definition, solution, and learning algorithms of static and dynamic game theory, respectively.
Section 2.2 describes several key machine learning algorithms that are successfully used
in the smart grid reliability and resilience evaluation with large datasets.
Chapter 3 proposes a hybrid framework integrating Multilayer Perceptrons (MLPs)
and parametric regression models for forecasting the daily numbers of power interruptions in smart grid distribution networks using time series of common weather data. Sec-
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tion 3.1 formally defines the reliability problem and provides a basic introduction to the
existing literature. Section 3.2 introduces the reliability metrics and weather parameters
collected for analysis. Section 3.3 develops the parametric regression models between
the reliability metrics and various weather parameters. Section 3.4 formulates a MLP
model for forecasting the daily numbers of power interruptions and introduces a modified
Extreme Learning Machine (ELM) based algorithm for training the formulated model.
In Section 3.5, the proposed framework is evaluated, and the sensitivity of each weather
parameter is analyzed. Section 3.6 concludes the chapter and outlines the future work.
Chapter 4 provides a systematic survey of existing game-theoretic approaches that
implemented for mitigating security threats in three main smart grid zones including the
power system network infrastructure, AMI, and power system state estimation. Section
4.1 categorizes the smart grid into three main zones and makes an overview of the network
security challenges faced by each zone. Section 4.2 evaluates the current game theoretic
models for cyber-physical security in power system network infrastructure. Section 4.3
compares the game theoretic models for cyber-physical security of communication network and smart meters in AMI. Section 4.4 introduces the game theoretic models for
cyber-physical security in the power system state estimation. To conclude this chapter,
we discuss future work and recent progresses in Section 4.5.
Chapter 5 investigates the risk assessment of the coordinated cyber-physical attacks
against power grids using a novel game-theoretic approach. Section 5.1 makes an overview
of the cyber-physical security issues in the smart grid. Section 5.2 presents the attackdefense scenario in the power grid as well as the formulated stochastic game. Section 5.3
introduces an optimal load shedding technology to quantify the attacker and defender’s
rewards. Then, Section 5.4 derives the Nash equilibrium of the proposed stochastic game,
and computes the risk of the coordinated cyber-physical attack faced by the grid based
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on the probability of successful attack and corresponding physical impacts. Section 5.5
presents the simulation results while Section 5.6 concludes the chapter.
Chapter 6 presents a multimodal data-driven framework for the attack detection in
power distribution systems integrated with a large-scale of distributed energy resources
(DERs). Section 6.1 makes an overview of this chapter. Section 6.2 introduces the cyber
attack models in DER systems. Section 6.3 describes the proposed DER attack detection
framework. Section 6.4 develops a test distribution system. Section 6.5 compares the
experimental results of the proposed attack detection framework with existing works,
while Section 6.6 concludes the paper and outlines the future work.
Chapter 7 presents a Distributed Intelligent Framework for Electricity Theft Detection
(DIFETD) is proposed and implemented in this chapter. Section 7.1 make a summary of
this chapter. A summary of related work is provided in Section 7.2. Benford’s Analysis
for preliminary theft detection is explained in Section 7.3. A Stackelberg game between
utility and thieves is proposed in Section 7.4. LRT for theft detection is described in Section 7.5. While Section 7.6 discusses data cleansing and the results, Section 7.7 provides
conclusion and future work.
Chapter 8 summarizes the dissertation outcomes, concludes the significance of this
research, discuss the results, and finally makes recommendations for the future works.
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CHAPTER 2
Game-Theoretic and Machine-Learning Techniques
This chapter presents an overview of fundamental game theoretic concepts and current machine learning techniques applied to the reliability and resilience areas of the smart
grid. Section 2.1 outlines the classification of game theory, and briefly introduces the definition, solution, and learning algorithms of static and dynamic game theory, respectively.
Section 2.2 describes several key machine learning algorithms that are successfully used
in the smart grid reliability and resilience evaluation with large datasets.

2.1

Fundamental Game Theoretic Concepts

Game theory is a branch of applied mathematics that deals with strategic interactions
among multiple decision makers, i.e., players, in which each player’s success in making
choices depends on the choices of others [57]. With respect to whether the players can
select actions or make decisions collectively or individually, games can be classified into
cooperative and noncooperative games. Due to the conflicting interests between malicious personnel, i.e., attackers, and smart grid operators, i.e., defenders, this dissertation
mainly focuses on noncooperative games that can be used to analyze the strategic decision making processes between attackers and defenders. In the noncooperative game,
each attacker or defender’s preference ordering among multiple alternatives is captured
in an objective function. Attackers try to maximize their objective functions for utility or
benefit, while defenders intend to minimize their objective functions for cost or loss. For a
nontrivial game, the objective function of an attacker or defender depends on the choices
(actions, or equivalently decision variables) of at least one other player, and generally of
all the players, and hence players cannot simply optimize their own objective function
independent of the choices of the other players.
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Table 2.1: Noncooperative Game Classification
Classification Player
Type 1
Type 2

Action Set

2
finite
N(≥ 2) infinite

Utility

Utility/ Action Set

zero-sum
deterministic
nonzero-sum stochastic

Utility/Information

Time

complete
incomplete

static
dynamic

The classification of noncooperative games is shown in Table 2.1. A noncooperative game is nonzero-sum if the sum of the players’ objective functions cannot be made
zero even after appropriate positive scaling and/or translation that do not depend on the
players’ decision variables. A two-player game is zero-sum if the sum of the objective
functions of the two players is zero or can be made zero by appropriate positive scaling
and translation that do not depend on the decision variables of the players. A game is a
finite game if each player has only a finite number of alternatives, that is, the players pick
their actions out of finite sets (action sets); otherwise the game is an infinite game; finite
games are also known as matrix games. A game is said to be deterministic if the players’
actions uniquely determine the outcome, as captured in the objective functions; whereas,
if the objective function of at least one player depends on an additional variable (state
of nature) with a known probability distribution, then the game is a stochastic game. A
game is a complete information game if the description of the game [that is, the players, the objective functions, and the underlying probability distributions (if stochastic)]
is common information to all players; otherwise it is an incomplete information game.
Finally, noncooperative games can be classified into two categories: static games and dynamic games. A game is static if each player acts only once, and none of the players has
access to information on the actions of any of the other players; otherwise it is a dynamic
game. A dynamic game is said to be a differential game if the evolution of the decision
process (controlled by the players over time) takes place in continuous time, and generally involves a differential equation. In the following parts, the definition, solution, and
learning algorithms of static and dynamic games will be introduced in detail.
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2.1.1

Static Game Theory

A static game is one in which the notions of time or information do not affect the action
or decision selection of the players [58]. Therefore, in a static setting, a noncooperative
game can be seen as a one-shot process in which the players take their actions only once
(simultaneously or at different points in time). Here, we provide one general definition
for N (≥ 2) players’ static noncooperative games, which is shown as follows:
Definition 2.1.1 A N -player static noncooperative game, Ξ = hN , {Ai }i∈N , {Ui }i∈N i,
in normal form, is characterized by three main elements: (1) the players’ set N :=
{1, ..., N }, (2) the action set Ai for each player i ∈ N , and (3) the utility function Ui
for each player i ∈ N , which reflects the gains and costs from players’ action choices.
In such a game, each player i ∈ N intends to choose an action ai ∈ Ai so as to optimize its utility function Ui (ai , a−i ) which depends not only on player i’s action choice
ai but also on the vector of actions taken by the other players in N \ i, denoted by a−i .
The action selection of N players in such a deterministic manner is called pure strategies, denoted by a = (a1 , ..., aN ) ∈ A1 × · · · × AN . Then, one of the most important
objectives of static noncooperative game theory is to derive a Nash equilibrium [59], that
is, a∗ ∈ A1 × · · · × AN , such that no player i can improve its utility by changing unilaterally its actions, given that the actions of the other players are fixed. For the static
noncooperative game theory, the Nash equilibrium can be formally defined as follows:
Definition 2.1.2 A vector of actions a∗ ∈ A1 × · · · × AN is a Nash equilibrium of a
N -player, if and only if ∀i ∈ N , the following condition holds:
Ui (a∗i , a∗−i ) ≥ Ui (ai , a∗−i ), ∀ai ∈ Ai .

(2.1)

However, a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies is not guaranteed for all static noncooperative games, which opens the door for a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium [60]. A
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mixed strategy for each player i is a probability distribution over its action set Ai , denoted by π i , and a Nash equilibrium is guaranteed to exist in mixed strategies for any
finite game.
Numerous learning algorithms have been proposed in the literature for computing
Nash equilibrium of static noncooperative games. Two classical iterative algorithms are
best response dynamics [61] and fictitious play [62], in which each player chooses the
action that maximizes its utility function given the actions of the other players. A myopic
best response strategy was first studied in [63] and refers to the scenario where a firm
in a duopoly adjusts its output to maximize its payoff based on the known output of its
competitor. The strategy known as fictitious play (employed in finite games), where a
player devises a best response based on the history of the other players’ actions, was
introduced in [64] in the context of mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium in matrix games.
The advantage of an iterative algorithm is its simple implementation, however, it suffers
from several drawbacks. First, a best response process is only guaranteed to converge
to an equilibrium for certain types of utility functions. Second, best response dynamics
are highly sensitive to the initial conditions and any change in these conditions could
lead to different equilibriums. Third, adopting a best response approach does not always
guarantee convergence to an efficient equilibrium.
In contrast, regret matching is a type of learning algorithms in which the players
attempt to minimize their regret from using a certain action, i.e., the difference between
the utility of always playing a certain action and the utility that they achieved by playing
their current strategy. An in-depth treatment of regret matching algorithms is found in
[65]. Many other types of learning schemes such as reinforcement learning (RL) are
also used in various game-theoretic scenarios in order to find a desirable state of the
system [66].
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2.1.2

Dynamic Game Theory

In contrast to static games, dynamic noncooperative game [67–69] is one in which the
players have some information about each others’ choices, can act more than once, and
time has a central role in the decision making. Note that, when the game is dynamic,
one needs to also define, as part of the game, additional components such as information
sets, time, or histories (i.e., sets of past actions) which are usually reflected in the utility functions. Dynamic games can be classified into series of games including repeated
games, extensive games, differential games, evolutionary games, and stochastic games. A
common framework to study the interactions between attackers and defenders in dynamic
smart grid systems is a stochastic game [69]. Here, we provide one general definition for
N (≥ 2) players’ stochastic smart grid security games, which is shown as follows:
Definition 2.1.3 A N -player stochastic game, Ξ = hN , {Ai }i∈N , {Ui }i∈N , S, T i in normal form, has the following key elements:
• The players’ set N = {1, ..., N };
• The action set Ai for each player i ∈ N ;
• The utility function Ui for each player i ∈ N , which reflects the gains and costs
from players’ action choices;
• The smart grid state space S, where each state s ∈ S is associated with the status
of smart grid elements;
• The state transition probability Ts,s0 (a, d) from state s ∈ S to state s0 ∈ S under
the action selection of N players, denoted by a = (a1 , ..., aN ) ∈ A1 × · · · × AN .
In such a stochastic game, players’ actions directly affect underlying state variables
that influence their utilities. The state variables evolve according to a Markov process in
discrete time, and players maximize their infinite horizon expected utility, respectively.
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The standard solution concept for stochastic games is Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE)
[67], where a player’s equilibrium strategy depends on the current state of all players.
The traditional Q-Learning algorithm for Markov decision processes is extended to twoplayer zero-sum stochastic games for Minimax-Q Learning in [66]. And the Minimax-Q
Learning algorithm is applied for general-sum stochastic games in [70].
However, MPE presents two significant obstacles as an analytical tool, particularly
as the number of players grows larger. First is computability: the state space expands in
dimension with the number of players, and thus the “curse of dimensionality” kicks in,
making computation of MPE infeasible in many problems of practical interest. Second
is plausibility: as the number of players grows larger, it becomes increasingly difficult
to believe that individual players track the exact behavior of all other agents. Therefore,
fictitious play [64] assumes opponents play stationary strategies. The algorithm maintains information about the average value of each action (i.e., is the average expected
discounted reward from past experience). The algorithm then selects the action that has
done the best in the past. This is nearly identical to single agent value iteration with a
uniform weighting of past experience.
Opponent modeling and joint action learners (JALs) [71,72] are RL algorithms, which
are multi-agent extensions to the well-studied Q-learning algorithm. Explicit models of
the opponents are learned as stationary distributions over their joint action space, which
contains the probability the other players will select joint action based on past experience.
These distributions combined with learned joint-action values from standard temporal
differences are used to select an action. The algorithm has very similar behavior to fictitious play that requires observations of the opponents’ actions, but not of their individual
rewards. Additionally, its empirical distribution of play may converge to an equilibrium
solution, but its action selection is deterministic and cannot play a mixed strategy.
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2.2

Machine Learning: Algorithms and Applications

The concept of machine learning refers to the automated detection and extraction of meaningful patterns from large datasets, using statistical techniques [73]. In the smart grid, the
bidirectional information flow between the electric utility and its customers, the increasing electricity supply from DERs, and the integration of advanced sensor and metering
technologies makes it challenging for the traditional power system analysis, but ideal
for the application of machine learning techniques. Based on the learning style, current
machine learning techniques can be categorized into the following types:
• Supervised Learning: The goal is to develop a model to predict new examples in
the test dataset through analyzing examples with known class labels in the training
dataset. The derived model can be implemented for the smart grid data classification
and regression such as in system monitoring and attack detection.
• Unsupervised Learning: The objective is to formulate a model to deduce structures
and patterns presented in the training dataset with unlabeled examples. The application areas contain data clustering, dimensionality reduction, and association
rule learning. One example is for grouping together data points with similar active/reactive power profiles for power transmission analysis.
• Semi-Supervised Learning: For the training dataset including a mixture of labeled
and unlabeled examples, this learning algorithm intends to propose a model to learn
the structures to organize the data as well as make predictions. The learning algorithms can also be implemented for the smart grid data classification and regression.
• Reinforcement Learning: This algorithm learns a policy/strategy of how to act given
an observation of the system, wherein each action has an impact on the system, and
the system provides feedback that guides the learning process.
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In the following section, we briefly review the theoretic models of supervised, unsupervised, semi-supervised, and reinforcement learning. Moreover, we introduce several
popular machine leaning algorithms in detail that help in the resilient smart grid design
and deployment.

2.2.1

Supervised Learning

Supervised learning involves formulating a mapping between a set of input variables X
and a set of output variables Y, and applying this mapping to predict the outputs for
unseen data [74]. Mathematically, the objective is to derive a function f : X → Y based
on a training set An = {(x1 , y1 ), ..., (xn , yn )}, which is composed of pairs of input and
output points xi ∈ X and yi ∈ Y. Typically, xi ∈ Rd and yi ∈ R. yi is discrete for
classification problems and continuous for regression problems. Let H denote the set of
functions where the solution is sought: f ∈ H. The supervised learning can be converted
into an optimization problem to find the function f ∈ H that minimizes the error or
loss between the prediction f (x) and the desired output y, which is measured by a loss
function L(f (x), y) : Y × Y → R+ .
In this section, we focus on kernel-based approaches to supervised learning. We first
explore one of the simplest algorithms for data classification, termed the nearest neighbor
algorithm [75]. We then review the support vector machine (SVM) algorithm which represents the dominant supervised learning technology used for the smart grid data processing, specially in the cyber attack detection. Finally, we discuss the ensemble technique,
an important strategy for increasing the stability and accuracy of a classifier whereby a
single classifier is replaced by a committee of classifiers.
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Nearest Neighbor Algorithm
The nearest neighbor algorithm classifies the example in the test dataset by identifying its
nearest neighbor and using this neighbor to determine the class of this example. Given
two observations x1 and x2 in the training dataset X , the distance between two can be
defined as D(x1 , x2 ). Here, the function D(·) is defined as an Euclidean distance, where
q
Pd
(i)
(i) 2
D(x1 , x2 ) =
i=1 (x1 − x2 ) . Given a test data example xt , the nearest neighbor
classifier chooses the class corresponding to the data item in the training set with the
shortest distance to the test example. Using the notation we established above, let i∗
denote the index of the training example closest (i.e., with minimum distance) to the test
example xt . Therefore, i∗ can be derived through solving the following problem:
i∗ = arg min D(xt , xi ).
i=1,...,n

(2.2)

After finding i∗ , the nearest neighbor role would assign to the test example the label yi∗ ,
which is the label of the training example xi∗ that was closest to the test example xt .
In [76], a k-Nearest Neighbor (kNN) algorithm was introduced as an extension of the
nearest neighbor algorithm, where the class of the test data example xt is determined by
the majority of samples of the labels for k nearest neighbors.

Support Vector Machine (SVM) Algorithm
For binary classification, we try to formulate a function f : Rd → {±1} using the training
set An = {(x1 , y1 ), ..., (xn , yn )}, where xi ∈ Rd and yi ∈ {±1}, such that f will
correctly classify the test data example xt . Assume that the training set An is linearly
separable, the linear SVM algorithm [77] is designed based on the class of hyperplanes:
< w, x > +b with yi (< w, xi > +b) > 0, ∀i = 1, ..., n. Therefore, the decision function
can be expressed as fd (x) = sign(< w, x > +b) with
fd (xi ) = sign(yi ), i = 1, ..., n.
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(2.3)

The SVM classification method aims at finding the optimal hyperplane based on the
maximization of the margin between the training data for both classes. Because the dis(x)
tance between a point x and the hyperplane is yfkwk
, it is easy to show that the optimization

problem may be expressed as the following minimization:
1
min kwk2
2

(2.4)

s.t. yi f (xi ) ≥ 1, i = 1, ..., n.
The support vectors are the training points for which we have an equality in (2.4). They
are all equally close to the optimal hyperplane. In the real world, the training data is usually far from linear and the datasets are inseparable. Thus, the nonlinear SVM classifiers
were created by applying the kernel trick to maximum-margin hyperplanes in [78].

Ensemble Techniques
Given a set X = {x1 , ..., xn } of training examples, an ordinary machine learning algorithm outputs a classifier, which is an hypothesis about the true classification function
f . The ensemble technique [79] aims to construct a set of classifiers to solve the same
classification problem. In particular, an ensemble classifier is implemented to classify X
into −1 and +1, in which P subsets of tuples of size m(< n) are created by uniformly
sampling from X with replacement. Therefore, P subsets {X1 , ..., XP } are generated,
and P classifiers {C1 , ..., CP } are built on each subset Xi , i = 1, .., P . A final ensemble
classifier classifies a test example xt by giving as output the class predicted most often
by {C1 , ..., CP }. The main discovery is that ensembles are often much more accurate than
the individual classifiers that make them up. In addition, the ensemble classifier can be
implemented for the parallel computing, in which each subset Xi resides on a different
processor within the parallel computer.
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2.2.2

Unsupervised Learning

In unsupervised learning, the machine simply receives the set of training examples X =
{x1 , ..., xn } without supervised target outputs. The goal of unsupervised learning is to
build representations of the training examples that can be used for decision making, forecasting future inputs, and efficiently transferring the training dataset to another machine.
Therefore, unsupervised learning can be defined as a way to find patterns in the unlabeled dataset. Two popular algorithms of unsupervised learning are Principal Component
Analysis (PCA) and data clustering. PCA is a a dimension-reduction tool that can extract the most informational representations or features with a low dimension from a large
dataset [80]. Data clustering represents a broad class of methods, such as K-means clustering and hierarchical clustering, for dividing the training examples into groups (clusters)
that are meaningful and useful [81].

2.2.3

Semi-supervised Learning

Semi-supervised learning is halfway between supervised and unsupervised learning, where
the learning algorithm is provided with both labeled and unlabeled training data [82].
Therefore, the training dataset X = {x1 , ..., xn } can be divided into two parts: the
points Xl = {x1 , ..., xl }, for which labels Yl = {y1 , ..., yl } are provided, and the points
Xu = {x1 , ..., xu }, the labels of which are not known. Semi-supervised learning addresses the problem that the supervised learning cannot integrate part or all of the available unlabeled data in its learning algorithms. The goal of semi-supervised learning is
to maximize the learning performance by combining both labeled and unlabeled data,
and develop learning algorithms to take advantage of such a combination. There are
some popular semi-supervised learning models, such as self-training, mixture models,
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co-training and multiview learning, graph-based methods, and semi-supervised support
vector machines [83].

2.2.4

Reinforcement Learning

The intrinsic nature of Reinforcement Learning (RL) is learning through interactions,
where a machine interacts with its environment by producing a policy π [84]. The derived policy affects the state of the environment, which in turn results in the machine
receiving some scalar rewards or losses. The goal of the machine is to find an optimal
policy π ∗ that maximizes/minimizes the total expected rewards/losses over its lifetime,
termed the discounted reward/loss. RL is closely related to the field of decision theory,
especially the Markov Decision Process (MDP). The MDP is comprised of four main
characteristics including: (1) state, (2) policy, (3) transition between states, and (4) reward function. The dynamic programming is a class of algorithms that is able to compute
optimal policies in the presence of a perfect model of MDP [85]. Moreover, RL is closely
related to game theory, where the machine interacts with some other machines which can
also make actions, receive rewards/losses, and learn. Therefore, the goal of the machine
is to derive an optimal policy so as to maximize/minimize its rewards/losses based on the
other machines’ current and future actions.
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CHAPTER 3
Hybrid Model for Power Distribution Reliability Forecasting

This chapter proposes a hybrid framework integrating Multilayer Perceptrons (MLPs)
and parametric regression models for forecasting the daily numbers of power interruptions
in smart grid distribution networks using time series of common weather data. Section 3.1
formally defines the reliability problem and provides a basic introduction to the existing
literature. Section 3.2 introduces the reliability metrics and weather parameters collected
for analysis. Section 3.3 develops the parametric regression models between the reliability metrics and various weather parameters. Section 3.4 formulates a MLP model for
forecasting the daily numbers of power interruptions and introduces a modified Extreme
Learning Machine (ELM) based algorithm for training the formulated model. In Section
3.5, the proposed framework is evaluated, and the sensitivity of each weather parameter
is analyzed. Section 3.6 concludes the chapter and outlines the future work.

3.1

Overview

The reliability has always been a critical focus area for the design and operation of the
electric power grid, where the distribution networks account for up to 90% of all customer
reliability problems [86, 87]. Improving the distribution reliability is a key point for increasing customer satisfaction and system performance. However, with the high penetration of renewable resources and increasing electricity demands in distribution networks,
meeting reliability objectives in modern grids becomes increasingly challenging [88–91].
According to the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory’s (LBNL) report in 2016 [5,6],
the annual cost for power interruptions to the electricity customers of the United States is
estimated to be $110 billions, which increases more than 30% since 2004.
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Figure 3.1: The distribution of causes for power interruptions in distribution networks:
178 million customers collected from 1992 to 2011 in the United States.
The power interruptions in distribution networks can be caused by a wide range of
factors including equipment failures, animals, trees, and human errors [7, 8]. However,
weather conditions, such as windstorm, lightning, ice storm, and high temperature, are
usually the important causes of the distribution power interruptions [9–11]. According
to the reliability data collected by the United States Department of Energy (DOE) [14]
from 1992 to 2011, weather conditions contribute more than 64% of the total number of
distribution power interruptions as shown in Figure 3.1. As a result, the accurate reliability forecasting based on time series of weather condition data is both challenging and
desirable for the smart grid distribution system design and operation.
In the last decades, a wealth of researchers have investigated the effect of extreme
weather conditions, such as floods, hurricanes, and ice storms, on the electric grid reliability performance [20–24]. In [20], a three-state weather model was formulated for
the predictive reliability assessment of the electric distribution systems, where the system failure rate was analyzed based on extreme weather conditions. The potential effects
of extreme weather conditions and climate changes on power system components oper-
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ation and reliability were reviewed in [21], and the mitigation framework was outlined
for boosting the resilience of electrical networks. In [22], a mathematical framework was
presented to assess the risk of extreme weather cases on the power systems, in which
the performances of system protection devices were evaluated under extreme events. Additionally, a risk-based defensive islanding algorithm was proposed in [23] for boosting
the power grid resilience to extreme weather events. However, all of these works only
consider extreme weather conditions. Although severe weather events can cause large
amounts of power interruptions, it is not common to consider these events under normal operation conditions and the major of electric customers’ interruptions happen under
normal weather conditions.
Recently, statistical analysis techniques were introduced in [27, 28] to analyze the
relationship between the number of power interruptions on electric distribution networks
and common weather parameters, such as temperature, wind, air pressure, and lightning.
The number of power interruptions was predicted based on the total sum of the statistical
model of each weather parameter. However, the power interruptions related with common
weather conditions are essentially the result of combined action of many factors. The
power interruption prediction only based on statistical models might be compromising
due to the various effects of different weather parameters.
This chapter presents a hybrid framework integrating Multilayer Perceptrons (MLPs)
and parametric regression models is for forecasting the daily numbers of power interruptions in smart grid distribution networks using time series of common weather data. The
main contributions of this chapter contain:
1. Both polynomial and exponential regression models are implemented to analyze
nonlinear relationship between power interruptions and common weather parameters;
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2. Derived regression models are integrated as inputs to formulate a MLP neural network to predict the number of power interruptions instead of directly summing
together;
3. A modified Extreme Learning Machine (ELM) based algorithm is proposed for
training the formulated MLP model using real-time monitored power interruptions
data from an electric utility in Florida and common weather data from National
Climatic Data Center (NCDC);
4. Sensitivity analysis is implemented to analyze the various impacts of different common weather parameters on the number of power interruptions.

3.2

Reliability and Weather Data Collection

In order to analyze the impacts of common weather conditions on the reliability performances of the smart grid distribution networks, a series of reliability metrics are collected
from an electric utility in the United States, serving approximately 10 million people
across nearly half of the state of Florida. The reliability metrics collected from the electric utility are comprised of the daily numbers of sustained interruption (N ), momentary
interruption (M ), System Average Interruption Duration Index (SAIDI), System Average
Interruption Frequency Index (SAIFI), Momentary Average Interruption Frequency Index
(MAIFI), and Customer Momentary Experience (CME). The numbers of N and M play
a key point in reliability analysis, and other reliability metrics can be calculated based
on these values [92]. Therefore, N and M in one utility management area are selected
for reliability analysis in this chapter, and a sample of the daily numbers of N and M is
shown in Figure 3.2.
Weather data is mostly collected from NCDC, which provides monthly, daily, and
even hourly normal weather data summaries. In addition, a source of weather data like
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Figure 3.2: Daily numbers of N and M collected from Jan. 1st 2015 to Apr. 30th 2017
in one utility management area.
lightning is provided by the control center of the electric utility, which installs its own
weather stations centrally located in various management areas. The selected weather
characteristics for analysis contain temperature, precipitation, air pressure, wind speed,
and lightning. All of these data are collected and preprocessed for each utility management area in order to analyze their relationship with the daily numbers of N and M .
The power interruption data can be classified into interruptions with exclusion data
and without exclusion data for an entire day. In order to analyze the combined effect
of common weather conditions on the system reliability performance, the daily numbers
of N and M are selected without exclusion data to avoid extreme events. On the other
hand, the weather data is collected hourly to model the data more precisely and improve
the location of the weather source. In the following section, the preprocessed power
interruptions and weather data will be used for formulating the parametric models to
evaluate the effect of each weather parameter on the daily numbers of N and M .
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3.3

Parametric Regression Models between Reliability and Weather

In this section, parametric regression analysis is introduced to analyze the nonlinear relationship between the number of sustained interruptions and each common weather parameter in one distribution management area. Similarly, the regression analysis can be
expanded for the number of momentary interruptions.
For each utility management area, assume that N is the vector of the daily sustained interruptions in one time period, and x is a common weather parameter vector
in corresponding time series, the relationship between the two can be represented as:
N = f (x, β) + ε, where f (·) is the relationship function; β is the vector of estimation
parameters; and ε are the unobserved random error satisfying ε ∼ N (0, δ 2 ), where δ
is the standard deviation. Two most popular regression models can be implemented for
this analysis including polynomial and exponential regression. For polynomial regression
with the n-th degree, the relationship function can be defined as:

f (x, β pol ) = β0pol + β1pol x + β2pol x2 + · · · + βnpol xn .

(3.1)

Correspondingly, for two-term exponential regression, the relationship function can
be determined by:
f (x, β ex ) = β0ex + β1ex exp(β2ex x) + β3ex exp(β4ex x).

(3.2)

Commonly, based on the known samples (N k , xk ), k = 1, ..., Ntotal , the least square
method [93] can be adopted to estimate β, and the estimation can be expressed by:
N
total
X
k=1

(N − f (x, β̂)) = min
β

N
total
X

(N k − f (xk , β)),

(3.3)

k=1

where β̂ is the estimation of β. The goodness-of-fit of polynomial regression with the
n-th degree, n = 1, 2, 3, and two-term exponential regression for each common weather
parameter including temperature, precipitation, air pressure, wind speed, and lightning
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Table 3.1: Goodness-of-Fit of Regression Models for Each Weather Parameter
Weather Parameter

Performance

Polynomial (1)

Polynomial (2)

Polynomial (3)

Exponential (2)

SSE
R-square
Adjusted R-square
RMSE

7.13E+04
0.09367
0.0926
9.171

6.68E+04
0.1517
0.1497
8.877

6.63E+04
0.1574
0.1544
8.853

7.42E+04
0.05683
0.05349
9.366

SSE
R-square
Adjusted R-square
RMSE

7.47E+04
0.05044
0.04932
9.387

7.39E+04
0.06093
0.05872
9.34

7.33E+04
0.06798
0.06467
9.311

7.38E+04
0.06238
0.05906
9.338

SSE
R-square
Adjusted R-square
RMSE

7.30E+04
0.07222
0.07113
9.278

7.06E+04
0.1031
0.101
9.128

7.05E+04
0.104
0.1008
9.129

7.06E+04
0.1028
0.09958
9.135

Heat Days

SSE
R-square
Adjusted R-square
RMSE

7.87E+04
0.0002128
-0.0009662
9.632

7.85E+04
0.002496
0.0001408
9.626

7.85E+04
0.002849
-0.0006875
9.63

7.83E+04
0.005259
0.001732
9.619

Cool Days

SSE
R-square
Adjusted R-square
RMSE

7.22E+04
0.08255
0.08147
9.227

7.08E+04
0.1006
0.09848
9.141

7.08E+04
0.1006
0.09848
9.141

7.08E+04
0.1006
0.09848
9.141

Precipitation

SSE
R-square
Adjusted R-square
RMSE

6.69E+04
0.08588
0.08462
9.596

6.61E+04
0.0963
0.09381
9.547

6.49E+04
0.1133
0.1096
9.464

6.43E+04
0.1212
0.1175
9.422

Air Pressure

SSE
R-square
Adjusted R-square
RMSE

7.71E+04
0.02001
0.01886
9.536

7.66E+04
0.02647
0.02417
9.51

7.57E+04
0.03759
0.03417
9.461

7.60E+04
0.03367
0.03024
9.48

SSE
R-square
Adjusted R-square
RMSE

7.62E+04
0.03019
0.02904
9.506

7.51E+04
0.04404
0.04177
9.444

7.49E+04
0.04623
0.04282
9.438

7.48E+04
0.04843
0.04504
9.427

SSE
R-square
Adjusted R-square
RMSE

7.71E+04
0.01996
0.0188
9.551

7.66E+04
0.02649
0.02418
9.525

7.61E+04
0.03265
0.02921
9.501

7.44E+04
0.05445
0.05108
9.393

SSE
R-square
Adjusted R-square
RMSE

7.77E+04
0.01321
0.01205
9.569

7.76E+04
0.01411
0.01178
9.57

7.72E+04
0.01847
0.01499
9.555

7.74E+04
0.01641
0.01293
9.565

SSE
R-square
Adjusted R-square
RMSE

6.60E+04
0.1609
0.16
8.824

6.31E+04
0.1987
0.1968
8.628

6.26E+04
0.2041
0.2013
8.604

6.35E+04
0.1937
0.1908
8.66

Maximum
Temperature

Minimum
Temperature

Average
Temperature

Average
Wind Speed

Peak
Wind Speed

Sustainable
Wind Speed

Lightning

Remarks:

SSE measures the total deviation of the predicted values from the fit to the observed values.
R-square is the square of the correlation between the response values and predicted response.
Adjusted R-square is a modified R-squared that has been adjusted for the number of predictors.
RMSE is the estimate of the standard deviation of the random component in the data.
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is shown in Table 3.1, where each regression model performance is evaluated through
the error metrics including Sum of Squares Due to Error (SSE), R-square, Degrees of
Freedom Adjusted R-Square, and Root Mean Squared Error (RMSE) defined:
• SSE =

PN total
k=1

wk (xk − f k )2 measures the total deviation of the original values

from the regression fit, where f k is the predicted value derived by the regression
model, and wk is the weighting applied to each data point. SSE closer to 0 indicates that the regression model has a smaller fitting error, which is more useful for
prediction.
• R-square = 1 −

PN total
wk (xk −fk )2 ]
[ k=1
PN total
[ k=1 wk (xk −xav )2 ]

denotes the square of the correlation between

the original and predicted values, where xav is the mean of the original data. Rsquare has the unit interval [0, 1], where a value closer to 1 represents that a greater
proportion of variance is accounted by the regression model.
• Adjusted R-square = 1 −

[

PN total

2
k=1 w k (xk −f k ) ](N total −1)
PN total
[ k=1 wk (xk −xav )2 ](v)

is a modified type of R-

square, where the residual degrees of freedom v is determined by N total minus the
number of fitted coefficients. The adjusted R-square statistic can take on any value
less than or equal to 1, where a value closer to 1 implies a better regression fitting.
p
• RMSE = SSE/v is correlated with the fit standard error and the standard error of
the regression model, which is an estimate of the standard deviation of the random
component in the data. Similar with SSE, a RMSE value closer to 0 indicates that
the regression model is more useful for prediction.
In the subsequent subsections, the regression models between N and various weather
parameters are detailed described.
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3.3.1

Temperature

Temperature is an important weather parameter impacting on the reliability performance
of smart grid distribution networks. An increase of the power interruptions can be caused
at relatively low or high temperatures, since the electricity demand will increase due to
the heating/cooling requirements of customers. Moreover, high air temperatures may
strain power infrastructure devices and reduce transmission capacity [94]. In order to
achieve the relationship between temperature and N , a series of temperature characteristics including dry-bulb maximum temperature Tmax , average temperature Tave , minimum
temperature Tmin , heat days H, and cool days C are selected.
For one utility management area, Figure 3.3(a) shows the variations of Tmax , Tave ,
and Tmin , and Figure 3.3(b) displays the variations of H and C. Polynomial regression
with the n-th degree, n = 1, 2, 3, and two-term exponential regression are implemented
for analyzing the relationship between each temperature characteristic and N . Based
on the goodness-of-fit results in Table 3.1, for Tmax , Tave , and Tmin , polynomial regression with 3-th degree has a better performance with less SSE and RMSE, and greater
R-square. Exponential regression with 2 terms has a better performance for H, while,
for C, polynomial regression with 2-rd and 3-th degree and exponential regression with
2 terms have similar performances in modeling fitting. Figure 3.4(a) and (b) present the
polynomial and exponential regression models adapted for analyzing Tmax and C, respectively. The relationship function between NTmax and Tmax can be expressed as: NTmax =
β0Tmax + β1Tmax Tmax + β2Tmax Tmax 2 + β3Tmax Tmax 3 . Correspondingly, the relationship function
between NC and C can be determined by: NC = β0C + β1C exp(β2C C) + β3C exp(β4C C).
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Figure 3.3: The collected temperature data including maximum temperature, average
temperature, minimum temperature, heat days, and cool days.
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Figure 3.4: The polynomial and exponential regression for analyzing: (a) the number
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days C.
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3.3.2

Wind Speed

Wind also plays a key role in the reliability analysis of smart grid distribution networks.
The power of wind is directly proportional to the cube of the wind speed. If the wind
reaches high speeds, it can cause damages to distribution networks such as entire trees
blowing over into power lines, which results in broken conductors, broken crossarms,
broken insulators, broken poles, and leaning poles [95]. There are three factors which
attribute to the severity of wind speeds: peak wind speed Wp , average wind speed Wa ,
and sustained wind speed Ws .
Figure 3.5(a) plots the variation of Wp , Wa , and Ws for one utility management
area, and Figure 3.5(b) shows the polynomial and exponential regression models fitted
for analyzing the number of NWp corresponding to Wpea . Based on the goodness-of-fit
results in Table 3.1, exponential regression with 2 terms has a better performance for
Wp and Wa , while Ws has a better performance in polynomial regression with 3-th degree. The relationship function modeling of the effect of Wp on NWp can be defined as:
W

W

W

W

W

NWp = β0 p + β1 p exp(β2 p Wp ) + β3 p exp(β4 p Wp ).

3.3.3

Precipitation

Precipitation is any product of the condensation of atmospheric water vapor that falls
under gravity, and two main forms of precipitation contain rain Prain and snow Psnow .
When raining density is large, formerly underground cables, vaults, and manholes may
be exposed. Additionally, many power infrastructure equipments may not be sufficient to
cater for heavy rain conditions, especially at ultra-high voltage [96]. On the other hand,
snow occurs when supercooled rain freezes on contact with tree branches and overhead
conductors. Ice buildup on conductors places a heavy physical load on the conductors,
which increases the cross-sectional area exposed to the wind [97]. Since little snow falls
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Figure 3.5: (a) Peak wind speed Wp , average wind speed Wa , and sustained wind speed
Ws . (b) The polynomial and exponential regression for analyzing the number of NWp
respond to peak wind speed Wp .

39

50

in Florida, the correlation of raining Prain to NPra is evaluated in this chapter through polynomial and exponential regression models. As shown in Table 3.1, exponential regression
with 2 terms has a better performance with less SSE and RMSE, and greater R-square
for Prain . For this purpose, the following equation is developed for modeling the effect
of Prain on NPra : NPra = β0ra + β1ra exp(β2ra Prain ) + β3ra exp(β4ra Prain ). Figure 3.6(a) plots
the variation of raining precipitation Prain for one utility management area, and Figure
3.6(b) shows the polynomial and exponential regression fittings adapted for analyzing the
relationship between Prain and NPra .

3.3.4

Air Pressure

Air pressure is the pressure within the atmosphere of Earth, which is highly connected
with other weather parameters, such as raining, heat storm, and wind speed. The variation of air pressure A for one utility management area is plotted in Figure 3.7(a). The
relationship between air pressure A and NA is analyzed by both polynomial and exponential regression models as shown in Figure 3.7(b). Polynomial regression with 3-th degree
has a better performance for A with less SSE and RMSE, and greater R-square according
to Table 3.1. Therefore, the relationship function between NA and A can be expressed as:
NA = β0A + β1A A + β2A A2 + β3A A3 .

3.3.5

Lightning

Highly-scaled electrical discharges between the cloud and a piece of earth are called lightning strikes L. This natural phenomenon may strike the phase conductors, the tower or
shield wires causing backflash, and a piece of nearby ground generating transient overvoltage. The energy of the lightning flash may exceed the thermal limit of the struck object
causing thermal failure [98]. In addition, the combined effects of strong winds and rain
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Figure 3.6: (a) Raining precipitation Prain . (b) The polynomial and exponential regression for analyzing the number of NPra respond to raining precipitation Prain .
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Figure 3.7: (a) Air pressure A. (b) The polynomial and exponential regression for analyzing the number of NA respond to air pressure A.
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30.4

are generally accompanied with L, Thus, L can have a random, though important, effect
on the numbers of NL in distribution networks. Based on the goodness-of-fit performance
results in Table 3.1, for lightning L, polynomial regression with 3-th degree has a better
performance with less SSE and RMSE, and greater R-square. Therefore, the relationship
function between NL and L can be determined by: NL = β0L + β1L L + β2L L2 + β3L L3 .
Figure 3.8(a) plots the numbers of L in one utility management area, and both polynomial
and exponential regression models are adopted for analysis of the effect of L on NL as
shown in Figure 3.8(b).

3.4

Power Interruption Forecasting Framework

In this section, taking the polynomial and exponential regression models derived for common weather parameters as inputs, a MLP based forecasting framework is developed for
forecasting the daily numbers of N and M in smart grid distribution networks. Additionally, a modified ELM based algorithm is proposed to train, validate, and test the proposed
framework.

3.4.1

MLP based Forecasting Framework

A typical MLP network structure is composed of input, hidden, and output layers. The
input layer neurons receive sample data for analysis and the output layer neurons give
the network results out. A MLP network structure is made up by usually one, but occasionally more than one hidden layers between input and output layers. The hidden
layer neurons learn the nonlinear relationship between the inputs and outputs. The mathematical expression of the outputs of the MLPs can be defined as follows: Y = F (b +
Pm
Pn
j=1 vj [
i=1 G(wij xi + bj )]), where xi , i = 1, .., n, is the input value; Y is the output
value; wij is the weight of connection between the ith input neuron and jth hidden neu-
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Figure 3.8: (a) Lightning L. (b) The polynomial and exponential regression for analyzing the number of NL respond to lightning L.
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Figure 3.9: Network structure of the proposed MLP based forecasting framework.
ron; vj is the weight of connection between the jth hidden neuron and output neuron; b
and bj are the bias values of the corresponding output neuron and jth hidden neuron; and
F (·) and G(·) are the activation functions of output and hidden neurons, respectively.
However, large MLPs usually generalize poorly due to the time needed for variable
preprocessing and the possibility of model overfitting [99]. In this chapter, a hybrid model
integrating MLPs and parametric regression models is proposed to analyze the combined
effect of common weather parameters on the numbers of N and M . In the proposed
framework, the input layer of MLP contains both the common weather parameters, such
as Tmax , Tave , Tmin , H, C, Wpea , Wave , Wsus , Prain , A, and L, and corresponding daily
numbers of N and M derived by their regression models. The output layer is for the
forecasted daily numbers of N and M . To restrict the net capacity, one hidden layer is
included in the MLP. The network structure of the MLP based forecasting framework is
shown in Figure 3.9.
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3.4.2

Extreme Learning Machine Algorithm

ELM is an emerging and efficient algorithm for MLP learning [100], where the model
training is transformed into a matrix calculation problem. Assume F (·) to be a constant
function, the MLP model then can be represented in the matrix form:
Y =

m
X
j=1

vj [

n
X

G(wij xi + bj )] = Hv,

(3.4)

i=1

where H ∈ Rn×m is the hidden layer output matrix, and v = [v1 , ..., vm ]T represents the
output weight vector. Since wij , i = 1, ..., n, and bj are determined randomly for each
hidden layer neuron j = 1, .., m, the objective of ELM algorithm is to calculate v in order
to formulate the MLP model. Given a training set {X, Y }, where X = {x1 , ..., xn },
v can be derived by v = H † Y , where H † can be be calculated through orthogonal
projection: H † = (H T H)−1 H T .
However, ELM algorithm may have a high training error when inappropriate wij and
bj are selected. In order to boost the training performance of algorithm, a self-adjusting
parameter λ = kY kδ , δ ∈ [1, 2], is introduced into the diagonal elements of H T H:
H † = (H T H + λ)−1 H T . Therefore, the MLP learning problem is converted into a least
square problem defined as:
min kvkδ1 + λkHv − Y kδ2
v

(3.5)

where δ1 , δ2 > 0. The modified ELM algorithm intends to minimize both the training
error and the norm of output weights, where λ is a parameter to balance the two. The
procedures of the modified ELM algorithm can be summarized as Table 3.2. The convergence of the proposed ELM learning algorithm can be proved based on the expansion of
Theorem 3.1 in [101]:
Theorem 3.4.1 Assume the level set: L(v 0 ) = {v ∈ Rm : f (v) ≤ f (v 0 )} be bounded
and F (v) = Hv − Y is semismooth over L(v 0 ). Let v k be generated by the modified
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Table 3.2: Formulated MLP based Forecasting Framework
Parametric Regression Analysis and Modified ELM Algorithm
Phase 1 - Data Collection & Parametric Regression Analysis:
a) Collect the daily numbers of N and M in one utility MA;
b) Collect the common weather parameters including Tmax , Tave ,
Tmin , H, C, Wpea , Wave , Wsus , Prain , A, and L for the MA;
for each common weather parameter do
1: Implement f (x, β pol ) = β0pol + β1pol x + β2pol x2 + · · · + βnpol xn ,
n = 1, 2, 3, for polynomial regression analysis;
2: Implement f (x, β ex ) = β0ex + β1ex exp(β2ex x) + β3ex exp(β4ex x),
for two-term exponential regression analysis;
3: Analyze the goodness-of-fit of each derived regression model;
4: Derive the number of N and M by the optimal regression model.
end for
Phase 2 - ELM based Learning Algorithm:
a) For each hidden neuron j = 1, .., m, randomly determine its
input layer weights wij , i = 1, ..., n, and the bias value bj ;
b) Calculate the hidden layer output matrix H using both common
weather parameter data and corresponding the number of N and
M derived by Phase 1;
c) Define the self-adjusting parameter λ = kY kδ , δ ∈ [1, 2];
d) Obtain the output weight vector v by solving the problem:
v = H † Y , where H † = (H T H + λ)−1 H T .
Or equivalently, minv kvkδ1 + λkHv − Y kδ2 .
ELM algorithm, then the algorithm terminates in finite iterations or satisfies:
limk→∞ kF (v k )k = 0.

3.5

Evaluation of Proposed Forecasting Framework

The implementation of the proposed forecasting framework contains four main parts including: 1) data collection & preprocessing; 2) parametric regression analysis; 3) MLP
based model formulation and training; and 4) sensitivity analysis, in which , in which the
flowchart is detailed explained in Figure 3.10.
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Figure 3.10: The flowchart of the formulated MLP based forecasting model for power
distribution networks.
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1) Data Collection & Preprocessing: The sustained and momentary power interruption data is collected from one utility management area ranging from Jan. 1st 2015 to
Apr. 30th 2017. The interval data is recorded daily, annotated with timestamp. Additionally, one climate station, which is nearest to the central point of this management area,
is selected for collecting hourly common weather data including Tmax , Tave , Tmin , H, C,
Wpea , Wave , Wsus , Prain , and A. The weather data is noted hourly ranging from Jan. 1st
2015 to Apr. 30th 2017. Correspondingly, the hourly lightning strike L data is collected
from the control center of the electric utility located inside this management area.
2) Parametric Regression Analysis: Both polynomial regression with the n-th degree,
n = 1, 2, 3, and two-term exponential regression are implemented for the analysis of the
numbers of N and M in the management area response to various weather parameters.
Based on the goodness-of-fit results in Table 3.1, for Tmax , Tave , Tmin , Ws , A, and L, polynomial regression with 3-th degree has a better performance with less SSE and RMSE,
and greater R-square. Exponential regression with 2 terms has a better performance for
H, Wp , Wa , and Pra , while, for C, polynomial regression with 2-rd and 3-th degrees and
two term exponential regression have similar performances in fitting. Based on these
regression models, the daily numbers of N and M can be derived by model fitting.
3) MLP based Forecasting Framework: The input layer of the formulated MLP network contains all common weather parameters and corresponding daily numbers of N
and M derived by their regression models. The hidden layer is set to be one, and the output layer is for the target numbers of N and M . The proposed modified ELM algorithm
is used for training, validating, and testing the formulated MLP network, in which 70%
of the collected dataset is for the network training, 15% of the dataset is for the network
validation, and the remaining 15% of the dataset is for the network testing.
Figure 3.11(a) presents the actual numbers of N and the predicted numbers of N
derived by statistical models and the proposed MLP based framework, respectively. In
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Figure 3.12: Training error of the modified ELM algorithm for forecasting the daily
number of N and M .
this figure, we can find that, compared with statistical models, the proposed MLP based
framework derives better predicted numbers of N . In particularly, the proposed MLP
based framework yields a Mean-Squared Error (MSE) reduction of 8.77% relative to statistical models. Correspondingly, Figure 3.11 (b) compares the predicted numbers of M
derived by statistical models and the proposed MLP based framework with the actual
numbers of M , respectively. We can also see that the proposed MLP based framework
achieves better predicted numbers of M response to statistical models, in which 61.37%
MSE reduction yielded by the proposed MLP based framework. Furthermore, the training
performance and convergence of the modified ELM algorithm for the MLP based framework are shown in Figure 3.12, in which the y-axis describes the variation of MSE for
each epoch.
4) Sensitivity Analysis: The sensitivity of the output to various input perturbations is
an important issue in the design and implementation of the MLP based forecasting framework. Therefore, the sensitivity analysis is implemented to analyze the impact of each
weather parameter on the daily numbers of N and M , respectively. The sensitivity is cal-
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Figure 3.13: Sensitivity analysis of N and M with each weather parameter.
culated by the first-order derivative of system network function with respect to the system
parameters, which denotes the degree of influence of parameter variations on the network
function. Figure 3.13 presents the sensitivity of each weather parameter response to the
daily numbers of N and M , respectively. In this figure, we can find that lightning strike
L is the most important weather parameter that has an influence on the daily numbers
of N and M , while heat day H has the least impact on the numbers of N and M . This
phenomenon can be explained that the most number of N and M was happened ranging
from June to September during one year, where is the raining season for the Florida and
lightning strike happen most frequently. Since the temperature of Florida is almost kept
above 65o F , heating days has little happened during one year.

3.6

Summary

This chapter presents a MLP based framework to forecast the daily numbers of sustained
and momentary interruptions in smart grid distribution networks using time series of common weather data. A modified ELM based learning algorithm is proposed to train, vali-
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date, and test the proposed framework, whose convergence is proved. Essentially, compared with traditional statistical models, the proposed framework can reduce MSE by
8.77% and 61.37% for sustained and momentary interruption forecasting, respectively. In
addition, we can derive the sensitivity of each common weather parameter with respective
to the daily numbers of power interruptions. For the utility management area in Florida,
we can find that the lightning strike is the most important common weather parameter
impacting on the reliability performance of the smart grid distribution networks, while
the heat degree days have the least impacts. In the future, the other factors like power
system equipment failure rates and aging of distribution network components can also be
integrated as inputs for the proposed framework.
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CHAPTER 4
Application of Game Theory for Smart Grid Security
In this chapter, a systematic survey of existing game-theoretic approaches for mitigating security threats is proposed for three main smart grid zones: the power system network
infrastructure, advanced metering infrastructure (AMI), and state estimation. Section 4.1
makes an overview of the cyber-phsyical security challenges faced by the three main smart
grid zones. Section 4.2 evaluates the current game theoretic models for the cyber-physical
security in the power system network infrastructure. Section 4.3 compares the game theoretic models for the cyber-physical security of the communication networks and smart
meters in AMI. Section 4.4 introduces the game theoretic models for the cyber-physical
security in the power system state estimation. To conclude this chapter, Section 4.5 will
discuss future work and recent progresses.

4.1

Overview

The smart grid is the next generation electrical infrastructure integrated with information
and communication technologies (ICTs), which are large scale, dynamic cyber-physical
systems (CPSs). The ICTs facilitate the grid with effective operation, monitoring and
control, enable predictive maintenance and self-healing responses to system disturbances,
automate maintenance and operation, and promote expanded deployment of renewable
energy sources. However, the large-scale, interconnected nature of smart grid renders the
system susceptible to a range of cyber and physical attacks due to a dramatic increase in
its attack surface.
Given the presence of risks that could potentially cripple the smart grid as it undergoes
an increased shift towards the Internet of Things (IoT) paradigm, identifying and analyzing potential threats that effectively translate risks into successful attacks is essential to
achieve a more robust and resilient grid. However, due to the complex and interdepen-
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dent nature of the different smart grid technologies, various challenges accompany these
diagnostic and corrective efforts, such as the dynamic nature of the grid, the impact on
the control system, and the synergies between cyber and physical functions. More importantly, and somewhat remarkably, existing CPS security mechanisms are primarily based
on mathematical and engineering principles that ignore the human decision making processes of cybercriminals and system administrators. Indeed, cybercriminals are active
agents who engage in an intelligent, dynamic decision-making process when selecting a
target and executing an attack. Likewise, the defenders, system operators, and engineers
also rely on human intelligence in conjunction with available mathematical and software
tools. Beyond these limitations, most of the state-of-the-art works often assume that attackers or defenders act individually, which, in a large-scale CPS, can be a restrictive
assumption. In this respect, game theory is expected to constitute a key analytical tool
for analyzing the strategic interactions between the potential attackers and the smart grid
operators. Game theory is a formal analytical tool as well as a conceptual framework
with a set of mathematical tools, which enable the study of complex interactions among
independent rational players. In recent decades, game theory has been adopted in a wide
number of fields, including economics, politics, and psychology. More recently, game
theory has also become a central tool in the design and analysis of CPSs such as the smart
grid.
In order to design a resilient and secure smart grid, it will have to build on the solid
mathematical tools, in which game theory provides a mathematical framework for analyzing and implementing security solutions. Currently, there is little research in the literature
that comprehensively reviews and evaluates the application of the game-theoretic models to cyber-physical security issues within the smart grid. The main contribution of this
chapter is to propose a systematic survey of existing game-theoretic approaches for mitigating security threats in three main smart grid zones including the power system network
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infrastructure, AMI, and state estimation. Overall, the goal of this paper is threefold:
• identify and explore the cyber-physical security threats targeted at the three smart
grid zones;
• compare the game-theoretic frameworks and solution approaches that can help with
analysis of the security of the smart grid as well as devising proper defense strategies;
• discuss the future opportunities and extension of current game theoretic applications in the cyber-physical security of the smart grid.

4.2

Game Theory for Cyber-Physical Security in Smart Grid Zone 1

The emergence of the smart grid, which integrate new communication and information
technologies within the power system network infrastructures such as the power generation, transmission, and distribution systems, has opened new cyber security concerns and
new points of entry for attackers. Moreover, the growth of the smart grid in both scale
and complexity makes it financially and logistically impossible to protect the entire infrastructure. In this section, an overview of the cyber-physical security issues targeted at
the power system network infrastructure will be provided. Additionally, the Markov game
model for distributed denial of services (DDoS) in automatic generation control (AGC),
the three-stage Sequence game for the distribution networks integated with DERs, and
the stochastic game for the coordinated cyber-phsyical attack targeted at the transmission
system will be provided.
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4.2.1

Markov Game for DDoS in Automatic Generation Control

1) Automatic Generation Control Model: AGC is load-frequency control with the additional objective of economic dispatch (distributing the required change in generation
among units to minimize costs), which is an indispensable part of the “central nervous
system” of a power grid called the energy management system (EMS), and possibly the
only automatic closed loop between the IT and power system of a control area; because
of this, it is subject to attacks propagated through the IT system.
When system frequency deviates from the nominal frequency by a certain threshold,
overfrequency and underfrequency protection relays execute tripping logic defined by a
protection plan that varies from operator to operator. Underfrequency relays perform
underfrequency load shedding (UFLS), which is the sole concFor our studyern of our
study because it results in directly measurable revenue loss. , we adopt Mullen’s UFLS
scheme. The gist of the scheme is, when the system frequency drops by more than 0.35
Hz below the nominal frequency, to shed this much load: 4Pm − 4Pe − 0.3/R, where
4Pm is the change in generator’s mechanical power, 4Pe is the change in generator’s
electrical power, and R is the droop characteristic.
The automatic generation controller is an integral controller of gain KAGC . AGC
design is an established discipline with designs dating back to the 1950s; a simple integral
controller seems to be a logical starting point. The UFLS relay in each area decides on
the necessity to shed load, and the amount of load to shed if necessary, using Mullen’s
algorithm. Once the system frequency has stabilized for at least 30 s, the UFLS relays
reconnect the shed loads in the reverse order they were shed. In this sample configuration,
the maximum sheddable loads are capped at 4 p.u. and 1 p.u. for the areas 1 and 2
respectively. “p.u.” stands for “per unit” and is simply the ratio of an absolute value in
some unit to a base/reference value in the same unit. The base load for both areas is taken
to be 1000 MW.
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It is impossible to exhaust all injection patterns, but there is one basic attack pattern:
constant injection. If an attacker injects a constant false ∆f , then it effectively disables
the integral control loop, causing the system frequency to converge to a non-nominal frequency. If the false is positive, then the system will settle on a below-nominal frequency,
causing loads to be shed; otherwise, the system will settle on an above-nominal frequency,
causing generators to be tripped. Both cases lead to cascading failures. Correspondingly,
one basic defense mechanism is saturation filter. We can constrain the attack by limiting
the ∆f input to the integral controller to [−4.5, 3.5] Hz, because at ∆f = −4.5 Hz, not
only should all sheddable loads have been shed, but also all generators would be tripped.
At ∆f = 3.5 Hz, all generators would be tripped.
2) Game Formulation and Results: The security game between the attacker and the
defender is formulated as a stochastic game with a finite state space, and two players
that choose their actions from their respective finite action space; or more formally, as a
6-tuple hS, AA , AD , M, U A , U D i, where:
• S := {s1 , s2 , ..., sNS } is the system’s state space, which is associated with the
tuple (∆f1 , ∆f1 ) consisting of area 1’s frequency deviation and area 2’s frequency
deviation;
• AA := {a1 , a2 , ..., aNA } and AD := {d1 , d2 , ..., dND } represent the attacker and
defender’s action space, respectively;
• M (a, d) = [Msi ,sj (a, d)]NS ×NS which represents the system’s state transition matrix corresponding to attack action a ∈ A and defense action d ∈ D;
• U A (s) := [RA (a, d, s)]NA ×ND which represents the attacker’s expected reward
function corresponding to attack action a ∈ A against defense action d ∈ D in
state s ∈ S;
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• U D (s) := [RD (a, d, s)]NA ×ND which represents the defender’s expected reward
function corresponding to defense action d ∈ D against attack action a ∈ A in state
s ∈ S.
For each state s ∈ S, the attacker (defender) incurs a net gain (net loss), and the
attacker’s net gain is assumed to be close to the defender’s net loss, and hence the security
games to be zero-sum. The defender’s loss is defined including the cost of load shed
and the costs of false positives. The cost of the expected total load shed in state s under
attack action a and defense action d is defined as E{Pshed (a, d, s)}. And the expected
cost of false positives is cf p pf p , where cf p is the cost of a false positive in the same unit
as load shed, and pf p is the probability of getting a false positive. Dynamic programming
is implemented to obtain the stationary optimal strategy (solving a zero-sum matrix game
at each stage).

4.2.2

Three-Stage Sequence Game for Distribution Networks with
DERs

1) Electricity Distribution Networks: Consider a tree network of radial electric distribution systems G = (N ∪{0}, E), where N denotes the set of all nodes except the substation
(labeled as node 0), and let N := |N |. Let Vi ∈ C denote the complex voltage at node
i, and vi := |Vi |2 denote the square of voltage magnitude. We assume that the magnitude
of substation voltage |V0 | is constant. Let Ij ∈ C denote the current flowing from node
i to node j on line (i, j) ∈ E, and `j := |Ij |2 the square of the magnitude of the current.
A distribution line (i, j) ∈ E has a complex impedance zj = rj + jxj , where rj > 0 and
√
xj > 0 denote the resistance and inductance of the line (i, j), respectively, and j = −1.
The voltage regulation requirements of the DN under nominal on attack conditions
govern that: v i ≤ vi ≤ v i , ∀i ∈ N , where v i = |V i |2 and v i = |V i |2 are the soft lower and
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upper bounds for maintaining voltage quality at node i. Additionally, voltage magnitudes
under all conditions satisfy: µi ≤ vi ≤ µi , ∀i ∈ N , where µ and µ are the hard voltage
safety bounds for any nodal voltage, and 0 < µ < mini∈N v i ≤ maxi∈N v i < µ.
We consider constant power loads. Let sci := pci + jqci denote the power consumed
by a load at node i, where pci and qci are the real and reactive components. And let
sg i := pg i + jqg i denote the power generated by the DER connected to node i, where
pg i and qg i are the real and reactive components, respectively. The 3-phase balanced
nonlinear power flow (NPF) on line (i, j) ∈ E is given by:
Sj =

X

Sk + scj − sg j + zj lj ,

k:(j,k)∈E

(4.1)

vj = vi − 2Re(z j Sj ) + |zj |2 lj ,
where lj = |Sj |2 /vi , and Sj = Pj + jQj denoting the complex power flowing from node
i to node j on line (i, j) ∈ E.
2) Game Formulation and Results: A 3-stage sequential game between a defender
(network operator) and an attacker (external threat agent) is formulated:
• Stage 1 [Security Investment]: The defender chooses a security strategy u ∈ UB
to secure a subset of DERs, where the set of defender actions is: AD := {d ∈
{0, 1}N | kdk0 ≤ B}, where B ≤ |N | denotes a security budget.
• Stage 2 [Attack]: The attacker chooses from the set of DERs that were not secured by the defender in Stage 1, and manipulates their set-points. Let ΨM (d) :=
S(d) × DM (d) denotes the set of attacker actions for a defender’s choice d, where
Q
Q
S(d) := i∈Nv (d) Si × j∈Ns (d) {0 + 0j}, DM (d) := {δ ∈ {0, 1}N }, and M ≤ |Nv |
denoting the maximum number of DERs that the attacker can compromise. The
attacker simultaneously compromises a subset of vulnerable DER nodes by introducing incorrect set-points, and increase the loss L.
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• Stage 3 [Defender Response]: The defender responds by choosing the set-points
of the uncompromised DERs and, if possible, impose load control at one or more
nodes according to a strategy φ := [spd , γ] ∈ Φ(u, ψ). Let γ i ≥ 0 denote the
maximum permissible fraction of load control at node i, and define the set of Stage 3
Q
defender actions: Φ(d, ψ) := S ×Γ, where Γ := i∈N [γ i , 1]. The defender chooses
new set-points spd of non-compromised DERs, and load control parameters i to
reduce the loss L.
The [DAD] game is a sequential game of perfect information, i.e. each player is
perfectly informed about the actions that have been chosen by the previous players. The
equilibrium concept is the classical Stackelberg equilibrium. In this game, uB and Φ(µ, ψ)
denote the set of defender actions in Stage 1 and 3, respectively; and ΨM (µ) denotes the
set of attacker strategies in Stage 2.

4.2.3

Stochastic Game for Coordinated Cyber-Physical Attacks

1) Smart Grid Transmission Networks: Consider a power grid system with NV buses and
NE branches. This system can be modeled using an undirected graph G := (V, E) with
NV vertices and NE edges. The set of vertices V = {v1 , v2 , ..., vNV } represents NV nodes
in the graph that can include generation plants, transformers, substation devices, and customers. The set E = {e1 , e2 , ..., eNE } of edges encompasses NE edges that correspond to
transmission lines. Thus, the total number of elements (vertices and edges) of the system
that must be protected against cyber-physical attacks is NG = NV + NE .
Consider an attacker that seeks to disrupt the system by distributing its finite attack
resources over one or more elements of the graph to maximize the physical impact on
the system. The resources owned by the attacker can include a) personnel or hackers that
are assigned to the attack, b) technological resources such as advanced tools or malwares
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to disrupt the power grid, and c) economic resources among others. Due to the resource
limitation, we define CA as the maximum number of attacks that can be carried out at
a time, each of which corresponds to a specific attack. For example, the attacker may
launch a DoS attack over poorly protected wireless channels to block the communication
between power grid sensors and remote estimators. Alternatively, the attacker may plan to
launch a physical attack on a high voltage (HV) transformer. Thus, the action space A of
the attacker contains all possible methods of allocating CA attacks over the NG elements
of the graph.
In order to maximize the system resiliency against such attacks, the defender needs
to allocate its limited defense resources over the NG elements of the graph to reinforce
operational elements or to repair disabled elements. Similarly, the defense resources can
include a) personnel such as users, administrators, and support personnel, b) technological
resources such as advanced tools or softwares to reinforce operational elements or to repair broken elements of the power grid, and c) economic resources such as investments in
new infrastructures or nodes, among others. Let CD be the maximum number of defense
mechanisms that can be implemented at a time, each of which is dependent on the type of
the attack and the element disrupted. For instance, for false data injection attacks on the
automatic generation control system, the defense mechanism can be to implement saturation filters. Alternatively, the defender needs to build some barriers and fortification for
preventing physical attacks on critical infrastructures. Briefly, the defender should make
sensible decisions about how to allocate finite resources over elements of the graph. Let
D be the action space of the defender, then, it conditions all possible methods to distribute
CD defense mechanisms over the NG elements of the graph.
In the literature, the physical impact of an attack on the system is measured by the
cost of shed load following the failure of elements. In order to analyze the physical
impacts of various attacks, attacks on the system can be classified into two categories:
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isolated and coordinated. The former can only destroy one element of the graph at a time,
while the latter can target two or more elements. A coordinated attack that can collapse
a combination of elements will naturally have a more detrimental impact, as opposed to
a single, isolated attack. For the system impacted by coordinated attacks, load shedding
must be performed in order to regain stability.
2) Game Formulation and Results: We now mathematically analyze and identify the
interactions between the attacker and the defender using the advanced tools of stochastic,
noncooperative game theory. In particular, we formulate a two-player stochastic game
in normal form, Ξ = hS, A, D, RA , RD i, in which the players are the attacker and the
defender. This game is played over a finite state space and each player has a finite number
of actions to choose from. The main components of the game include:
• S := {s1 , s2 , ..., sNS } represents the transmission network’s state space;
• A := {a1 , a2 , ..., aNA } and D := {d1 , d2 , ..., dND } represent the attacker and defender’s action space, respectively;
• RA (s) := [RA (a, d, s)]NA ×ND (S × A × D → R) which represents the attacker’s
expected reward function corresponding to attack action a ∈ A against defense
action d ∈ D in state s ∈ S;
• RD (s) := [RD (a, d, s)]NA ×ND (S ×A×D → R) as the defender’s expected reward
function corresponding to defense action d ∈ D against attack action a ∈ A in state
s ∈ S.
For the power grid composed of NG elements to be protected, the actions of both
the attacker and the defender are constrained by a finite amount of resources. Thus,
the attacker and the defender can only implement CA attacks and CD defense mechanisms, respectively, at a given time. We define each attack action vector ai ∈ A,
i = 1, ..., NA , as a method of allocating an attacker’s finite resources over NG elements:

63

A
A
T
ai = [cA
i,1 , ci,2 , ..., ci,NG ] , where

PNG

A
j=1 ci,j

= C A . 0 ≤ cA
i,j ≤ CA , j = 1, 2..., NG ,

represents the number of attacks related to action ai that target element j of the grid.
Similarly, each defense action vector di ∈ D, i = 1, ..., ND , conditions one method
D
D
T
to distribute its limited defense resources over NG elements: di = [cD
i,1 , ci,2 , ..., ci,NG ] ,
P G D
D
where N
j=1 ci,j = CD . 0 ≤ ci,j ≤ CD , j = 1, 2..., NG , denotes the number of defense

mechanisms in action di that the defender plans to commit to element j of the grid.
In this game, the defender’s expected reward is just the negative of the attacker’s expected reward, denoted by RD (a, d, s) = −RA (a, d, s). The proposed stochastic game Ξ
is therefore a zero-sum stochastic game. Given a state s ∈ S, the attacker and the defender
independently choose actions a ∈ A and d ∈ D, and receive immediate expected rewards
RA (a, d, s) and RD (a, d, s). The state then transits to the next state s0 based on the fixed
transition probability Ts,s0 (a, d). New expected rewards RA (a, d, s0 ) and RD (a, d, s0 ) will
be obtained in the new state. We have specified the immediate rewards of the attacker
and the defender at each stage game, but not how these rewards are aggregated into an
overall payoff. To solve this problem, the most commonly used aggregation method is the
discounted-sum reward. For an attack action a and a defense action d, the discounted-sum
reward of the attacker is the discounted sum of expected rewards at each time step t, with
a discount factor γ ∈ [0, 1):

Q :=

∞
X

γ t RA (a, d, s(t)),

(4.2)

t=0
t

where γ represents the weight of the immediate reward at the time step t, given by
RA (a, d, s(t)), which denotes the relative importance of the immediate reward in the
overall payoff. Small values of γ emphasize near-term gains while large values emphasize
future rewards. Correspondingly, the defender’s discounted-sum reward is the negative of
the number.
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In this game, the attacker aims to maximize the discounted sum of expected rewards
Q, while facing the defender who intends to minimize it. In order to solve for the two
players’ optimal strategies of a stochastic game in normal form such as Ξ, one popular solution is that of a closed-loop Nash equilibrium. A Nash equilibrium is a state of the game
such that no player can increase its reward by unilaterally deviating from this equilibrium
state. Formally, the Nash equilibrium of the proposed stochastic game Ξ is defined as
follows:
Definition 4.2.1 Consider the proposed stochastic game Ξ = hS, A, D, RA , RD i, where
expected rewards RA and RD are derived by solving the optimal load shedding problem (1), a Nash equilibrium solution of the proposed game is a two-tuple of mixed strategies {π ∗A , π ∗D }, where π ∗A = {π ∗A (s)|s ∈ S} and π ∗D = {π ∗D (s)|s ∈ S}, such that, for
all attack mixed strategies π A (s) and defense mixed strategies π D (s), s ∈ S, it satisfies
the following set of inequalities in state si ∈ S, i = 1, ..., NS :
Q(π A (s1 ), ..., π ∗A (si ), ..., π A (sNS ),π D (s1 ), ..., π D (si ), ..., π D (sNS ))
≥ Q(π A (s1 ), ..., π ∗A (si ), ..., π A (sNS ), π D (s1 ), ..., π ∗D (si ), ..., π D (sNS ))

(4.3)

≥ Q(π A (s1 ), ..., π A (si ), ..., π A (sNS ),π D (s1 ), ..., π ∗D (si ), ..., π D (sNS )).

4.3

Game Theory for Cyber-Physical Security in Smart Grid Zone 2

The Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) is a key component of the Smart Grid Zone
2 as shown in Figure 4.1, which integrates smart meters, information/communications
networks and meter data management systems (MDMS). Smart meters of the AMI provide customers with accurate load-profile information and billing data to help manage
their electricity consumption. MDMS is the portion of the AMI that enables the electric
utilities to create a real-time market. Furthermore, the power system outages can be detected for service providers through meter measurements derived by MDMS. However,
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Figure 4.1: The network model of smart grid AMI and its connections with customers,
markets and service providers.
the large scalability and cyber-physical nature of the AMI unavoidably exposes the smart
meters and the communication network to a range of cyber and physical attacks. In this
section, we first provide an overview of the cyber-physical security issues for the AMI.
Then, we study, in detail, the application of static noncooperative games for analyzing
data confidentiality attacks targeting at the AMI communication network and the use of
Stackelberg games for detecting electricity theft in smart meters. We conclude with insights on future game-theoretic approaches for enhancing cyber-physical security in the
AMI systems.

4.3.1

Introduction to Cyber-Physical Security Threats in AMI

The AMI enables the two-way communication between the electric utilities and the end
customers of power. This, however, opens up two main surfaces for attack vectors and
intruders including the smart meters and the AMI communication network. Smart meters are the primary point of data collection for smart grid energy consumption, which
facilitate a dense and large-scale metrology of the smart grid operating characteristics in
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voltage, frequency, power factor, etc. Moreover, smart meters simplify the automated
connection and disconnection of consumers to the smart grid. The design of the smart
meter incorporates two network communication radios, and often a local infrared serial
port for maintenance, which results in a broadened cyber attack surface. Physical access
to the meters adds another attack surface since internal serial links are typically unsecured
and based on common protocols. A series of the theoretical and demonstrated cyber and
physical attacks target at the smart meters are listed as follows:
• Meter Manipulation (P) that modifies the smart meter measurements to AMI through
physical tampering.
• Meter Spoof and Energy Fraud Attack (P) that can occur by gaining the smart meter
ID through physical access.
• Denial of Service (DoS) (C) that compromises smart meters such that they are not
capable of responding to any request sent by a customer or energy supplier, which
can be accomplished through tampering with the routing of the smart meter traffic.
• False Data Injection Attack (FDIA) (C) that introduces arbitrary and/or certain errors inside a normal smart meter traffic activity causing invalid measurements that
are unacceptable in a smart grid network.
• De-pseudonymization Attack (C) that compromises anonymization and privacy of
smart meter data.
• Man-in-the-middle Attack (C) where rogue agents can place themselves in between
end consumer and electric utility.
The vulnerabilities of the AMI communication network can be exploited or disabled
by attacks on the underlying communication infrastructure, insertion of false user requests, unauthorized alteration of demand side management schedules and illegal market
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Table 4.1: Cyber-Physical Attacks Targeted at AMI
Attack Target

Attack Type
Smart Meter
Physical
Availability
Cyber Integrity
Confidentiality

AMI Communication Network

• Meter Manipulation
• Crypto Key Flash Extraction
• Meter Spoof and Energy Fraud Attack
• Denial of Service (DoS)

• Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS)

• False Data Injection Attack (FDIA)

• False Data Injection Attack (FDIA)

• De-pseudonymization Attack
• Man-in-the-middle Attack

• WiFi/ZigBee Attack
• Internet Attack
• Data Confidentiality Attack

manipulation; all of which can impact system operations and result in both power shortage, loss of trust and negative economic impacts. The potential and demonstrated attacks
aimed at compromising the AMI communication network are listed as follows:
• Crypto Key Flash Extraction (PC) that accesses AMI device hardware directly with
specific tools to extract data.
• Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) (C) that compromises AMI data collection
units, preventing the normal communication between Wide Area Network (WAN)
and Neighbourhood Area Network (NAN).
• False Data Injection Attack (FDIA) (C) that manipulates power system’s state measurements or readings by injecting false load data via AMI/sensors.
• WiFi/ZigBee Attack (C) that attacks the WiFi/ZigBee networks in Home Area Network (HAN) of the AMI.
• Internet Attack (C) that compromises the AMI software and systems installed inside
the electric utility.
• Data Confidentiality Attack (C) that attacks device hardware in the AMI in order to
compromise data sent from these devices to the electric utility.
A summary of the different types of cyber and physical attacks targeted at smart meters and communication network of the AMI are shown in Table 4.1. To give more insights
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on these open cyber-physical security problems and related game-theoretic solutions, in
what follows, first, we provide a step-by-step tutorial on how static noncooperative game
theory can be applied for modeling the interactions between the defender and the attacker implementing data confidentiality attacks in AMI Communication Network.Then,
we overview the use of Stackelberg games for detecting potential electricity theft through
compromising smart meters. This section is concluded with a brief overview on other
existing game-theoretic techniques for protecting the AMI against cyber and physical attacks as well as with a discussion on the future outlook of game theoretic applications in
the cyber-physical security of the AMI.

4.3.2

Game Theoretic Models for AMI Communication Network

Due to the sensitivity of importance of the smart meter data, the main security objectives
of the AMI communication network is to guarantee data confidentiality. However, the
large number of devices deployed in the AMI renders the management of the overall
security a challenging task. In this subsection, a two-player noncooperative security game
is proposed for the AMI communication network. The attacker’s objective is to attack the
AMI devices in order to compromise data sent from these devices to the electric utility.
Correspondingly, the defender intends to choose which security mode to enable on each
device in order to protect the maximum amount of data from the attacker.
1) System Model: Consider the AMI communication network as a tree-pattern architecture T with one root node, where nodes represent the AMI devices. We refer the root
node of T by 1, and let V = {1, 2, ..., Y } be the set of nodes in T , where Y is the total
number of nodes. Each node i ∈ V \ {1} collects data from its children nodes Ch(i),
aggregates it, and finally sends it to its parent node f (i). We consider that there exists N
aggregation levels, and let Li be the set of nodes that belong to the i-th aggregation level,
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where each node can only belong to one aggregation level. Smart meters are denoted by
nodes that belong to LN .
Data on each node i has a value or security asset Wi , which quantifies the loss in data
confidentiality if node i is attacked successfully. These values can be quantified as a result
of the application of a security risk assessment method [102]. The parent node i collects
data from all its children Ch(i). A node could be responsible of processing and analyzing
a set of the data collected from its children. The result of this analysis is then sent with
the aggregated data from children nodes to the parent node. Therefore, we consider that
P
Wi ≥ j∈Ch(i) Wj . The value of data on node i is the sum of the value of data generated
by the node in addition to the value of data collected from its children. Finally, let L(T )
be the set of leaves of the tree T . We refer by ∇ki , the number of children of node i ∈ Lm
at level k > m, and Wiτ the security asset of the parent of node i ∈ Lm at level r < m.
As notations, let ∇ki = 1 and Wik = Wi , ∀i ∈ Lk .
For data confidentiality attacks in the AMI communication network, the attacker aims
to intercept data by attacking the nodes without being detected. If the attacker wants to
intercept data sent by node i, it can either attack node i or attack the parent node of i. We
consider that encryption keys are stored in a cryptoprocessor that cannot be accessed by
the attacker. The inbound data arrive at a device and is decrypted using the appropriate
cryptographic key, processed and then encrypted using a different key. The attacker has
no access or control on the decryption and encryption processes. Correspondingly, on
each node, the defender can choose one of a set of security modes available on that node.
The defender chooses an encryption level of outbound data on each node. For example,
if 100 packets are sent from the node, the defender chooses how many packets need
to be encrypted. We consider that data on each communication link is encrypted with
different encryption keys or using different encryption algorithms. At the root node, data
is encrypted for storage after being analyzed.
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2) Game Theoretic Formulation and Results: To determine the interactions between
the attacker and the defender, a two-player static noncooperative game is formulated in.
For the attacker, the strategy is defined as the probability pi of attacking node i, which is
P
subject to a budget constraint i pi ≤ P ≤ 1(0 ≤ pi ≤ 1, ∀i). In contrast, the defender’s
strategy is defined as the encryption rate si of the packets at node i, which is subject to a
P
budget constraint i si ≤ S ≤ Y (0 ≤ si ≤ 1, ∀i). We consider that on each node, an
Intrusion Detection System (IDS) is installed with a detection rate of a. The IDS can be
a combination of hardware and software detection capabilities.
In general, defense mechanisms deployed to protect a device depend on the value
of data generated, stored, or processed by that device. The efficiency, robustness and
therefore the cost of the countermeasures deployed by administrators to protect devices
are often proportional to the value of the assets on these devices. The attacker’s effort to
compromise data on a device increases with defense measures deployed to protect that
device which depend on the value of its assets. Therefore, we consider that the cost of
attacking and encrypting data on node i are proportional to the value of the data Wi and
are given by Ca Wi and Ce Wi respectively, where 0 ≤ Ca , Ce ≤ 1.
To intercept data sent by node i, the attacker can choose either to attack node i or its
parent node f (i). Therefore, the probability of compromising unencrypted data sent by i
with an encryption level of si for Wi without being detected is given by Wi (pi +pf (i) )(1−
a)(1 − si ). We assume that 1 − a > Ca . Otherwise, the attacker has no incentive to
attack since the cost to attack is greater than the payoff when the attack is successful and
undetected. The utility functions UA and UD of the attacker and the defender respectively
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are as follows:
UA (p, s) =

X

(Wi (pi + pf (i) )(1 − a)(1 − si ) − pi Ca Wi )

i∈V

=

X

(Wi pi (1 − a)(1 − si ) − pi Ca Wi ) +

i∈V

X

X

pi Wi (1 − a)(1 − sj )

i∈V,i∈L−N
/
j∈Ch(i)

(4.4)

UD (p, s) = −

X
(Wi pi (1 − a)(1 − si ) + si Ce Wi ) −
i∈V

X

X

pi Wi (1 − a)(1 − sj )

i∈V,i∈L−N
/
j∈Ch(i)

(4.5)
The attacker and the defender have complete knowledge of the architecture of the system. The Nash equilibrium is considered as the most profitable strategy profile that gives
each player the maximum utility given the actions of other players. Let p = (p1 , ..., pY ) ∈
P and s = (s1 , ..., sY ) ∈ S be the strategy profiles of the attacker and the defender respectively, where P and S refer to the strategy spaces of each player. The Nash equilibrium
of the proposed game is defined as follows:
Definition 4.3.1 A Nash equilibrium is a strategy profile (p∗ , s∗ ) in which each player
cannot improve his utility by altering his decision unilaterally. More precisely, we have:
UA (p∗ , s∗ ) ≥ UA (p, s∗ ), ∀p ∈ P, and UD (p∗ , s∗ ) ≥ UA (p∗ , s), ∀s ∈ S.
3) Future Opportunities: The noncooperative game model studied in [102] can be
used as a basis to analyze data confidentiality attacks on the AMI communication network. In fact, several future opportunities for extending the work in [102] can be explored:
• Studying the impact of false alarm rates for the detection of attacks on players’
behaviors.
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• Introducing additional players and strategies into the game that enables analyzing
the data confidentiality attack targeted at multiple AMI devices simultaneously, or
studying choosing different possible encryption algorithms on each device.
• Proposing dynamic noncooperative game models that can capture the instantaneous
state changes in the AMI communication network.
• Analyzing the impact of both the attacker’s and defender’s information sets on the
optimal attack and defense strategy selections.
• Proposing a practical implementation that can be used as an AMI communication
testbed to evaluate the defender’s Nash equilibrium strategies against the data confidentiality attacks.
In the security domain, the defenders often deploy defense countermeasures based on
the value of the assets available to protect and potential threats from attackers. Due to
strict defense budgets, defenders must consider the possible actions of attackers while
intelligently allocate defense resources. Clearly, noncooperative games could become a
foundation for analyzing this type of interactions between attackers and defenders, and
eventually identify the optimal defense strategy.

4.3.3

Game Theoretic Methods for Smart Meters

The proliferation and cyber-physical nature of smart meters have rendered them vulnerable to both cyber and physical attacks. Particularly, electricity theft, such as Meter Manipulation and FDIA, where malicious attackers alter usage measurements collected by
smart meters, is a major challenge of these attacks [103–105]. According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration, in 2016, between 1.5 and 2% of electricity in the U.S.
was lost due to theft, costing utilities as much as $6 billion annually. Traditional research
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on electricity theft detection has focused on employing specific devices, like wireless sensors and balance meters, which have a high electricity theft detection accuracy [106,107].
In [106], an AMI intrusion detection system was proposed to accurately detect electricity
theft, where anti-tampering sensors were embedded into smart meters. A set of trusted
balanced meters were implemented in the distribution network of smart grid in order to
detect electricity theft [107]. Although these research works do reduce the risks due to
unmeasured and non-billed usage of electricity, they do not identify specific meters being
compromised. Furthermore, these methods significantly increase the cost of deploying
and operating millions of smart meters.
Additionally, statistics and machine learning have been used to train a classifier based
on detailed electricity usage measurements [108–110]. Average historical electricity usage under the same conditions was used for constructing an electricity theft detector; an
alarm was raised if the average usage was below a predefined detection threshold. Principal Component Analysis (PCA) based anomaly detection was proposed in [108], where
anomalies were deviations from the normal usage behavior. In [109], usage data was
proved to be non-stationary, and Auto-Regressive Integrated Moving Average (ARIMA)
forecasting methods were proposed to validate readings. A Consumption Pattern-Based
Energy Theft Detector (CPBETD) that employed a multi-class Support Vector Machine
(SVM) for each customer was formulated in [110]. However, these works ignored the
attack models of potential thieves, and the effectiveness of anomaly detector was only
evaluated based on a dataset of attack examples.
1) Game Formulation and Results: Consider an electric utility serving a set of customers, denoted by N := {1, ..., N }. Assuming these customers have a similar preference
of electricity usage, they can be separated into two classes: normal customers and thieves.
Let M := {1, ..., M } ⊆ N be the set of thieves among the N customers of an electric
utility. Then, a single leader, multi-follower Stackelberg game is formulated in [111] be-
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tween the utility and M thieves to characterize and analyze strategic interactions between
the two. In this game, a subset from N customers is chosen for an anomaly detection
test D, aiming to reduce NTLs. Based on the limited sampling rate l, the utility intends
to maximize detection probability and minimize false positives, while the thieves interact
with one another using a non-cooperative game to identify optimal quantities of electricity
to steal in response to the utility’s detection strategy.
The noncooperative game of M thieves is formulated, Ξ := hM, (Ai )i∈M , (Ri )i∈M i,
where M is the set of M thieves. Ai is the set of actions available to thief i ∈ M, where
ai ∈ Ai is represented by the expected amount of consumed and stolen electricity by
thief i, denoted by qi and qiS , respectively. Additionally, Ri (ai ) is the reward function of
thief i under action ai . Thus, thief i selects an action ai := {qi , qiS } that maximizes its
reward Ri , which can be defined as below:
S
S
Ri (qi , qiS ) := B(qiS ) − pD
i (l, qi )P (qi ),

(4.6)

where B(·) represents the utility’s electricity billing function; B(qiS ) gives the amount of
S
the electricity bill that is not paid by thief i; pD
i (l, qi ) denotes the probability of thief i

being detected when the sampling rate is l and the amount of stolen electricity is qiS ; and
P (qiS ) indicates the penalty function activated upon the successful detection of thief i for
stealing a power of qiS .
One popular solution of the thieves’ game is the Generalized Nash Equilibrium (GNE):
Definition 4.3.2 Consider the noncooperative game Ξ := hM, (Ai )i∈M , (Ri )i∈M i. GNE
is a state of the game in which each electricity thief aims at maximizing its rewards. As a
response to optimal chosen actions of other thieves, a thief aims at choosing the actions,
in the restricting subset dictated by the choice of other thieves that maximizes their own
reward.
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Under the derived GNE of M thieves, the utility needs to selects a defense action, a0 ,
that maximizes its reward, R0 . It is assumed that the utility’s defense action is determined
by two variables including: (1) Detection mechanism, D, used to identify electricity theft,
and (2) Customer sampling rate, l. The objective of the utility is to maximize the following problem:
max R0 :=
D,l

X

S
S
E
S
E
pD
i (l, qi )P (qi ), s.t. 0 ≤ pi (l, qi ) ≤ pimax , 0 ≤ l ≤ lmax ,

(4.7)

i∈M

S
where qiS is derived from the GNE of the proposed noncooperative game Ξ; pE
i (l, qi )

represents the false alarm probability for thief i; pD
imax gives the constraint of the false
alarm probability for thief i; and lmax indicates sampling rate limitation for the utility. The
Stackelberg solution concept is adequate for games with hierarchy in which the leader
enforces its strategy and the followers respond, rationally (i.e. optimally), to the leader’s
strategy. The optimal response of M thieves to an action a0 by the utility is written as
Atheft (a0 ) = {a∗1 , ..., a∗M }. This optimal strategy denotes the equilibrium strategy profile
of the attackers as a response to the defender’s strategy. In this regard, a∗0 ∈ A0 is a
Stackelberg equilibrium if it minimizes the utility’s reward function, R0 . In other words,
R0 (a∗0 , Atheft ) ≤ R0 (a0 , Atheft ), ∀a0 ∈ A0 .

(4.8)

In the Stackelberg equilibrium, the optimal customer sampling rate l and the threshold
selected for the the detection mechanism D can be derived; then they determine the deE
tection probability pD
i and false alarm probability pi , i ∈ N . In the thieves’ game,

M thieves make their decisions simultaneously at each step of the evolutionary process,
playing a GNE between themselves. A multimodal Genetic Algorithm is implemented
for computing the Stackelberg equilibrium for the utility.
2) Further Opportunities: Essentially, the work in [111] establishes how the Stackerlberg game theory can be used to study the adversarial nature of the electricity theft
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problem. The game-theoretic framework proposed in this work can help analyze equilibrium consumer and distributor choices in scenarios where the assumptions on consumer
utilities and distributor’s profit function are applicable. Moreover, one can envision several future directions that build upon [111], as follows:
• Investigating the impact of the privacy-preserving demand response on the optimal
sampling rate selection.
• Exploring how the sampling interval of smart meters affects the ability of the distribution utility to identify anomalies and electricity theft.
• Developing utility functions that capture not only the expected electricity stolen, but
also the prices during energy trade and the costs for the communication overhead.
• Analyzing the interactions between the M electricity thieves using classical cooperative games.
• Proposing effective algorithms that can identify optimal and stable associations between the electric utility that acts a leader and millions of electricity thieves as
followers.
Beyond [111], the application of Stackerlberg games for detecting electricity theft is also
discussed in [112], in which the objective of the attacker is set to find the optimal amount
of electricity stolen, while minimizing the expected probability being detected. A summary of the different applications of game theory for cyber-physical security in the AMI
is shown in Table 4.2.

4.4

Game Theory for Cyber-Physical Security in Smart Grid Zone 3

The State Estimation (SE) of the smart grid is an essential function for the wide area
system monitoring and control in the Smart Grid Zone 3, which is an important part
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Game Theoretic Features
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Electricity Theft
in Smart Meters
[111]

• Multiple-player
(Defender vs Multiple Attackers)
• Finite Action Set
• Nonzero-sum Utility
• Deterministic
• Complete Information
• Stackerlberg game

• Two-player
(Attacker vs Defender)
Data Confidentiality
• Finite Action Set
Attack in AMI
• Nonzero-sum Utility
Communication Network
• Deterministic
[102]
• Complete Information
• Static game

Application

• Investigating the impact of the privacy-preserving demand response.
• Exploring the impact of the sampling interval of electricity theft.
• Developing utility functions that capture the price change in the market.
• Analyzing the cooperative interactions between the M electricity thieves.
• Proposing effective algorithms for game including millions of electricity thieves.

• Studying the impact of false alarm rates for the detection of attacks on players’ behaviors.
• Introducing additional players and strategies into the game.
• Proposing dynamic noncooperative game models.
• Analyzing the impact of the attacker and defender’s information sets.
• Proposing a practical AMI communication testbed for evaluation.

Main Future Extensions

Table 4.2: Summary of Game Theoretic Techniques for Security in AMI.

Figure 4.2: The network model of smart grid state estimation and its connections with
system monitoring and control.
of the modern Energy Management System (EMS), as shown in Figure 4.2. The smart
grid SE uses the redundancy of measurement data provided by SCADA to improve the
accuracy of data, automatically exclude error messages caused by random interference,
and estimate or forecast the running state of the system. In this section, an overview of the
mathematical model of SE and the false data inject attack targeted at SE will be provided.
Then, the application of Stackelberg games for analyzing FDIAs in the smart grid SE will
be studied in detail. Finally, insights on future game-theoretic approaches for enhancing
cyber-physical security within the SE systems will be discussed.

4.4.1

Introduction to Security Threats in State Estimation

A smart grid SE uses multiple power measurements collected throughout the grid to estimate the system states. The relation between the measurement vector z, and the vector
of system states θ, in a linearized SE model can be expressed as z = Hθ + e, where H
is the measurement Jacobian matrix and e is the vector of random errors assumed to follow a normal distribution N (0, R). Using a Weighted Least Square (WLS) estimator, the
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estimated system states are given by θ̂ = (H T R−1 H)−1 H T R−1 z. Using the estimated
states, an estimate of the measurement vector can be calculated as ẑ = H θ̂ = Sz, and
residual r = z − ẑ = (I n − S)z = W z, where I n is the identity matrix of size (n × n),
and n is the total number of collected measurements.
The WLS estimator is the maximum likelihood estimator for locating the system
states, but the estimated system states have zero robustness against faulty data, either
caused by random network errors or malicious attacks. Evidently, a secure and efficient
power system requires an accurate state estimation that truthfully reflects the system operating state. The state estimator commonly uses a bad data detection (BDD) mechanism
to filter fault data, which typically implements the Chi-squares test over the sum of the
P
squares of the residuals. krk22 = ni=1 ri2 follows a χ2 distribution with n − Nθ degrees
of freedom, where Nθ is the number of states to be estimated; the residuals must satisfy
krk2 ≤ τ , where τ is a detection threshold. Hence, for a measurement set to be considered free from bad data, the residuals must satisfy krk2 ≤ τ , where τ is a detection
threshold.
However, BDD is unable to detect some structured collaborating injection attacks that
are disguised as normal measurements. One common cyber attack in smart grids is FDIA,
which distorts the measurements collected by the system operator through either physical
device compromise or remote cyber-data injection. Due to its ability to compromise the
state estimation, an adversary capable of false-date injecting can have devastating effects,
such as exploiting profits from electricity price manipulation in the power market and
causing a regional blackout, which could potentially induce financial chaos. The Stackelberg game-theoretic approach in [113] is described in detail in order to give more insight
about cyber-physical security problems.
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4.4.2

Stackelberg Game for False Data Injection Attacks in SE

1) Game Formulation and Results: Consider M attackers implementing a FDIA targeted
at the smart grid SE, and the defender intends to secure a set of measurements in order to
decrease the aggregate effect of the FDIA on the system. In [113], a single leader, multifollower Stackelberg game between the defender and the M attackers is formulated to
capture and analyze their strategic interactions. In this game, the defender acts as a leader
who selects a set of measurements to defend the SE from the potential FDIA attacks.
The M attackers interact with one another by using a followers’ noncooperative game to
identify the optimal FDIA attack based on the defender’s strategy.
The noncooperative game between M attackers is formulated in its normal form as
follows: Ξ = hM, {Zm }m∈M , {Um }m∈M i, where M is the set of M attackers, Zm is the
set of FDIA actions available to attacker m ∈ M, and Um is the utility function of attacker
m. Thus, each attacker, m ∈ M, selects an attack vector, zm ∈ Zm , that maximizes its
utility, Um . For each attacker m, let Km denote the subset of measurements that can be
attacked by m. Hence, Zm can be represented by a column vector with elements equal
to 0 except for those in Km which can take values within a compact range reflecting the
range of magnitude of the attack.
The utility function Um for each attacker m can be defined as the financial benefit
obtained by virtual bidding. In virtual bidding, attacker m buys and sells Pm MW at
buses im and jm in day ahead, respectively, while, conversely, attacker m sells and buys
Pm MW at, buses im and jm , respectively. Thus, the goal of attacker m ∈ M is to
optimize:
max

zm ∈Zm

s.t.

−1
DA
DA
RT
Um (zm , zm
) = [(µRT
im − µim ) + (µjm − µjm )]Pm − cm (zm ),

kW zm k2 +

M
X

(4.9)
kW zl k2 ≤ m ,

l=1,l6=m
−1
where cm (zm ) is the cost of attack, and zm
is the strategy vector of all players except m.
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Based on the equilibrium of the followers, the grid defender selects a defense vector
a0 that determines which measurements to be secured from the FDIA attacks. The objective of the defender is to minimize a cost function that captures the variation between the
day ahead and real-time prices on all buses in the system:
v
u
N
u1 X
t
2
min U0 (am , a−0 ) = PL
(µRT − µDA
im ) + c0 (a0 ),
a0 ∈A0
N i=1 im
s.t.

(4.10)

ka0 k2 ≤ B0 ,

where c0 (a0 ) is the cost of defense, PL is the total system load, and B0 is the limit on the
number of measurements that the operator can defend simultaneously.
The Stackelberg solution concept is adequate for games with a hierarchy in which
the leader enforces its strategy and the followers respond, rationally (i.e., optimally), to
the leader’s strategy. The optimal response of the attackers to action a0 played by the
∗
(a0 )}. This optimal strategy denotes
defender is denoted by Ratt (a0 ) , {z1∗ (a0 ), ..., zM

the equilibrium strategy profile of the attackers as a response to the defender’s strategy.
In this regard, a∗0 ∈ A0 is a Stackelberg equilibrium if it minimizes the leader’s (i.e.,
defender’s) utility function U0 . In other words,
U0 (a∗0 , Ratt (a∗0 )) ≤ U0 (a0 , Ratt (a0 )), ∀a0 ∈ A0 .

(4.11)

2) Further Opportunities: The work in [113] provides a Stackerlberg game theoretic
approach in order to analyze the strategic interactions between the defender and multiple
attackers, which intend to inject FDIA into the smart grid SE. Based on this work, several
future directions can be pursed, such as:
• Investigating the multiple-stage sequence game by integrating the defender’s FDIA
mitigation strategy if the attack is successfully detected.
• Developing utility functions that capture not only the expected price changes during
energy trade, but also the physical impact for the grid operation.
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• Analyzing the interactions between the M FDIA attackers by using classical cooperative games.

4.5

Summary

In this survey, a comprehensive overview on the applications of noncooperative game
theory for analyzing the cyber-physical security of the smart grid, which was divided into
three zones, was provided. The smart grid analysis was carefully drawn from a broad
range of cyber and physical security issues spanning key elements such as the network
layer, AMI and state estimation. In each zone, the main cyber-physical security threats
were presented and an elaborate discussion on how noncooperative game theory can be
applied to address these challenges was presented. Moreover, several future directions
for extending these approaches and adopting advanced game theoretic techniques was
provided, so as to reduce the gap between theoretical models and practical implementations of future smart grids. Essentially, from the surveyed works, it can be clearly noted
that noncooperative game theory has a strong potential to provide solutions for pertinent
cyber-physical security problems within the smart grid; however, these theoretic applications face many design challenges. It can also noted that many of the existing works have
focused on classical static noncooperative games. Hence, for future works, it is of interest
to investigate dynamic game models (both in cooperative and noncooperative settings)
and their applications within smart grid systems.
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CHAPTER 5
Risk Assessment of Coordinated Cyber-Physical Attacks in Smart Grid

In this chapter, the risk assessment of the coordinated cyber-physical attacks against
power grids is investigated using a novel game-theoretic approach. Section 5.1 makes an
overview of the cyber-physical security issues in the smart grid. Section 5.2 presents the
attack-defense scenario in the power grid as well as the formulated stochastic game. Section 5.3 introduces an optimal load shedding technology to quantify the attacker and defender’s rewards. Then, Section 5.4 derives the Nash equilibrium of the proposed stochastic game, and computes the risk of the coordinated cyber-physical attack faced by the grid
based on the probability of successful attack and corresponding physical impacts. Section
5.5 presents the simulation results while Section 5.6 concludes the chapter.

5.1

Overview

The modern electric power grid constitutes the backbone of any nation’s economy. The
cyber-physical nature of its critical infrastructures facilitates its effective operation, monitoring and control, but renders it to be a high priority target for a range of malicious attacks
in cyber and physical domains [114]. Indeed, the security of the grid is not guaranteed
at all times, and some element failures can cause significant problems for the producers and consumers of electricity. For example, the Blackout on August 14, 2003 [115]
showed that even a single transmission line outage has cascading effects on an area with
an estimate of 50 million people and 61,800 megawatts (MW) of electric load in the
Northeastern and Midwestern United States and the Canadian province of Ontario. The
North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) traditionally requires that the
bulk electric power grid in an operation state should be able to transition into another op-
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eration state in case of one element failure, commonly referenced as the N-1 contingency
criteria [116].
Compared with accidental single element failures, the well-organized coordinated
cyber-physical attacks can not only lead to severe physical damages to the grid, but may
also potentially nullify the functionality of existing defense mechanisms. A class of coordinated cyber-physical attacks was presented in [117] whereby physical transmission line
attacks and corresponding false data injection attacks were considered. False data injection attacks, as a special case of cyber attacks, can be implemented into the power grid
state estimation to mask the line outages caused by these physical attacks, and potentially
exasperate outages to trigger cascading failures. As a result, risk analysis of coordinated
attacks and devising defense countermeasures are both challenging and desirable.
Risk assessment is identified as a critical part of the security framework by most power
grid standards and guidelines [118]. Attack graph is a common starting point for most of
the work in this area [50, 119–121]. An attack graph-based framework was developed
in [120] to assess the risk faced by the power grid control systems, in which the cyber
attack targeted at control systems was graphed in a tree structure, and the risk was quantified according to existing defense mechanisms. In [121], a privilege graph was introduced
to analyze all potential attack paths that can be exploited by the attacker in the advanced
metering infrastructure (AMI) system, and an exposure metric was derived for evaluating the vulnerability of the system. In [122], a mathematical risk assessment framework
was proposed as an alternative to attack graphs for analyzing coordinated cyber attacks
against the supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) system of the power grid.
This work defined the risk of coordinated cyber attacks as the product of probability of
successful cyber intrusion and resulting power grid impacts.
Furthermore, due to the multi-faced decision making process involved in the power
grid protection against coordinated cyber-physical attacks, a noncooperative game-theoretic
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approach was introduced in [123] to analyze the interactions between an intelligent attacker and the grid defender. Also, the attack probability to various elements of the grid
at the game’s equilibrium was used to assess the risk associated with them. In [124], a
zero-sum static game between a malicious attacker and the grid operator was proposed
to compute optimal defense budget allocation strategies that seek to protect physical infrastructures of the power grid against physical attacks. Risk faced by each physical
infrastructure was determined by corresponding defense budget allocation. In [125], a
general-sum game-theoretic framework was proposed to explore and evaluate strategies
for the power grid defender to protect the grid against a variety of physical and cyber
attacks, where the attack and defense resource limitations were considered. Optimal attack/defense resource allocation strategies at the game’s equilibrium were used for risk
analysis of each power grid element.
However, the works in [123–125] depend on static game frameworks, in which the interactions and decision making processes between the attacker and defender are assumed
to be one-shot events. In [36, 51], the dynamic game theory was introduced for modeling
the attack-defense scenarios in the power grid while factoring in the dynamic nature of
the power grid protection. The Nash equilibrium of the formulated dynamic game was
derived for guiding the grid defender to optimally protect power grid elements at different
system states.
The main contribution of this chapter is to develop a new game-theoretic framework
for assessing the risk faced by a power grid in terms of coordinated cyber-physical attacks. In order to characterize the dynamic nature of the grid protection, this problem is
formulated as a stochastic budget allocation game between a malicious attacker and the
grid defender. An optimal load shedding problem is proposed to quantify the amount of
shed load under coordinated attacks representing their physical impacts on the power grid.
Taking these physical impacts as the two players’ rewards, a novel learning algorithm is
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devised to enable the two players to reach the Nash equilibrium of the game while maximizing their respective minimum rewards in a sequence of stages. The attacker’s budget
allocation strategies at such game’s equilibrium are implemented to assess the vulnerability associated with each grid element. Furthermore, the risk of a coordinated cyberphysical attack faced by the whole power grid at various states can be evaluated based on
the information about the successful attack probability to various elements. Simulation
results using the IEEE 9-bus system are presented to illustrate the proposed framework
and deriving different risk under different attack/defense budget limitations.

5.2

Problem Statement and Game Formulation

In this section, we first present the problem of power grid protection against coordinated
cyber-physical attacks and then, formulate a stochastic budget allocation game between
the attacker and defender. Main notations are listed in Table 5.1.

5.2.1

Problem Statement

We consider an electric power grid system consisting of NB buses including Ng generation buses and Nl load buses and NT transmission lines. The network topology of this
system can be abstracted as a digraph G(V, E), where V with size NB denotes the set of
all power buses (vertices), and E denotes the set of NT transmission lines (edges). The
total number of elements (vertices and edges) of the system that must be defended against
coordinated cyber-physical attacks is NG = NB + NT .
A malicious attacker aims to disrupt the system by allocating its limited attack budgets
over NG system elements, in order to bring the maximum physical damage to the system.
The budgets possessed by the attacker can contain 1) human budgets such as hackers and
terrorists, 2) technological budgets such as electrical tools and malwares, and 3) economic
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Symbol
i
NB
Ng
Nl
NT
NG
G
V
E
A(D)
a(d)
ΠA (ΠD )
π A (π D )
B A (B D )
D
bA
i (bi )
RA (RD )
S
s
T
pfail
i
prec
i
γ
Q

Table 5.1: Summary of Notations
Description
a power grid element’s index
the number of power buses
the number of generation buses
the number of load buses
the number of transmission lines
the total number of system elements to be protected
electric power grid digraph
vertex set of power grid digraph
edge set of power grid digraph
attacker’s (defender’s) action space
attacker’s (defender’s) action vector
attacker’s (defender’s) mixed strategy space
attacker’s (defender’s) mixed strategy
the maximum attack (defense) budget
attack (defense) budget implemented for element i
attacker’s (defender’s) expected reward
power grid state space
a power grid’s state
state transition probability
fail probability of normal element i
recovery probability of failed element i
discount factor to the overall reward
the discounted-sum reward

budgets. Let A be the action space of the attacker, and B A be the maximum budget that
can be implemented for attacking NG system elements at a time. Each attack action
a ∈ A can be defined as a vector of allocating B A budgets over NG system elements:
A
A T
a = [bA
1 , b2 , ..., bNG ] , each element denotes the budget that action a implements for
P G A
A
the corresponding element, and N
i=1 bi = B . For example, the attacker may allocate

a part of technological budgets on launching a false data injection attack over poorly
protected wireless channels to block the communication between command control center
and remote senors. Alternatively, the attacker may plan to distribute several economic
budgets on a physical attack on high voltage (HV) transmission lines.
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Correspondingly, in order to minimize the risk of the attacks against the system, the
system defender (administrator) needs to distribute its finite defense budgets over NG
system elements to protect normal elements or to repair broken elements. The budgets
possessed by the defender can contain: 1) human budgets such as users, administrators,
and maintenance staff, b) technological budgets such as advanced operation systems and
monitoring softwares, and c) economic budgets. Let D be the action space of the defender,
and B D be the maximum defense budget that can be implemented at a time. Then, each
defense action d ∈ D conditions one vector to distribute its limited defense budgets over
D T
D
NG elements of the system: d = [bD
1 , b2 , ..., bNG ] , whose element is the defense budget
P G D
in action d that committed to the corresponding element, and N
j=1 bj = BD . Therefore,

the attacker’s (defender’s) action space A (D) includes all possible methods of allocating
its limited budgets over NG system elements.

5.2.2

Game Formulation

The interactions and decision making processes between the attacker and defender are
analyzed using the dynamic noncooperative game theory [57, 67–69, 126]. In particular, we formulate a two-player, discrete time stochastic budget allocation game Ξ =
hS, A, D, RA , RD , T i, whose key elements are shown as follows:
• S: Power grid state space, where each state s ∈ S is associated with the status of
NG grid elements.
• A: Action space of the attacker, where each attack action a ∈ A represents a
method of allocating the attack budget over NG grid elements.
• D: Action space of the defender, where each defense action d ∈ D conditions a
defense budget allocation over NG grid elements.
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• Π(A) (Π(D)): Mixed strategy space of the attacker (defender), where each mixed
strategy π A ∈ Π(A) (π D ∈ Π(D)) yields a probability distribution over action
space A (D).
• RA (s, a, d) (RD (s, a, d)): Reward function for the attacker (defender), under a
pair of attack and defense actions (a, d) at state s ∈ S.
• Ts,s0 (a, d): State transition probability from state s ∈ S to state s0 ∈ S under a pair
of attack and defense actions (a, d).
• pfail
i (a, d): Fail probability for normal element i failing under a pair of attack and
defense actions (a, d).
• prec
i (a, d): Recovery probability for failed element i recovering under a pair of
attack and defense actions (a, d).
The game is played over a finite state space S, where each state is an enumeration
of the status of NG power grid elements in order. For instance, if we use ”1” and ”0”
to denote the normal and failed statuses, respectively. Two states then can be defined as:
state s1 : {1,1,...,1,1} for all elements being operated normally, and state s2 : {0,0,1,...,1,1}
for all elements being operated normally except elements 1 and 2. The state transition
rec
probability Ts,s0 (a, d) is derived from corresponding probabilities pfail
i (a, d) and pi (a, d),

i = 1, ..., NG , based on state s and s0 . For example, Ts1 ,s2 (a, d) = pfail
1 (a, d)×(1 −
fail
fail
pfail
2 (a, d))×(1 − p3 (a, d))×· · ·×(1 − pNG (a, d)).

This game proceeds in time steps. In each time step of the game, the attacker takes
an action a ∈ A, and, at the same time, the defender takes an action d ∈ D. The
pair of players’ actions (a, d) will bring a reward for each player at the current state
s ∈ S. Assume the attacker seeks to maximize the physical damage towards the system
under the pair of actions (a, d), while the defender intends to minimize this damage. The
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attacker’s reward will be the negative of the defender’s reward at each time step, where
RA (s, a, d) = −RD (s, a, d).
Thus far, the immediate rewards at each time step are defined for both players, but the
proposed stochastic game Ξ still proceeds. In order to quantify the attacker and defender’s
overall rewards in Ξ, two players’ immediate rewards derived at each time step should be
aggregated together. A popularly used method for aggregating these immediate rewards
is the discounted-sum method [127]. For a pair of attack and defense actions (a, d), the
overall reward of the attacker can be defined the discounted sum of immediate rewards at
each time step, with a discount factor γ ∈ (0, 1):
QA =

∞
X

γ t RA (s(t), a, d),

(5.1)

t=0

where γ t represents the relative importance of the reward at the time step t in the overall
reward QA . Since the defender’s reward is the negative of the attacker’s reward at each
time step, the defender’s overall reward is just the negative of the attacker’s overall reward,
where QD (s, a, d) = −QA (s, a, d). Therefore, the proposed stochastic game Ξ is a zerosum stochastic game.
The attacker and defender’s optimal strategies for the proposed stochastic game Ξ are
characterized by the concept of a closed-loop Nash equilibrium [68, 126]:
Definition 5.2.1 The pair of attack and defense mixed strategies (π ∗A , π ∗D ) is said to be a
closed-loop Nash equilibrium of the proposed stochastic game Ξ = hS, A, D, RA , RD , T i,
if, for all attack and defense strategies π(A) ∈ Π(A) and π D ∈ ΠD , we have in state
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si ∈ S, i = 1, ..., NS :



QA (π A (s1 ), ..., π ∗A (si ), ..., π A (sNS ),







π D (s1 ), ..., π ∗D (si ), ..., π D (sNS ))








≥ QA (π A (s1 ), ..., π ∗A (si ), ..., π A (sNS ),







π (s ), ..., π (s ), ..., π (s )),
D

1

D

i

D

NS

(5.2)




QD (π A (s1 ), ..., π ∗A (si ), ..., π A (sNS ),







π D (s1 ), ..., π ∗D (si ), ..., π D (sNS ))








≥ QD (π A (s1 ), ..., π A (si ), ..., π A (sNS ),






π D (s1 ), ..., π ∗D (si ), ..., π D (sNS )).
The existence of a closed-loop Nash equilibrium for stochastic games is known only
in some very special cases [128]. However, for the proposed stochastic game Ξ, if the attacker and defender’s mixed strategies are limited to stationary strategies, we can present
the existence of a closed-loop Nash equilibrium. First, the stationary strategy is defined
as follows:
Definition 5.2.2 For the proposed stochastic game Ξ = hS, A, D, RA , RD , T i, a stationary strategy is one in which the rule of choosing a mixed strategy is the same in each
system state s ∈ S, where the attacker and defender’s mixed strategies satisfy for ∀s ∈ S,
π A (s) = π A (s(t)), and π D (s) = π D (s(t)), ∀t.
Now, we can present the existence of Nash equilibrium in stationary strategies for the
proposed stochastic game Ξ.
Theorem 5.2.3 For the proposed stochastic game Ξ = hS, A, D, RA , RD , T i, if it satisfies that action sets A and D are finite and state transitions T are dominated by some
probability measures on S, there exists a stationary Nash equilibrium for each discount
factor γ ∈ (0, 1).
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This theorem was proved in a more general form in [129], in which the players’ rewards and the discount factor γ may rely on time, and the state space S is a measurable
space. If we assume that action sets A and D are finite and transition probabilities T are
dominated by some probability measures on S, the proposed stochastic game Ξ becomes
as a special case of stochastic games given in [129].

5.3

Optimal Load Shedding

We now calculate the attack and defender’s rewards RA and RD at each time step of the
proposed stochastic game Ξ, which are determined by the physical damage under the pair
of attack and defense actions (a, d). In the literature [130–132], such physical damage
can be quantified by the cost of load that must be shed due to element failures, in which
some load must to be cut off to avoid a cascading failure. For the power grid composed
of NB buses including Ng generation buses and Nl load buses, let p = [pg ; pl ] be the
power distribution over NB buses, where pg ≥ 0 represents the power generation over
Ng generation buses and pl ≤ 0 represents the load distribution over Nl load buses.
Additionally, let z = [z g ; z l ] be the power assignment changes over NB buses due to
element failures, where z g represents the re-dispatched power at Ng generation buses and
z l represents load to be shed at Nl load buses. Finally, let ul be the load cost vector of
load buses, an optimal load shedding strategy then can be derived by solving the following
optimization problem:
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min L = ul T z l ,
z,θ

s.t.

ΓT B sin(Γθ) − (p + z) = 0,
pgmin ≤ pg + z g ≤ pgmax ,
z gmin ≤ z g ≤ z gmax ,

(5.3)

pl ≤ pl + z l ≤ plmax ,
θ min ≤ Γθ ≤ θ max ,
cmin ≤ B sin(Γθ) ≤ cmax ,
where pgmin ≥ 0 and pgmax ≥ 0 represent, respectively, the minimum and maximum
outputs at given generation buses. z gmin ≤ 0 represents the maximum power can be
reduced at given generation buses for a time step, and z gmax ≥ 0 represents the maximum
power can be increased at given generation buses for a time step. plmax ≤ 0 refers to
important load that cannot be shed at given load buses. θ is the phase angle at each bus.
θ min and θ max represent the minimized and maximized limitations of the phase angle at
each bus, respectively. Γ is the incidence matrix for the topology of the power grid, and
B is the diagonal matrix whose diagonal entries correspond to line admittances. cmin and
cmax independently represent the minimized and maximized power limitations of each
branch.
The first constraint of the formulated problem gives the physical power flow equations that must be satisfied during the load shedding, where the voltages at NB buses are
assumed to be fixed. For Ng generation buses, the minimum output of some generation
buses is an important constraint because of the cogeneration, where they must generate
certain power to ensure the heat supply. Additionally, the output of each power plant cannot exceed its maximum output. Therefore, the second constraint gives the limitations for
generation buses about their minimum and maximum outputs. Additionally, the ramping
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capability also exists in generation buses because the power plants need certain time to
increase or decrease their outputs. The constraint for the ramping capability of generation
buses is given in the third constraint. For Nl load buses, in order to ensure the uninterrupted power supply to certain load, there may be some important load can not be shed at
any time for load buses, which is shown by pl + z l ≤ plmax of the fourth constraint. And
pl ≤ pl + z l in the fourth constraint ensures that the load at given load buses can only be
shed, not added. In order to keep the power grid in a stable state, the phase at NB buses
and NT transmission line flows are also required to be in certain range, which are given
in the fifth and sixth constraint, respectively.
For a given time step t, a pair of attack and defense actions (a, d) will cause the state
(topology) change of the power grid, which is represented by the incidence matrix Γ.
Therefore, the incidence matrix Γ should be updated according to the current power grid
state. For different power grid states, we can derive different incidence matrices to represent the topology of the power grid. Then, the cost of shed load under the attack, denoted
by L, will be equal to ul T z l derived by solving (7.3). The attacker’s reward is then given
P
by RA (s(t), a, d) = s0 ∈S Ts,s0 (a, d)L(s0 ), and the defender’s reward RD (s, a, d) is just
negative of RA (s, a, d).

5.4

Game Solution and Risk Assessment

With the two players’ rewards computed, the proposed stochastic game Ξ can be solved
by characterizing the closed-loop Nash equilibrium for each state s ∈ S. At the Nash
equilibrium, one player’s strategy is the optimal strategy to maximize the minimum overall rewards under the other player’s optimal strategy, and the optimal attack and defense
budgets allocated at NG power grid elements can be derived. Moreover, the probability
of successful attack a ∈ A can be derived according to the two players’ optimal budget

95

Formulated stochastic budget allocation
game, defined by Ξ =<S, A, D,T, RA, RD>

Start

Formulate Power Grid State Space S

No

All a and d
processed?

For s  S ,
a  A and d  D

Determine Attacker’s Action Space A
and Defender’s Action Space D

Yes
Update linear programming V(s)
according to (8)

Set initial Q-value Q0(s, a, d) and V(s)

For s  S ,
a  A and d  D

Derive Attacker’s Nash equilibrium
strategy by solving V(s)

No

Derive state transition matrix T(a, d)
based on probabilities pfail(a, d) and prec(a, d)

All s, a and d
processed?
Yes

Define learning rate
αt=1/(t+1)ω for ω in (0.5, 1]

Derive optimal cost L(s, a, d) of load to be
shed by solving problem (3)
Derive attacker and defender’s expected
rewards RAa,d (s) and RDa,d (s) at each system
state according to L(s, a, d)
No

Stochastic Budget Allocation Game Formulation

Derive Defender’s Nash equilibrium
strategy by solving Vdual (s)

For s  S ,
No

For a  A, d  D

All s
Processed?

Update Q-value Qt+1(s, a, d)
according to (6)

End

Yes
All s, a and d
processed?

Update dual problem Vdual (s) of V(s)
according to (9)

Yes

Deriving Nash equilibrium of Stochastic Game

Figure 5.1: Flowchart of the proposed algorithm for deriving the Nash equilibrium of
the stochastic budget allocation game Ξ.

allocation strategies at the Nash equilibrium of the game. The risk of the coordinated
cyber-physical attack faced by the power grid is then defined as the product of the probability of successful attack and its corresponding physical impact on the grid.

5.4.1

Game Solution

Since the proposed stochastic game Ξ is a zero-sum game, we can first derive one player’s
mixed strategies at the Nash equilibrium, and the other’s mixed strategies can be derived
in the same way. Here, we first focus on the attacker, and assume the following overall
reward Q as QA . As shown in [126], the attacker’s Nash equilibrium strategies can be
derived recursively through the following dynamic iterations. Given an initial overall
reward Q0 , the optimal overall reward Q∗ for the attacker can be derived iteratively as

96

follows:
Qt+1 (s, a, d) = RA (s, a, d) + γ

X

Ts,s0 (a, d)V (s0 ),

(5.4)

s0 ∈S

V (s0 ) = max min π TA (s0 )Qt (s0 , a, d).
πA

d

(5.5)

The attacker’s stationary strategy π ∗A (s), ∀s ∈ S derived by (5.5) is the optimal strategy at
Nash equilibrium. However, one of the drawbacks of this method is that, during each iteration, the Q-value is only updated by immediate rewards derived at the current time step,
but immediate rewards derived at previous steps are ignored. Therefore, the algorithm’s
computational complexity grows exponentially with the bus and transmission line size of
the power grid, and will make it impractical for grids with reasonable sizes to be solved
by this algorithm. This chapter introduces a changeable learning rate αt = 1/(t + 1)ω
in [67] for each time step t, for ω ∈ (0.1, 1), into the above algorithm. Using the learning rate αt , two new recursions are defined for computing the optimal discounted sum of
expected rewards Q∗ at time step t, as follows:
Qt+1 (s, a, d) = (1 − αt )Qt (s, a, d) + αt (RA (s, a, d)
X
Ts,s0 (a, d) × V (s0 )),
+γ

(5.6)

s0 ∈S

V (s0 ) = max min π TA (s0 )Qt (s0 , a, d),
πA

d

(5.7)

for a given initial condition Q0 . (5.7) can be formulated as a linear constrained optimization problem. And the attacker’s stationary strategy π ∗A (s), ∀s ∈ S derived by the
following problem is the Nash equilibrium strategy:
max V (s0 ),
πA

s.t.

(5.8)
π TA (s0 )Qt (s0 , a, d)

0

≥ V (s ), ∀d ∈ D.

The fixed points of (5.6) and (5.7), V ∗ and Q∗ , lead to the optimal maxmin solution for
the attacker. Correspondingly, the defender’s Nash equilibrium strategy π ∗D (s), ∀s ∈ S
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can be obtained by solving the dual of the linear constraint optimization (5.8):
min Vdual (s0 ),
πD

s.t.

(5.9)
π TD (s0 )Qt (s0 , a, d)

0

≤ Vdual (s ), ∀a ∈ A.

For the proposed stochastic games Ξ, the strong max-min property in [?] proves that
strong duality applies and Vdual (s0 ) is equal to V (s0 ). Therefore, the tuple of stationary
strategies (π ∗A (s),π ∗D (s)), ∀s ∈ S, obtained by (5.8) and (5.9) is the Nash equilibrium
that we are looking for each system state of the power grid. The flowchart of computing
the Nash equilibrium of the proposed stochastic game Ξ is detailed presented in Fig. 5.1.
However, in order to derive the pure strategy Nash equilibrium, a ε-greedy technology
is introduced to select the attack/defense action at each time step. With ε-greedy, the
attacker (defender) selects at each time step a random action with a fixed probability,
0 < ε < 1, instead of selecting greedily one of the learned optimal actions with respect
to the Q-function:



random action from A(D), if ξ < ε,
a(d) =


optimal solution of problem (5.8)((5.9)), otherwise,

(5.10)

where 0 ≤ ξ ≤ 1 is a uniform random number drawn at each time step.
The risk faced by the power grid is defined as the product of the probability of successful attacks and corresponding physical impacts on the grid, which can be taken as the
cost of the shed load under the given attack action. Since the tuple of Nash equilibrium
strategies (π ∗A (s),π ∗D (s)) gives the optimal attack and defense action selection strategy
over the two players’ action spaces, the probability P r(s, a) of successful attack action
a ∈ Aatt at state s can be defined as follows:
P r(s, a) =

X

π ∗A (s, a)π ∗D (s, d)

where

and

π ∗D (s, d)

pfail
i (a, d),

(5.11)

i∈T

d∈D

π ∗A (s, a)

Y

represents the probability of selecting attack action a and

defense action d in the tuple of Nash equilibrium strategies (π ∗A (s),π ∗D (s)) at state s,
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respectively. T represents the set of grid elements targeted by attack action a. The risk
faced by the power grid at state s is therefore shown as follows:
Γ(s) =

X

P r(s, a)L(a),

(5.12)

a∈A

where L(a) is the cost of load that must be shed under successful attack action a, which
is derived by solving (7.3).

5.4.2

Risk Assessment

For a given state s ∈ S, with the tuple of Nash equilibrium strategies (π ∗A (s),π ∗D (s))
computed, the optimal defense budget allocation for element i of the power grid at the
Nash equilibrium of the proposed game Ξ can be formulated as follows:
BiD (s) =

X

∗
bD
i (d)π D (s, d),

(5.13)

d∈D

where i = 1, ..., NG , and bD
i (d) represents the defense budget implemented for element i
in defense action d. Similarly, the optimal attack budget allocation for grid element i at
the game equilibrium can be formulated for state s shown as follows:
BiA (s) =

X

∗
bA
i (a)π A (s, a),

(5.14)

a∈A

where i = 1, ..., NG , and bA
i (a) represents the attack budget implemented for element i
in attack action a. Therefore, the vulnerability of the power grid can be assessed with
respect to the ranking of grid components regarding the attack budget ratio BiA /B A being
allocated.

5.5

Simulation Results and Analysis

To illustrate the application of the stochastic game theoretic approach to the risk assessment of coordinated cyber-physical attacks, the IEEE 9-bus system [133] is taken as the
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test system. We consider that the attacker can take both physical attacks and denial-ofservice (DoS) attacks to disrupt the transmission lines of the system, while the defender
must implement proper defense mechanisms such as building barriers and implementing
filters, to reinforce normal transmission lines and repair broken lines. For clarity, conciseness, and easy illustration of this case study, the attack and defense budgets, independently denoted by BA and BD , are considered as dimensionless quantities, i.e., quantities
without any physical units. In the test system, 6 types of single attacks and 15 types of coordinated attacks are investigated. The amount of shed load following each of successful
attacks is listed in Table 5.2. Table 5.2 shows that coordinated attacks can lead to more
load to be shed than single attacks, and attack 7-9, 13-15, 17 and 19-21 are ten coordinated attacks that can cause more physical damages on the grid than other coordinated
attacks. Thus, the attack action space A contains above ten coordinated attacks, where
a1 for Line 1 and 2, a2 for Line 1 and 3, a3 for Line 1 and 4, a4 for Line 2 and 4, a5
for Line 2 and 5, a6 for Line 2 and 6, a7 for Line 3 and 5, a8 for Line 4 and 5, a9 for
Line 4 and 6, and a10 for Line 5 and 6. Similarly, the defense action space D includes ten
corresponding defense actions.
With the two players’ action spaces and rewards computed, we intend to derive the
Nash equilibrium of the proposed stochastic game in stationary strategies for each state
of the power grid. Here, eleven grid states are considered including state s1 : {1,1,1,1,1,1},
state s2 : {0,0,1,1,1,1}, state s3 : {0,1,0,1,1,1}, state s4 : {0,1,1,0,1,1}, state s5 : {1,0,1,0,1,1},
state s6 : {1,0,1,1,0,1}, state s7 : {1,0,1,1,1,0}, state s8 : {1,1,0,1,0,1}, state s9 : {1,1,1,0,0,1},
state s10 : {1,1,1,0,1,0}, and state s11 : {1,1,1,1,0,0}, where ”1” and ”0” independently denote the normal or failed status of transmission lines in order. Given the discount number
A
A
D
γ = 0.5, here, we assume that BA = BD = 10, and pfail
i = [bi /(1 + bi )] × [1/(1 + bi )]
A(D)

D
A
and prec
= [bD
i
i /(1 + bi )] × [1/(1 + bi )], where bi

budget implemented on Line i.
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represents the attack (defense)

Figure 5.2: The defense budget allocation strategies for the test system at the Nash equilibrium of the proposed game from state s1 to state s11 .
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Table 5.2: Shed Load due to Attacks in the IEEE 9-Bus System
Attack No. Attack Target Shed Load
(MW)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7(a1 )
8(a2 )
9(a3 )
10
11

Line 1
Line 2
Line 3
Line 4
Line 5
Line 6
Line 1 and 2
Line 1 and 3
Line 1 and 4
Line 1 and 5
Line 1 and 6

0
0
0
0
0
0
120
376
232
0
0

Attack No. Attack Target Shed Load
(MW)
12
13(a4 )
14(a5 )
15(a6 )
16
17(a7 )
18
19(a8 )
20(a9 )
21(a10 )

Line 2 and 3
Line 2 and 4
Line 2 and 5
Line 2 and 6
Line 3 and 4
Line 3 and 5
Line 3 and 6
Line 4 and 5
Line 4 and 6
Line 5 and 6

0
352
132
27
0
361
0
220
328
135

Fig. 5.2 presents the defender’s optimal budget allocation strategies for the test system
at the Nash equilibrium of the proposed game from state s1 to state s11 . In this figure, we
can see that different defense budget allocation strategies are derived in various system
states. For instance, at state s1 , the defender focuses on distributing its budgets on Lines
1, 3, 4 and 5, which are critical transmission lines that can cause more than 300 MW of
load must be shed if failed. In contrast, the defender shifts its focus to Lines 2 and 6 at
state s7 , which can only lead to 27 MW of load to be shed if failed. This observation can
be explained according to the difference between state s1 and s7 . At state s1 , all transmission lines of the grid are operated normally. Thus, the defender should implement more
budgets on protecting critical transmission lines that can lead to severe physical damages
if failed. However, at state s7 , Lines 2 and 6 have already been out of service. Although
Lines 2 and 6 can cause less physical impacts on the system if failed, the defender need to
implement more budgets on repairing them to avert a cascading failure on other transmission lines. Furthermore, in all broken states from s2 to s11 , Lines 2 and 6 are implemented
of more than 26% budgets, while, in normal state s1 , none budget is distributed on these
two lines. This observation shows that Lines 2 and 6 would took important roles if some
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Figure 5.3: The attack budget allocation strategies for the test system at the Nash equilibrium of the proposed game from state s1 to state s11 .

test system lines broken.
Fig. 5.3 presents the attacker’s optimal budget allocation strategies for the test system
at the Nash equilibrium of the proposed game from state s1 to state s11 . In Fig. 5.3, we can
also find that the attack budget allocation strategies at the Nash equilibrium varies with
different system states. However, compared with the defender’s optimal budget allocation
strategies, the attacker implements its budgets on only one or two transmission lines from
state s2 to s11 , which are broken states. This observation can be explained based on less
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attack budgets are owned by the attacker for allocation. Therefore, the attacker should
implement more budgets on limited critical transmission lines to increase the probability
of the successful attack action. Furthermore, from state s2 to s11 , the attacker distributes
its main budgets on broken transmission lines to disrupting the repair of the broken transmission lines. For instance, at state s2 , the attacker distribute its almost 50% budget on
Lines 1 and 50% budget on Lines 2. And the attacker shifts its focus to Lines 1 and 3 at
state s3 .
The attacker and defender’s Nash equilibrium strategies from state s1 to state s11
for the test system have been derived by solving the proposed stochastic game. The
two players’ optimal budget allocation strategies can be used to assess and quantify the
associated risk faced by the test system for the corresponding state. Here, we assume that
BA = BD = 10, and Fig. 5.4 presents the quantified risks faced by the test system from
state s1 to state s11 with various discount factors γ. In this figure, the x-axis represents
the discount factor γ ranging from 0 to 0.9, and the y-axis shows the corresponding risk
(MW). In this figure, we can see that different quantified risks are derived as we vary γ.
Small values of γ emphasize near-term gains while large values emphasize future rewards.
If γ = 0, the proposed stochastic game becomes a static game, where only the current
state is considered. For instance, at states s2 , s4 , s6 , s7 , and s9 , as we increase γ from 0
(static game) to 0.9 (stochastic game), the risk reduction reaches up to 87.99%, 87.89%,
87.57%, 82.76%, and 87.41%. Although, at states s5 , s8 , and s10 , the risk is increased
as we increase γ from 0 to 0.9, the risk increase only reaches up to 2.76%, 0.22%, and
1.47%.
The attack and defense budgets, denoted by B A and B D are also key contributors to
the risk variation. Given the discount factor γ = 0.5, Fig. 5.5 presents the risk variation
at state s1 of the proposed game for the test system with respect to various budgets of the
attacker and defender. In this figure, we can see that the risk faced by the grid diminishes
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Figure 5.4: The risk in each of eleven states for the test system with the discount factor
γ ranging from 0 to 0.9.
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Figure 5.5: The risk at state s1 of the proposed game for the test system with respect to
the various budgets of the attacker and defender that can be implemented at a time.

accordingly with the increase of B D . However, the reduction rate of the risk will be
gradually decreased. For instance, for B A = 10, the increase of B D from 10 to 40 yields
13.09 times of risk reduction than the increase of B D from 40 to 70. On the contrary,
to increase the probability of successful attacks and corresponding risks, the increase of
B att is much less effective. For example, for B D = 70, the addition of B A from 10 to 40
yields the almost same risk increase with the addition of B D from 40 to 70. The above
quantitative analysis provides a basis for the investment of the defense budget B D and
optimal defense budget allocations.

5.6

Summary

In this chapter, we have presented a novel game-theoretic approach for the risk assessment of coordinated cyber-physical attacks against power grids, while considering the
finite budget owned by the attacker and defender that will have an important influence
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on the assessment. We have formulated a two-player zero-sum stochastic game between
the attacker and defender in which each player seeks to maximize its respective minimum
rewards under the opponent’s optimal strategy. In order to quantify their rewards, the
optimal load shedding technology is introduced to determine the minimum cost of shed
load. Using these quantified rewards as inputs, the attacker and defender’s Nash equilibrium strategies about its budget allocation are derived by solving the proposed stochastic
game. At the Nash equilibrium of the game, the optimal attack and defense budget allocation strategies can be obtained, in terms of attacking/protecting the critical elements of
the grid. The probability of successful attacks and corresponding physical impacts on the
grid can be used to assess the risk for various states of the power grid, and the optimal defense budget allocation is formulated in terms of the corresponding risk. The IEEE 9-bus
grid is used as the test system, and simulation results have shown that different risks are
derived as we vary the attack/defense budget.
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CHAPTER 6
Multimodal Data-Driven Framework for DER Attack Detection

This chapter presents a multimodal data-driven framework for the attack detection in
power distribution systems integrated with a large-scale of distributed energy resources
(DERs). Section 6.1 makes an overview of this chapter. Section 6.2 introduces the cyber
attack models in DER systems. Section 6.3 describes the proposed DER attack detection
framework. Section 6.4 develops a test distribution system. Section 6.5 compares the
experimental results of the proposed attack detection framework with existing works,
while Section 6.6 concludes the chapter and outlines the future work.

6.1

Overview

The power grid architecture is currently evolving from a utility-centric structure to a distributed cyber-physical system (CPS) integrated with a large-scale of distributed energy
resources (DERs) [134]. The implementation of DERs requires electric utilities to coordinate grid control functions with customers and other energy providers, which demands
a wide-area communication for remotely controlling customer owned DERs. While smart
meters and advanced metering infrastructure (AMI) already significantly expand the utilities’ attack surfaces, DER deployments present additional risks due to the tremendous
number of devices and access points that operate outside the typical utility’s administrative domain. Therefore, cyber attacks could exploit vulnerabilities in the end-user devices
such as smart meters and renewable energy resources, thereby compromising the power
grid. Moreover, the high scalability of DER deployments and the existence of uncertainties in power distribution systems make the quick and accurate detection of DER cyber
attacks challenging [135].
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To detect targeted cyber attacks and achieve attack resilience, there is a requirement
for continuous monitoring of DERs and their interactions with power distribution systems in real-time [136]. The anomalies within the physical systems can be used for the
DER cyber attack detection. If cyber attacks are beginning to manipulate the operation
of DERs, a variety of smart meters and micro-PMUs on power distribution systems can
be utilized to evaluate which DER devices and customers are misoperating and what malicious functions they are performing. Additionally, historical data describing the DER
operation can help identify anomalies and potential attacks. As a result, it is useful and
effective to predict the DER system states and detect potential cyber attacks through measurement data-driven approaches.
Recently, a wealth of efforts have been proposed for the cyber attack detection in
the power grid using the advanced data analytics, such as supervised learning, unsupervised learning, and statistics-based learning approaches [38–41]. In [38], a decision tree
based anomaly detection approach was presented to secure the power grid communication network from distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks. A malware infection
detection using Kernel Fisher discriminant analysis was proposed in [39] by comparing
malware traffic with normal traffic. An intrusion detection system was developed in [40]
for early detection of threats in AMI of smart grid, where a multi-support vector machine
(SVM) classifier was trained. In [41], a Sybil attack detection method based on k-Nearest
Neighbours (kNN) classification was introduced for the vehicle-to-grid (V2G) networks.
However, all of these machine learning methods need to be evaluated to guide the selection of mechanisms that are most suitable for the DER cyber attack detection. Moreover,
techniques should be developed to handle the complex and high dimensional DER measurement data, whereas maintain the accuracy of the attack detection mechanisms.
Feature learning is a key to improve the performance of existing data analytics based
attack detection mechanisms, which consists of feature extraction and selection. Fea-
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ture extraction transforms the original features into a more meaningful representation by
reconstructing its inputs and involves reducing the amount of resources required to describe a large dataset. There are two broad categories for feature extraction algorithms
including linear and nonlinear. Linear feature extraction algorithms, such as principal
component analysis (PCA) [42], multidimensional scaling [43], and principal coordinates
analysis [44], assume the data lies on a lower-dimensional linear subspace and projects
them on this subspace using matrix factorization. However, nonlinear feature extraction
algorithms like self organizing maps (SOMs) [45] and Kohonen maps [46] create a lower
dimensional mapping of an input by preserving its topological characteristics.
Performance of attack detection mechanisms is heavily dependent on the choice of
applied features, and feature selection is to identify the most informative features from
the original and extracted feature sets. Typically, feature selection is partitioned into
three classes: filters, wrappers, and embedded methods. Filter methods analyze intrinsic
properties of dataset ignoring the type of classifier. Conversely, wrappers use classifiers
to score a given subset of features, and embedded methods inject the selection process
directly into the classification learning process. In this chapter, the filter methods are utilized to evaluate different types of classifiers for the DER attack detection. Among the
most used filter-based strategies, Relief algorithm [47] estimates the quality of features
according to how well their values distinguish between instances that are closer to each
other. Another effective yet fast filter method is the Fisher method [48], which computes
a score for a feature as the ratio of inter-class separation and intra-class variance, where
features are evaluated independently. In [49], a mutual information (MI) based approach
is proposed, and the quality of a given feature is evaluated by the MI between the distribution of the values of this feature and the membership to a particular class.
This chapter introduces a novel sparse feature extraction and a modified filter based
feature selection into an ensemble classifier, and formulates a multimodal data-driven de-
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tection framework for identifying the abnormal events within DER implementation. In
order to differentiate the attacked DER measurements from fault scenarios in the generated abnormal event list, the spatiotemporal correlation analysis is finally applied to each
measurement to quantify the differentiable characteristics of this measurement from other
correlated measurements. The main contributions of the chapter contain:
• Develop a two layer stacked denoising autoencoder (SAE) for feature extraction,
and construct the low dimensional abstract features from the original DER measurement data;
• Propose a modified Relief based feature selection algorithm to identify the most
relevant features;
• Train a decision tree based ensemble classifier using the selected features for identifying the abnormal events in DER measurement data;
• Implement a spatiotemporal correlation based approach for each DER measurement
to classify the cyber attacks and system faults in the generated abnormal event list;
• Formulate a test distribution system integrated with DERs for simulating the normal, fault, and attack scenarios, and compare the attack detection performance of
the proposed framework with existing works.

6.2
6.2.1

DER System Model and Adversary Model
DER System Model

A CPS architecture is developed to model the cyber-physical integration of DER systems
into the power grid, as depicted in Fig. 6.1, which consists of four main domains: 1) transmission operation and control, 2) distribution utility communication and control, 3) DER
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devices and controllers, and 4) third parties. The high penetration of DERs in Domain 3
leads to a large number of distributed energy devices, such as smart inverters and battery
controllers, which could vastly outnumber the utility owned and controlled resources. In
addition, the DERs span multiple security administrative domains, meaning that the utility
may only be able to monitor the security posture of devices up to the smart meter while
DER owners in Domain 4 control and manage their devices themselves. Furthermore,
a variety of communication networks (e.g., utility wide area network (WAN)) used to
control the DERs will likely be interconnected with DER local area network (LAN) and
related IT networks, thereby increasing the attack surfaces. All of these features introduce
many new threats to both DER instances and the broader grid, and potential attacks listed
in Fig. 6.1 include:
• Attack 1: Malicious commands to DERs over utility WAN;
• Attacks 2-3: Malware or unauthorized control over DER control devices to manipulate their operation;
• Attacks 4-6: Additional attack vectors to access DER components through interconnected networks;
• Attack 7: Novice system owners and administrators;
• Attack 8: Compromised wide-area monitoring, protection, and control (WAMPAC)
applications negatively influence the operation of a large number of DERs.
In the physical layer of the architecture, the DERs in the distribution system include
solar PV, battery energy storage systems, diesel generators, and electric vehicles (EVs),
while wind turbine generators (wind farms) are connected at the sub-transmission and
transmission levels. In addition, in power flow calculations, all DER devices except diesel
generators are modeled as constant active (P) and reactive (Q) power generators connected
at the corresponding bus. The diesel generators are treated as constant active power (P)
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Figure 6.1: CPS architecture of the power grid integrated with a large-scale of distributed energy resources (DERs) and its cyber security risk.
and constant voltage (V) bus. The PCC point with the bulk grid is considered as the slack
bus. In the cyber layer, the control architectures and communication networks of the DER
implementation directly determine the risk exposure from cyber attacks. Multiple devices
are involved in controlling DERs, especially smart inverters, DER controllers, and battery controllers. Models can be developed using cyber-architectural languages such as
data ow diagrams or the architectural analysis and design language. Specific properties
of DER control and communication that need to be modelled include: (1) communication protocols (e.g., IEEE 1815 (DNP3), IEC 61850-7-420, SEP (Smart Energy Prole)
2.0, and SunSpec Modbus) tailored for the control of DER devices; (2) unicast, multicast,
and broadcast communication topologies for DER messages; (3) dierent messaging patterns such as request reply, publish subscribe, push-pull, exclusive pair, and client-server;
and (4) smart inverter control functions including volt/var management, frequency/watt
management, status reporting, and time synchronization.
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6.2.2

Adversary Model

Consider a power distribution system integrated with DERs, and let M be the set of DER
devices in this system, where |M| = m. Assume that the control center collects the
DER measurements of different physical quantities (e.g., voltages and currents) from M
for a time period T . Hence, the collected time series measurement set can be defined as
(t)

(t)

X := {x(t) |t ∈ T }, where x(t) is an m-dimensional vector [x1 , ..., xm ]T ∈ Rm , and its
elements correspond to m DER device measurements. An attacker could compromise a
subset of DER devices and manipulate their measurements such that any operational decision made based on these measurements could trigger unwarranted control actions for the
true system state. There are various types of cyber attacks targeted at DERs. In the following parts, four specific cyber attack models are presented consisting of denial-of-service
(DoS) attack, fault replay attack, data manipulation attack, and device misconfiguration
attack.
Assume that the attacker has limited resources and could only compromise mA DER
devices for a time period T A ⊆ T . Define the set of compromised DER devices as
MA ⊆ M, where |MA | = mA . For DoS attacks, the attacker could jam the communication channels, attack networking protocols, and flood the network traffic to make the
DER measurement packets sent from sensors to be lost. Hence, ∀t ∈ T A , DER device
(t)

i measurement xi , i ∈ MA , is set to be NA. Fault replay attacks attempt to emulate a
valid fault by alerting system measurements followed by sending an illicit trip command
to relays at the ends of the lines. This attack may lead to confusion and potentially cause
an operator to take invalid control actions. For each compromised DER device i ∈ MA ,
(t)

the fault replay attack involves replacing the measurement xi , t ∈ T A , by a historical
valid fault measurement.
Correspondingly, data manipulation attacks refer to inject false data into the DER
measurements by hacking into the communication network. Here, two types of data ma-
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nipulation attacks are studied: 1) for each DER device i ∈ MA , a zero-mean white noise
(t)

is added into the measurement sequence: {xi + |t ∈ T A }; 2) a uniformly distributed
random number in the interval (a, b) is injected into the measurement of DER device
(t)

i ∈ MA : {xi + rand(a, b)|t ∈ T A }. In addition, an attacker can manipulate the droop
characteristic or references setpoints of DER control systems, which can cause changes
in the outputs of DERs or system frequency. For example, a scaling attack parameter λA is
(t)

injected into the device i measurement to change the magnitude: {(1 + λA )xi |t ∈ T A },
where i ∈ MA .
All of these cyber attacks could cause instabilities in the underlying physical system
or force the system to operate at uneconomical operating conditions due to non-optimal
control actions. This chapter aims to formulate a data-driven framework to identify the
compromised DER devices based on the collected measurements, and provide a performance analysis on the proposed DER attack detection mechanism.

6.3

DER Attack Detection Framework

In this section, we formulate a multimodel DER attack detection framework, whose main
objective is to: 1) reduce the cost of DER measurement collection; 2) improve detection
rates and reduce false alarms; and 3) control the attack detector training time. As depicted
in Figure 6.2, the basic procedure of the multimodel attack detection framework consists
of:
1. DER measurement data collection and preprocessing;
2. Sparse feature extraction;
3. Filter based feature selection;
4. DER anomaly detector training and postprocessing;
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Figure 6.2: Flowchart for the multimodel DER attack detection framework.
5. DER anomaly list generation;
6. Spatialtemporal correlation analysis for anomalies;
7. DER cyber attack and fault scenarios classification.
In particular, the SAE is introduced for the sparse feature extraction, and a Relief based
feature selection algorithm is proposed to select the most relevant features with a lower
dimensionality from the total of input and extracted feature sets.

6.3.1

SAE based Feature Extraction

An autoencoder mainly contains two parts including an encoder and a decoder. Given
a measurement point x(t) ∈ X with m DER features, the encoder first maps it to a
0

m0 (< m)-dimensional hidden representation (feature) y (t) ∈ Rm through a deterministic mapping y (t) = sf (W x(t) + b), where sf (·) is a nonlinear activation function pa0

rameterized by a m0 × m weight matrix W and a bias vector b ∈ Rm . The derived
latent representation y (t) is then mapped by the decoder back to a reconstructed vector
z (t) ∈ Rm in input space: z (t) = sg (W 0 y (t) + b0 ), where sg (·) is the decoder’s activation
function parameterized by a m × m0 weight matrix W 0 and a bias vector b0 ∈ Rm . In
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this chapter, the autoencoder is assumed to have tied weights, where W 0 = W T . Each
x(t) ∈ X is thus mapped to a corresponding y (t) and a reconstruction z (t) . The parameters
θ = {W , b, b0 } of the autoencoder is optimized through minimizing the reconstruction
loss L(x(t) , z (t) ):
θ ∗ = arg min L(x(t) , z (t) ) = min L(x(t) , sg (sf (x(t) ))),
θ

θ

(6.1)

where loss L(x(t) , z (t) ) is defined from cross-entropy:
T
m
1 X X (t)
(t)
(t)
(t)
L=−
[xi log(zi ) + (1 − xi ) log(1 − zi )].
T t=1 i=1

(6.2)

Due to the large scalability of the power distribution system integrated with DERs, the
anomalies caused by limited attack resources usually lie in sparse regions of the extracted
feature space Y := {y (t) |t ∈ T }. In order to keep the sparsity of the autoencoder, the
P
(t)
average output of each extracted feature j: ρ̂j = T1 Tt=1 yj , j = 1, ..., m0 , is enforced
to a sparsity parameter ρ0 close to zero. To achieve this, a sparsity regularization based
on Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence is added into the optimization objective (6.1) that
penalizes ρ̂j deviating significantly from ρ0 :
0

∗

(t)

(t)

θ = arg min L(x , z ) + λS
θ

m
X

KL(ρ0 kρ̂j ),

(6.3)

j=1

0
, and parameter λS controls the weight
where KL(ρ0 kρ̂j ) = ρ0 log ρρ̂0j + (1 − ρ) ) log 1−ρ
1−ρ̂j

of the sparsity regularization.
Furthermore, to enforce robustness to partially destroyed or missing DER measurements, a modified denoising autoencoder is trained to reconstruct a repaired input from
a corrupted version, which is done by first corrupting the initial input x(t) into x̃(t) by
means of a stochastic mapping x̃(t) ∼ qD (x̃(t) |x(t) ). Corrupted input x̃(t) is then mapped,
as with the basic autoencoder, to a hidden representation ỹ (t) = sf (W x̃(t) + b), from
which we reconstruct z̃ (t) = sg (W 0 ỹ (t) + b0 ). The overall objective function of the de-
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Figure 6.3: Network Architecture of SAE for Feature Extraction.
noising (sparse) autoencoder is:
0

m
X
(t)
θ = arg min L(x , z̃ ) + λ
KL(ρkρ̃j ),
∗

(t)

θ

s.t.
where ρ̃j =

1
T

PT

t=1

j=1

(6.4)

x̃(t) ∼ qD (x̃(t) |x(t) ),

(t)

ỹj , j = 1, ..., m0 , and qD (x̃(t) |x(t) ) denotes x̃(t) = x(t) + ε, where

ε is a zero-sum white Gaussian noise, x̃(t) ∼ N (0, δ 2 ), and δ is the standard deviation of
x(t) .
The SAE is a neural network consisting of multiple layers of denoising autoencoders,
which can generate different levels of new features by adding hidden layers. In this chapter, we construct two layer SAE as shown in Fig. 6.3, where two denoising autoencoders
are trained in a layer-wise manner. The input vector x(t) ∈ X is fed to Input Layer for
training Hidden Layer 1 of the first autoencoder. The outputs of the first autoencoder are
propagated to Hidden Layer 2 for deriving the second autoencoder. The overall process of
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encoding is y (t) = sf 1 (sf 2 (W x(t) +b)), where sf i (·), i = 1, 2, is the encoding function of
Hidden Layer i. Correspondingly, the decoding process is: z (t) = sg1 (sg2 (W 0 y (t) + b0 )),
where sgi (·), i = 1, 2, is the decoding function of Hidden Layer i. The neurons of Hidden
Layer 2 are used as extracted features of DER measurements, and Final Layer implements
the softmax function for identifying the abnormal measurements based on the extracted
features.

6.3.2

Relief based Feature Selection

Due to the increasing dimensionality of DER features, feature selection plays a critical
role in the attack detection for reducing computational complexity and enhancing detection performance. The key idea of Relief based algorithms is to estimate each feature
weight based on its ability to differentiate between neighboring features. Define the DER
0

feature set to be D := {d(t) |t ∈ T }, where d(t) = (x(t) , y (t) ) ∈ Rm+m is composed
of the original measurement x(t) ∈ X and its extracted feature y (t) ∈ Y through SAE.
(t)

(t)

Given a randomly selected feature vector d(t) = [d1 , ..., dm+m0 ]T , the Relief algorithm
first searches for its two nearest neighbors: one from the same class, termed the nearest
hit NH(d(t) ), and the other from the different class, called the nearest miss NM(d(t) ).
Let the feature weight vector to be w = [w1 , ..., wm+m0 ]T and the margin of d(t) to be
P
P
0
0
(t)
(t)
(t)
|di − NHi (d(t) )|. The optimal weight vector
ρd = m+m
|di − NMi (d(t) )|− m+m
i=1
i=1
w∗ then can be derived through maximizing the averaged margin computed with respect
to w:

0

T
m+m

1 X X
(t)
wi |di − NMi (d(t) )|
w = arg max
w
T t=1
i=1
∗

−

0
m+m
X

(t)
wi |di

i=1

s.t.

kwk22 = 1, w ≥ 0,
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− NHi (d )| ,
(t)

(6.5)

where the constraints correspond to the boundary of w. However, the objective function
of (6.5) only considers the nearest neighbors for calculating the averaged margin. Thus,
the performance of Relief algorithm may be greatly deteriorated when a large amount of
irrelevant features included in the dataset.
To increase the algorithm reliability, a modified objective function is proposed by
searching for all hits/misses of each feature vector d(t) ∈ D instead of only the nearest
0

0

hit/miss. We first define M(t) = {t0 |label(d(t ) ) 6= label(d(t) )} and H(t) = {t0 |label(d(t ) ) =
label(d(t) ), t0 6= t} as the miss and hit sets of d(t) , respectively. By using the pairwise
distances that have been computed when searching for the nearest hit and miss, the prob0

ability of d(t ) , ∀t0 ∈ M(t) , being the nearest miss of d(t) can be defined as:
Pm+m0
(t0 ) 
(t)
wi |di − di |
i=1
0 (t)
PM (t |d , w) = P
.
Pm+m0
(t)
(t00 ) 
w
|d
−
d
|
(t)
00
i
i
i
t ∈M
i=1

(6.6)

0

Similarly, ∀t0 ∈ H(t) , the probability of d(t ) being the nearest hit of d(t) can be defined
as:
PH (t0 |d(t) , w) = P

Pm+m0
i=1

t00 ∈H (t)

(t0 ) 
(t)
wi |di − di |

Pm+m0
i=1

(t)

(t00 )

wi |di − di

.
|

(6.7)

Finally, w can be derived by solving the following problem:
T
1 X X
PM (t0 |d(t) , w)
w = arg max
w
T t=1 0 (t)
t ∈M

X
0 (t)
−
PH (t |d , w) ,
∗

(6.8)

t0 ∈H (t)

s.t.

kwk22 = 1, w ≥ 0.

The feature weight wi , i = 1, ..., m + m0 , is updated after integrating all of the feature
vectors in D. In order to select the important features, a threshold σ > 0 is selected, and
the feature satisfying w > σ is collected for DER anomaly detection.
Let S = {s1 , s2 , ..., sN } be the index set of the selected N DER features, the selected
(t)

feature set then can be defined as DS = {{ds |s ∈ S}|t ∈ T }. An ensemble classifier is
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implemented to classify DS into “Normal” and “Anomaly”, in which P subsets of tuples
of size n(< N ) are created by uniformly sampling from DS with replacement. Therefore,
P subsets {D1 , ..., DP } are generated and P decision tree classifiers {C1 , ..., CP } are built
on each subset Di , i = 1, .., P . A final ensemble classifier classifies a DER feature
(t)

example {ds |s ∈ S} by giving as output the class predicted most often by {C1 , ..., CP }.
In addition, the ensemble classifier can be implemented for the parallel computing, in
which each subset Di resides on a different processor within the parallel computer.

6.3.3

DER Fault and Cyber Attack Classification

Situation awareness of the anomaly event such as a system fault or cyber attack is critical
for utility operators to make a reaction. Specially, this chapter propose a spatiotemporal correlation based approach to accurately extract patterns of system faults and cyber
attacks from the generated DER anomaly list derived by the ensemble classifier. Spatiotemporal correlation is a natural property found in various physical phenomena including power system fault scenarios, since the system components are typically continuous
over both the time and spatial domains. For the spatial domain, the DERs, such as PV
farm and battery storage, deployed in a nearby area are interdependent in such a way that
the fault of one DER device would affect the power quality of other independent devices
and may cause the faults of other DERs. In addition, these spatial correlations should be
similar to those that have occurred in the past, that is, these DER devices are temporally
correlated.
Define the anomaly measurement set to be XD = {x(t) |t ∈ T D }, where T D ⊆ T
denotes for the anomaly period. Each anomaly x(t) ∈ XD is an m-dimensional vector
corresponding to m DER devices. Given two DER devices (i, j ∈ M), the correlation
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coefficient ρij between two is:
P
(t)
− µi ) t∈T D (xDj − µj )
qP
ρij = qP
,
(t)
(t)
2
2
(x
−
µ
)
(x
−
µ
)
i
j
i
j
t∈T D
t∈T D
P

(t)
t∈T D (xDi

(t)

(6.9)

(t)

where µi and µj are the means of device measurement {xi |t ∈ T D } and {xj |t ∈ T D },
respectively. In this approach, we first define a correlation sphere G satisfying that, for
each DER device pair (i, j) ∈ G, the correlation coefficient ρij between two is greater
than a constant threshold τ ∈ (0, 1). Thus, the correlation neighbor set Ni of device
i ∈ G contains all the DER devices in G excluding i. The definition of correlation sphere
can guarantee that all of DER devices in G are spatially and temporally correlated in
fault scenarios. However, in the DER cyber attack scenarios, assume that the attacker has
limited resources and cannot access all DER devices in G, therefore, the attacked DER
device will not be correlated with the other DER devices in its neighbor set. Given a DER
device i ∈ G, let |Ni | be the number of DER devices in its neighbor set, and |NiD | be the
correlated DER device number in XD . If

|NiD |
|Ni |

> 50%, DER device i is classified into a

fault scenarios. Otherwise, its measurement is under cyber attacks.

6.4

Test System and Dataset Formulation

A test distribution system, shown in Fig. 6.4, is used for simulating system scenarios and
formulating corresponding DER measurement datasets. The developed test system is a
modified version of the IEEE 34-bus system. The test distribution system is integrated
with four types of DERs including PV farm, wind turbine generator (wind farm), utility
scale battery energy system, and diesel generator, where DERs are connected to a distribution node via a transformer having rating equal to the volts-ampere (VA) rating of
DERs. In the test system, the nominal voltage level is set to be 12.47 kV L-L; PV farm
is rated at 5 MW with modeled MPPT controller, DC-DC converter, and a three-phase
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Figure 6.4: The test distribution system integrated with four types of DERs.
inverter; wind farm is modeled using a single doubly fed induction generator of 7.5 MVA
capacitor including major components, such as rotor-side converter (RSC), grid-side converter (GSC), pitch controller, and two mass model for wind turbines; battery bank is
rated at 360 kW, 828 kWh with terminal voltage of 720 V dc, and the battery inverter is
rated at 540 kVA to provide enough reactive power support to the feeder; diesel generator is rated at 6.25 MVA with diesel engine governor, and IEEE AC1A type excitation
system. The battery inverter, PV inverter, and wind generator have the provision operated
in one of the following three modes of control:
1. Voltage control mode: With the voltage setpoint decided by the grid operator and the
DER tries to maintain its point of common coupling voltage at the desired setpoint.
2. Reactive power control mode: With the reactive power set point decided by the grid
operator and the DER tracks the reactive power setpoint.
3. Power factor control mode: With the power factor at the DER point of common
coupling decided by the grid operator and the DER tracks the power factor setpoint.
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Table 6.1: Simulated Scenarios For Test Distribution System
State

No.

Normal S1
Fault

Cyber
Attack

Scenario Description
Normal system operation and no event occurring.

S2

Three phase fault on Line 1.

S3

Three phase fault on Line 16.

S4

Two three phase faults on both Line 1 and 16.

S5-S9

Five types of attacks on PV farm power measurement.

S10-S14 Five types of attacks on wind farm RMS measurement.
S15-S19 Five types of attacks on battery power measurement.
S20-S24 Five types of attacks on diesel power measurement.
S25-S29 Five types of attacks on distribution node measurement.

In addition, the system is designed to operate in both radial system and loop configuration,
and has a provision to operate in both islanded and grid connected modes.
The system scenarios simulated by the test system are utilized to train and validate
the proposed DER attack detection framework, which have been grouped into three categories: 1) normal operation; 2) three phase line-to-ground faults; and 3) cyber attacks.
Given a initial system state, Table 6.1 lists the 29 simulated system scenarios, where each
scenario is named with capital “S” along with a number. For scenario S1, the test distribution system is in the normal operation state without abnormal events occurring. Three
phase line-to-ground faults are injected into the distribution lines for fault scenarios S2S4 simulation. Specially, S2 represents a scenario, in which a three phase fault is injected
into Line 1, and S3 shows the scenario that a three phase fault occurs on Line 16. Two
three phase faults are instantaneously injected into both Line 1 and 16 for S4.
For scenarios S5-S29, the five types of cyber attacks proposed in Section II, including DoS attack, fault replay attack, two types of data manipulation attack, and device
misconfiguration attack, are simulated for the distribution node and each DER in the test
distribution system. Especially, S5-S9 simulate five types of cyber attacks on the PV
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farm power measurement, respectively. S10-S14 inject five types of cyber attacks targeted at the root mean square (RMS) measurement of WTG. S15-S19 represent five types
of cyber attacks on the battery bank power measurement. S20-S24 describe five types
of cyber attacks for the diesel generator power measurement. In addition, S25-S29 show
five types of cyber attacks on the distribution node power measurement. Taking the real
power measurement of the distribution node as example, Fig. ?? presents its normal measurement (S1), fault measurement (S2), DoS attack (S25), fault replay attack (S26), two
types of data manipulation attacks (S27-S28), and device misconfiguration attack (S29),
respectively.
The collected dataset consists of data logs associated with 2 × 105 simulated instances
for each system scenario. Each data log is a CSV file with labeled tuples including 21
types of measurement data and a time stamp. The 21 data sources are collected from
the distribution node and four types of DERs including PV farm, WTG, battery energy
system, and diesel generator. The real & reactive power measurements and three phase
V-I measurements are collected for the distribution node and PV farm. The RMS measurement is selected for WTG. For battery energy system, the real & reactive power measurements, the State of Charge (SoC) measurement, RMS measurement, and grid real &
reactive power measurements are gathered together. The real & reactive power measurements and RMS measurement are collected for the diesel generator. In addition, relay
information, breaker events, snort alerts, and control panel alerted are logged for the
dataset. The simulation timestep is set to be 50 µs, and all logged data is merged into a
single dataset.
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6.5

Numerical Experiment

This section evaluates the performance of the proposed DER attack detection framework
using the test dataset, in which the dataset of fault and cyber attack scenarios is labeled
as “Anomaly”, while the dataset simulated in normal conditions is named as “Normal”.
First, the dataset is preprocessed through normalization and balancing. The SAE based
feature extraction and Relief based feature selection are then introduced for an ensemble
classifier for DER anomaly detection. Finally, the spatiotemporal correlation approach is
implemented to classify faults and cyber attacks in the generated anomaly list.

6.5.1

Data Preprocessing and Detection Evaluation Metrics

1) Data Normalization: The DER measurements contained in the test dataset are generally diverse in a flexible value, therefore, the preprocessing phase first implements data
normalization to transform all measurement ranges to be equal. The mean range method
(1)

(T )

is adopted, in which each device measurement xi = [xi , ..., xi ]T , i ∈ M, is linearly normalized in [0, 1] in order to avoid the undue influence of different scales. Given
(t)

a measurement point xi
(t)

zi =

(t)
xi −min(xi )

max(xi )−min(xi )

(t)

∈ xi , the normalized measurement zi

can be derived by:

, where min(xi ) and max(xi ) are the minimum and maximum val-

ues of device i measurement, respectively.
2) Data Balancing: In the test dataset, abnormal instances from scenarios S2-S29
significantly outnumber normal instances in S1, and the ratio between two is 28:1, which
is not a good representation of real situations. In addition, this property might be biased
to the attack detection model and affect its performance. To alleviate this, we balance
the dataset by randomly selecting the abnormal instances, and make the ratio between
normal and abnormal instances to be 1:1, which is an appropriate proportion for the model
training phase.
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3) Evaluation Metrics: In order to compare the performance of the proposed DER
attack detection framework with existing detection mechanisms, the following evaluation
metrics are implemented: Accuracy (Acc), Detection Rate (DR), Precision, False Alarm
Rate (FAR), F1 Score, Matthews Correlation Coefficient (Mcc),CPU Time of Model Building (TB ), and Prediction Speed (Sp ). In these metrics, Acc(%) represents the overall effectiveness of an algorithm. DR(%) refers to the number of anomaly detected divided by the
total number of abnormal instances, while Precision(%) counts the number of anomaly
detected among the total number of instances classified as anomaly. FAR(%) is the number of normal instances mistakenly classified as anomaly divided by the total number of
normal instances. F1 (%) measures the harmonic mean of Precision and DR. Mcc(%) represents the correlation coefficient between the detected and observed data. The proposed
DER attack detection framework aims to achieve a high Acc, DR, Precision, F1 , Mcc,
and Sp , and simultaneously maintain low FAR and TB .
The metrics can be defined by the following equations:
TP + TN
(%),
TP + TN + FP + FN
TP
(%),
DR =
TP + FN
FP
F AR =
(%),
TN + FP
2T P
F1 =
,
2T P + F P + F N
TP × TN − FP × FN
M cc = p
,
2
(T P + F P )(T P + F N )(T N + F P )(T N + F N )
Acc =

(6.10)

where TP is the number of intrusions correctly classified as an attack, TN is the number
of normal instances correctly classified as a benign packet, FN is the number of intrusions incorrectly classified as a benign packet, and FP is the number of normal instances
incorrectly classified as an attack.
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6.5.2

Sparse Feature Extraction and Selection

1) SAE based Feature Extraction: The SAE architecture with two hidden layers is utilized
to extract the new features from the preprocessed dataset, in which the features generated
from the first encoder layer are employed as the training data in the second encoder layer.
Meanwhile, the size of each hidden layer is decreased accordingly such that the encoder
in the second encoder layer learns an even smaller representation of the input data. The
classification layer with the softmax activation function is then implemented in the final
step. Although there is no strict rule for determining the number of hidden neurons, it is
generally selected from 70% to 90% of the input neurons [137]. In the formulated SAE
architecture, the first hidden layer is set to have 20 neurons. The SAE architecture is
then introduced for classifying the preprocessed dataset, and its performance is compared
for different numbers of second hidden layer neurons. The evaluation metrics including
Detection Rate (DR), False Alarm Rate (FAR), Accuracy (Acc), and F1 Score are shown
in Fig. 6.5 for the SAE architecture with varying the number of second hidden layer
neurons from 5 to 15. In Fig. 6.5(a), the formulated SAE architecture achieves similar
DR around 60% when the second hidden layer neurons are selected from 5 to 14, while
it only derives 40% DR when 15 second hidden layer neurons are defined. However,
when the second hidden layer is set to have 9 neurons, the least FAR of 15.8% is derived.
Meanwhile, in Fig. 6.5(b), the SAE architecture achieves the highest Acc (69.5%) and F1
(64.1%) for 9 second hidden layer neurons. As a result, the SAE architecture is chosen
with 21:20:9:2 topology.
2) Feature Selection: The preprocessed test dataset is then integrated with extracted
features from the second hidden layer of the SAE architecture. In the integrated dataset,
even though each instance is represented by various features, not all of these features
are needed to build an attack detection model. Therefore, it is important to identify the
most informative features from the integrated dataset to achieve higher performance. The
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Figure 6.5: The evaluation metrics of DR, FAR, Acc, and F1 for the formulated SAE
architecture with various numbers of second hidden layer neurons ranging from 5 to 15.
(a) for DR(%) and FAR(%), (b) for Acc(%) and F1 (%).
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proposed modified Relief based algorithm (MRelief) is compared with 7 state-of-the-art
algorithms for feature selection:
• Latent feature selection (LFS);
• Infinite latent feature selection (Inf-FS);
• Feature selection via eigenvector centrality (EC-FS);
• Distributed mutual information feature selection (DisMI);
• Unsupervised multi-cluster data feature selection (MC-FS);
• Generalized Fisher score for feature selection (Fisher);
• L1 regularized discriminative feature selection (L1-FS).
Based on the feature ranking/weight derived by these algorithms, the first 15 features
are selected as inputs from each algorithm for training and evaluating a decision tree
based ensemble classifier independently. The anomaly detection performance is measured
by DR, FAR, Acc, and F1 . Table 6.2 lists the feature selection algorithms compared,
where we note their types as filters and wrappers. The feature ranking/weight for total 30
features and the classification evaluation metrics are also reported. From the table, we can
find that MRelief achieves the best anomaly detection performance with the highest DR,
Acc, and F1 of 99.48%, 99.69%, and 99.69%, respectively. At the same time, the lowest
FAR (0.1%) is derived. In addition, based on the feature ranking/weight derived by these
algorithms, we can see that some features are essential for DER anomaly detection, such
as the power measurement data of the battery bank (Feature 19 and 20). This phenomenon
can be explained that the power of the battery bank will change significantly when some
faults or failures occur.
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Table 6.2: Anomaly Detection Comparison of Feature Selection Methods
Method

Type

MRelief
filter
LFS [138]
filter
Inf-FS [138]
filter
EC-FS [139]
filter
DisMI [49]
filter
MC-FS [140]
filter
Fisher [48]
filter
L1-FS [141] wrapper

6.5.3

Feature Ranking/Weight

DR(%)

FAR(%)

19,20,6,5,1,9,4,2,8,3,7,11,16,17,27,12,15,10,18,13,28,22,25,26,23,21,24,14,29,30
11,21,24,13,28,18,12,27,10,4,7,16,3,17,8,22,14,9,26,25,23,2,1,6,5,29,20,30,15,19
19,20,11,5,21,23,22,2,24,1,26,25,6,9,8,3,7,4,10,16,27,12,18,13,30,17,28,14,29,15
19,20,11,21,23,22,24,25,26,5,2,1,6,9,8,3,7,4,27,12,10,16,18,13,30,17,28,14,29,15
11,19,20,27,12,2,5,1,6,9,8,3,7,4,30,16,13,17,10,18,28,14,15,29,22,23,21,25,26,24
4,8,7,26,23,21,24,25,22,2,1,3,6,12,27,5,9,10,19,20,18,17,11,28,13,30,14,15,16,29
5,19,2,1,20,6,9,8,3,7,4,11,10,27,18,12,13,28,16,14,17,30,29,15,24,21,22,25,23,26
3,1,9,5,7,6,2,4,8,12,27,24,19,25,20,22,23,17,21,26,13,15,11,28,14,16,10,18,29,30

99.48
97.43
98.39
98.37
99.41
96.87
99.32
98.35

0.10
2.91
0.209
0.19
0.12
2.20
0.13
0.19

Acc(%) F 1 (%)
99.69
97.25
99.09
99.09
99.64
97.33
97.32
99.08

99.69
97.26
99.08
99.08
99.64
97.32
97.32
99.06

Comparisons With State-of-the-Art Methods

Based on the feature ranking derived by the MRelief, we compare the anomaly detection performance of the proposed ensemble classifier with three other decision tree based
classifiers including: 1) simple tree with 4 branch nodes, 2) medium tree with 20 branch
nodes, and 3) complex tree with 100 branch nodes. Fig. 6.6 plots the DR and FAR for the
four decision tree based classifiers with varying the number of selected features from 1
to 30. From this figure, we can find that the proposed ensemble classifier achieves higher
DR and lower FAR compared with other three classifiers, when more than 2 features are
selected for training the classification model. Especially, in Fig. 6.6(a), the proposed ensemble classifier achieves 99.48% DR after 15 features are selected, while the complex
tree obtains 90.8%, the medium tree derives 68.12%, and the simple tree only acquires
54.29%. Meanwhile, as shown in Fig. 6.6(b), the proposed ensemble classifier achieves
0.1% FAR after 15 features are selected, which is lower than 5.59% of the complex tree,
2.83% of the medium tree, and 2.17% of the simple tree. Additionally, in Fig. 6.6(a),
with the increasing of branch nodes, the decision tree based classifier can derive higher
DR. However, when more than 3 features are selected, the simple tree based classifier can
obtain lower FAR than medium and complex tree based classifiers, as depicted in Fig.
6.6(b).
We also compare the performance of the proposed ensemble classifier based DER
attack detection method against existing classification methods, such as Quadratic Dis-
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Detection Rate Comparison Between Decision Tree Related Algorithms
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Figure 6.6: The DR(%) and FAR(%) comparison between the decision tree based classifiers with various numbers of feature selected based on the feature ranking derived by
MRelief. (a) for DR; (b) for FAR.
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Table 6.3: Anomaly Detection Comparison With Existing Methods
Model Type

DR(%)

FAR(%)

Proposed Detection
Quadratic [39]
Logistic [142]
SVM [40]
kNN [41]

99.48
50.06
56.07
98.61
98.33

0.10
20.48
17.11
0.36
0.62

Acc(%) F 1 (%)
99.69
64.79
69.48
99.13
98.85

99.69
58.71
64.75
99.13
98.85

T B (s)
82.82
1.84
4.89
938.92
171.4

criminant Analysis, Logistic Regression Classifier, SVM, and Nearest Neighbor Classifier,
and their evaluation metrics, like DR, FAR, Acc, F1 , and the computing time for model
building (TB ), are provided in Table 6.3. Compared with other four existing algorithms,
we can see that the proposed DER attack detection algorithm shows the best performance
by achieving the highest DR (99.48%), Acc (99.69%) and F1 (99.69%), and the lowest
FAR (0.1%). Even though the nearest neighbor classifier and SVM algorithm derive the
competitive detection results, their TB are 2.07 and 11.34 times longer than the proposed
DER attack detection algorithm, respectively. The quadratic discriminant analysis and
logistic regression classifier consume less TB , whereas they only achieve Acc of 64.79%
and 69.48%, which are not satisfactory for accurate DER attack detection.

6.5.4

DER Fault and Cyber Attack Classification

Based on the spatiotemporal correlation in scenario S1, we define a correlation sphere G
including the real & reactive power measurements (P0 ,Q0 ) at the distribution node, the
real & reactive power measurements (PG ,QG ) and RMS measurement (RMSG ) for the
diesel generator, the RMS measurement data (RMSW ) for the wind generator, and the
real & reactive power measurements (PP ,QP ) for the PV farm. Therefore, we can define
the neighbor set of PP as: NPP = {P0 , Q0 , PG , QG , RMSG , RMSW , QP }. In the fault
scenarios S2-S4, the correlation ratio

|NPC |
P

|NPP |

for PP is 100%, 57.14%, 100%, respectively.
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Real Power Measurement at Distribution Node
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Figure 6.7: P0 measurement, PP measurement, and their coorelation coefficient ρij
change from time step 1 to 3000, where cyber attack occurs at PV farm from 500 to
1000, and a three phase fault occurs on Line 1 from 1500 to 2000.
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3000

However, for cyber attack scenarios S5-S9, the correlation ratio is only 14.29%, which is
less than 50%. Since the cyber attacks are injected into the PV power measurements in S5S9, PP is only spatiotemporally correlated with QP except other measurements in NPP .
In order to describe the spatiotemporal correlation approach in time series, we introduce
the measurements P0 and PP from time step 1 to 3000, where a fault replay attack is
injected into PP from time step 500 to 1000. Assume that a three phase line-to-ground
fault occurs on Line 1 from time step 1500 to 2000, Fig. 6.7 plots the measurements
(P0 ,PP ) and their coorelation coefficient ρij change from time step 1 to 3000. From this
figure, we can see that ρij decreases below 0.5 during the cyber attack period from 500 to
1000, whereas it keeps around 0.9 during the fault period from 1500 to 2000.

6.6

Summary

In this chapter, we introduced a novel DER cyber attack detection framework that integrates spare feature learning and spatiotemporal correlation analysis. First, a twolayer SAE architecture was formulated to extract the abstract representations from largevolume DER measurement datasets. The MRelief feature selection was then developed
to provide the feature ranking for both original measurements and extracted representations. Furthermore, we combined the SAE architecture and MRelief with a decision tree
based ensemble classifier for identifying the abnormal events in the DER measurement
dataset. The normal, fault, and cyber attack system scenarios simulated by the IEEE
34-bus test distribution system are utilized for training the proposed ensemble classifier.
Compared with existing detection methods such as decision tree, quadratic discriminant
analysis, logistic regression classifier, SVM, and nearest neighbor classifier, the proposed
DER anomaly detection framework achieved the best performance of 99.48% DR, 99.69%
Acc, 99.69% F1 , and only 0.1% FAR. Finally, a spatiotemporal correlation sphere is de-
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veloped for PV farm in the test distribution system for classifying the fault scenarios and
the potential cyber attacks in the generated abnormal event list.
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CHAPTER 7
A Distributed Intelligent Framework for Electricity Theft Detection

Electricity theft is a major contributor of non-technical losses in the distribution systems of the smart grid. However, owing to the resource-limitations of smart meters and
the privacy requirement of electricity usage data, theft detection has become a challenging task for electric utilities. To address this problem, a Distributed Intelligent Framework
for Electricity Theft Detection (DIFETD) is proposed and implemented in this chapter.
Section 7.1 make a summary of this chapter. A summary of related work is provided in
Section 7.2. Benford’s Analysis for preliminary theft detection is explained in Section
7.3. A Stackelberg game between utility and thieves is proposed in Section 7.4. LRT for
theft detection is described in Section 7.5. While Section 7.6 discusses data cleansing and
the results, Section 7.7 provides conclusion and future work.

7.1

Overview

The transformation of the traditional power grid into a smart grid capable of advanced
computing and communication functions, self-healing, and autonomy is expected to guarantee an improved efficiency, reliability, and security [143–145]. Advanced Metering
Infrastructure (AMI) is a key component of the smart grid, which brings together technologies deployed at the customer to the utility level and supports smart meters capable of
bidirectional communication [146]. However, proliferation of smart meters has rendered
the distribution system vulnerable to cyber-attacks [147, 148]. Particularly, electricity
theft is a major challenge for utilities, where malicious attackers alter usage measurements
collected by smart meters. According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration in
2016, between 1.5 and 2% of electricity in the U.S. is lost due to theft, costing utilities
as much as $6 billion annually [33, 149]. Although most traditional theft detection meth-
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ods consider both technical as well as Non-Technical Losses (NTLs), this chapter focuses
on NTLs caused by deliberate acts to manipulate electricity usage data by actors called
electricity thieves, referred to in this chapter as thieves.
The main contribution of this chapter is the development and implementation of a
data-driven Distributed Intelligent Framework for Electricity Theft Detection (DIFETD)
for smart meters. The proposed method first uses Benford’s Analysis [150] to study the
distribution of significant digits in a machine-generated data. The analysis is based on
Benford’s Law which states that the frequency of occurrence of the first significant digit
in a machine generated and natural data is around 30.1%, which is much higher than the
expected value of 11.1% [151]. The analysis compares the Probability Density Function (PDF) of the leading significant digits of the structured electricity usage data with
the baseline curve to which it must ideally adhere. Any violation therein signifies the
occurrence of suspected theft. The baseline curve is the PDF of the leading significant
digits of Fibonacci series which strictly conforms to Benford’s Law [152]. Therefore, the
Benford’s Analysis provides the first but important diagnostic of the dataset.
Additionally, the proposed method provides a mathematical approach to maximize
theft detection probability with minimum false positives. As shown in Fig. 7.1, for any
AMI data that fails Benford’s Analysis, the following steps are executed: 1) Implementation of Maximum Likelihood Estimator (MLE) for training historical usage data of customers and development of the adversary model of multiple thieves; 2) Formulation of
a Stackelberg game where the utility aims to maximize theft detection probability while
limiting false positives and the thieves engage in a non-cooperative strategic game by
stealing different amounts of electricity to maximize the trade-off between rewards and
probability of being detected; and 3) Application of the proposed game to obtain a Stackelberg equilibrium from which the customer sampling rate l and a threshold value are derived. Likelihood Ratio Test (LRT) at the sampling rate l and the derived threshold value
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Figure 7.1: Schematic of the proposed data-driven Distributed Intelligent Framework for
Electricity Theft Detection (DIFETD).

is implemented for classifying each customer into normal customers or thieves. Therefore, the specific meters being compromised are identified for final checking. It ensures
faster resolution, minimal latency, and identification of suspicious meters from which associated customers could be discovered. The proposed method was implemented using
real-world AMI interval data collected from an electric utility in Florida, USA, that contained multiple suspected electricity thefts. It is noteworthy that the terms attack and theft
are used interchangeably.

7.2

Related Work

The significance of cybersecurity for smart meters has been a well-researched topic in
the literature, where the focus is on ensuring power availability at all times.Traditional
research on electricity theft detection has focused on employing specific devices, like
wireless sensors and balance meters, to provide a high electricity theft detection accuracy [153, 154]. In [153], an AMI intrusion detection system was proposed to accurately
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detect electricity theft, where anti-tampering sensors were embedded into smart meters.
A set of trusted balanced meters were implemented in the distribution network of smart
grid to detect electricity theft [154]. Although these research works reduce the risks due
to unmeasured and non-billed usage of electricity, they do not identify specific meters
being compromised. Further, these methods significantly increase the cost of deploying
and operating millions of smart meters.
Despite cyber-physical vulnerabilities of smart meters, the high-resolution data is a
promising tool to complement traditional tools for theft detection, and is also considered
one of the preliminary tools for auditors [155–158]. A Fast NTL Fraud Detection (FNFD)
method using Recursive Least Squares (RLS) was proposed by [159] to detect frauds in
real-time, and its performance was shown to be better than Intrusion Detection Systems,
Binary Coded Grouping-based Inspection (BCGI) [160], NTL Fraud Detector (NFD) and
Difference-comparison-based detection [161]. However, it’s performance for real data
was not accounted for, nor was its convergence speed. Considering not all datasets conform to Benford’s Law, a model-based Digits Analysis was proposed using log-Pearson
Type IV model [162].
Additionally, statistics and machine learning have been used to train a classifier based
on detailed electricity usage measurements [163–166]. In [163], average historical electricity usage under the same conditions was used for constructing an electricity theft detector, and an alarm was raised if the average usage was below a predefined detection
threshold. Principal Component Analysis (PCA) based anomaly detection was proposed
in [164], where anomalies were deviations from the normal usage behavior. In [165],
usage data was proved to be non-stationary, and Auto-Regressive Integrated Moving Average (ARIMA) forecasting methods were proposed to validate readings. A Consumption Pattern-Based Energy Theft Detector (CPBETD) that employed a multi-class Support Vector Machine (SVM) for each customer was formulated in [166]. However, these
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works ignored the attack model of potential thieves, and the effectiveness of anomaly
detector was only evaluated based on a dataset of attack examples.
The problem of electricity theft detection was formulated as a game between the utility
and the thieves in [167], in which the utility intended to maximize the detection probability and minimize the investment in monitoring fraud, while each electricity thief was to
steal a certain amount of electricity and minimize the probability being detected. However, these works assume all electricity thieves as a player, and the competition between
thieves was ignored. If thieves add high loads to the distribution networks and steal electricity at the same time, the resulting power surges and electrical system failures can cause
power outages, causing thefts to be detected.

7.3

Benford’s Analysis

The first step in the proposed framework is Benford’s Analysis, as depicted by Fig.
7.1 [168]. Consider an electric utility serving a set of customers, denoted by N :=
{1, ..., N }. Assuming these customers have a similar preference of electricity usage however some customers have the ability to tamper with the smart meter data, they can be
separated into two classes, such as normal customers and thieves. The goal of this analysis is to determine whether the electricity usage data belonging to these N customers is
potentially tampered with or not.
It has been empirically proven by statisticians and mathematicians that PDF of the
leading significant digits of a data which is either randomly distributed or is a result of
mathematical operations on multiple randomly distributed data that is most likely to follow a trend as illustrated in Fig. 7.2 [169–171]. This is counter-intuitive to the presumption that the PDF of such digits should be uniformly distributed with a percentage
of occurrence around 11% each. Electricity usage falls under this category because it is
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Figure 7.2: Ideal vs. observed Benford’s distribution for normal meter dataset.
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derived by the product of voltage and current, both of which are randomly distributed.
Thus, by virtue of this property, this data is expected to conform to Benford’s Law. A
mathematical representation of Benford’s Law for first significant digits in decimal (base
10) system can be written as [172]:
1
P(d) = log10 (d + 1) − log10 (d) = log10 (1 + ),
d

(7.1)

where d is the first (leading) significant digit of the data and P(·) denotes the PDF of
the leading digit. PDF of the leading digits of Fibonacci series is used as the baseline
since real-world data does not conform with zero error. The frequency of occurrence
of the leading significant digits is expressed in percent for better intuition in Fig. 7.2.
Also shown in the same figure is the PDF of the leading significant digit frequency for
preprocessed meter data. It can be seen that this data is close to the ideal trend with a
small, acceptable deviation. A smart meter data that is tampered by humans is expected
to have a PDF that violates Benford’s Law.

7.4

Game Model for Strategic Interactions between Utility and Thieves

Let M := {1, ..., M } ⊆ N be the set of thieves among the N customers of an electric
utility. Then, a single leader, multi-follower Stackelberg game can be formulated between
the utility and M thieves to characterize and analyze strategic interactions between the
two. In this game, a subset from N customers is chosen for an anomaly detection test
D, aiming to reduce NTLs. Based on the limited sampling rate l, the utility intends
to maximize detection probability and minimize false positives, while the thieves interact
with one another using a non-cooperative game to identify optimal quantities of electricity
to steal in response to the utility’s detection strategy. In the following subsection, the
thieves’ game is first analyzed before finding the Stackelberg game solution.
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7.4.1

Thieves’ Non-cooperative Game Formulation

A non-cooperative game is formulated in this section to analyze optimal decision making
of M thieves in response to any arbitrary utility’s action. This game is formulated in
normal form, Ξ := hM, (Ai )i∈M , (Ri )i∈M i, where M is the set of M thieves. Ai is the
set of actions available to thief i ∈ M, where ai ∈ Ai is represented by the expected
amount of consumed and stolen electricity by thief i, denoted by qi and qiS , respectively.
Additionally, Ri (ai ) is the reward function of thief i under action ai . Thus, thief i selects
an action ai := {qi , qiS } that maximizes its reward Ri , which can be defined as below:
S
S
Ri (qi , qiS ) := B(qiS ) − pD
i (l, qi )P (qi ),

(7.2)

where B(·) represents the utility’s electricity billing function; B(qiS ) gives the amount
S
of electricity bill that is not paid by thief i; pD
i (l, qi ) denotes the probability of thief i

being detected when the sampling rate is l and the amount of stolen electricity is qiS ; and
P (qiS ) indicates the penalty function activated upon the successful detection of thief i for
stealing a power of qiS .
The reward function of each thief reflects the financial benefit obtained by stealing
electricity. Thus, for a given sampling rate l and theft detection mechanism D, the goal
of thief i is to optimize the following problem (Problem 1):
max Ri (ai , a−i )

ai ∈Ai

s.t.

S
D
0 ≤ pD
i (l, qi ) ≤ pimax ,

0 ≤ qiS ≤ qi ,

(7.3)

0 ≤ qi ≤ qmax ,
0≤

M
X

qi ≤ qTmax ,

i=1

where a−i denotes the actions of all thieves except thief i. In order to control the risk, pD
imax
represents the upper bound for the probability of being detected for thief i. qmax indicates
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the electricity usage limitation for thief i. Similarly, qTmax gives the total electricity usage
constraint for the community. Following this formulation, one popular solution of the
thieves’ game is the Generalized Nash Equilibrium (GNE) [126]:
Definition 7.4.1 Consider the proposed noncooperative game Ξ := hM, (Ai )i∈M , (Ri )i∈M i.
GNE is a state of the game in which each electricity thief aims at maximizing Problem
1. As a response to optimal chosen actions of other thieves, a thief aims at choosing the
actions, in the restricting subset dictated by the choice of other thieves that maximizes
their own reward.
To find a GNE that can be reached by the thieves, the distributed learning algorithm
using the framework of learning automata [126] is implemented, in which each thief only
knows its own action space and its own reward after choosing an action.

7.4.2

Utility’s Side Analysis

Under the derived GNE of M thieves, the utility needs to selects a defense action a0 that
maximizes its reward R0 . It is assumed that the utility’s defense action is determined by
two variables including: (1) Detection mechanism, D, used to identify electricity theft,
and (2) Customer sampling rate, l.
The objective of the utility is to maximize the following problem (Problem 2):
max R0 :=
D,l

s.t.

X

S
S
pD
i (l, qi )P (qi ),

i∈M
S
E
0 ≤ pE
i (l, qi ) ≤ pimax ,

(7.4)

0 ≤ l ≤ lmax ,
S
where qiS is derived from the GNE of the proposed noncooperative game Ξ; pE
i (l, qi )

represents the false alarm probability for thief i; pD
imax gives the constraint of the false
alarm probability for thief i; and lmax indicates sampling rate limitation for the utility. The
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Stackelberg solution concept is adequate for games with hierarchy in which the leader
enforces its strategy and the followers respond, rationally (i.e. optimally), to the leader’s
strategy. The optimal response of M thieves to an action a0 by the utility is written as
Atheft (a0 ) = {a∗1 , ..., a∗M }. This optimal strategy denotes the equilibrium strategy profile
of the attackers as a response to the defender’s strategy. In this regard, a∗0 ∈ A0 is a
Stackelberg equilibrium [57] if it minimizes the utility’s reward function R0 . In other
words,
R0 (a∗0 , Atheft ) ≤ R0 (a0 , Atheft ), ∀a0 ∈ A0 .

(7.5)

In the Stackelberg equilibrium, the optimal customer sampling rate l and the threshold
selected for the the detection mechanism D can be derived; they determine the detection
E
probability pD
i and false alarm probability pi , i ∈ N . In the thieves’ game, M thieves

make their decisions simultaneously at each step of the evolutionary process, playing a
GNE between themselves. A multimodal Genetic Algorithm [57] is implemented for
computing the Stackelberg equilibrium for the utility.

7.5

Likelihood Ratio Test

Following the scenario that the smart meter data from a community fails Benford’s Analysis, the proposed DIEFTED implements the Likelihood Ratio Test (LRT) for further
scrutiny in order to identify potentially fraudulent meters within this community using
results from the Stackelberg game. For each customer i ∈ N , the utility collects a time
series of electricity usage measurements, denoted by xit , from time 1 to time T . It is
assumed that the collected meter measurements xit , t = 1, .., T , are independently drawn
from identically distributed random variables following the PDF of fi0 . Then, the expected
value of xit for customer i is qi . In other words, it is the expected amount of electricity
consumed by customer i at one time step. However, if customer i is an electricity thief,
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they may have comprised their smart meter and thus can propagate a falsified time series,
x̂it , to lower their billable energy. Let the fraudulent meter measurements, x̂it , follow the
PDF of fi1 and thus the expected value of x̂it is qi − qiS , which is the expected amount of
electricity billed by customer i. Therefore, a binary hypothesis testing problem can be
formulated as follows:
H0 : xit ∼ fi0 , E[xit ] = qi ,
H1 :

xit

∼

fi1 ,

E[xit ]

= qi −

(7.6)
qiS ,

where t = 1, .., T . The null hypothesis H0 indicates that customer i’s time series follows
the PDF of normal customers, while the alternative hypothesis H1 states that customer i’s
time series follows the PDF of thieves.
For customer i, let the time series for a normal customer follow lognormal distribution
with scale parameter µ0i and shape parameter δi0 . Also let the time series for a thief follow
lognormal distribution with scale parameter µ1i and shape parameter δi1 . Therefore, the
LRT can be expressed as:
QK
Λ = ln
=

Qt=1
K
t=1

T
X
t=1

fin (xit )
fif (xit )

δ1
ln(| io | × e
δi

i
0 2
2
(ln(xit )−µ1
i ) − (ln(xt )−µi )
2
2
2δ 1
2δ 0
i
i

(7.7)
) ≷ γ,

where γ represents the threshold to classify customer i as ”Normal” or ”Thief”. If Λ > γ,
customer i is considered Normal, and a Thief otherwise. If δi0 = δi1 = δ, then:
Λ=

T
X
(2 ln xi − µ1 − µ0 )(µ0 − µ1 )
t

t=1

i

i

2δ 2

i

i

≷ γ.

(7.8)

where t = 1, .., T . The null hypothesis H0 indicates that customer i’s time series follows
the PDF of normal customers, while the alternative hypothesis H1 states that customer i’s
time series follows the PDF of thieves.
For customer i, let the time series for a normal customer follow lognormal distribution
with scale parameter µ0i and shape parameter δi0 . Also let the time series for a thief follow
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lognormal distribution with scale parameter µ1i and shape parameter δi1 . Therefore, the
LRT can be expressed as:
QK

Λ = ln Qt=1
K

t=1

=

T
X
t=1

fin (xit )
fif (xit )

δ1
ln(| io | × e
δi

2
0 2
i
(ln(xit )−µ1
i ) − (ln(xt )−µi )
2
2
2δ 1
2δ 0
i
i

(7.9)
) ≷ γ,

where γ represents the threshold to classify customer i as ”Normal” or ”Thief”. If Λ > γ,
customer i is considered Normal, and a Thief otherwise. If δi0 = δi1 = δ, then:
Λ=

T
X
(2 ln xi − µ1 − µ0 )(µ0 − µ1 )
t

i

i

i

i

2δ 2

t=1

Therefore, LRT can be simplified as

(7.10)

≷ γ.

PT

i
t=1 ln xt ≷ τ , where τ =

2γδ 2
µ0i −µ1i

+

T (µ0i +µ1i )
.
2

Under this assumption, successful detection probability pD
i and the false alarm probability
pE
i are defined as follows:
pD
i

=

Pr{xit

Z

τ

eτ

fi1 (x)dx,

< e |H1 } =
0

pE
i

=

Pr{xit

Z

τ

< e |H0 } =

(7.11)

eτ

fi0 (x)dx,

0

where fi0 (x) is the lognormal PDF of the time series consumed by the normal customer
with scale parameter µ0i and shape parameter δi , and fi1 (x) is the lognormal PDF of the
time series consumed by the thief with scale parameter µ1i and shape parameter δi . Based
on historical time-series on normal customers, the parameters µ0i and δi can be deter0

2

mined by the Maximum Likelihood Estimator (MLE), where E[X] = eµi +δi /2 = qi , and
0

2

2

1

2

V ar[X] = e2µi +δi (eδi − 1). For a thief, E[X̂] = eµi +δi /2 = qi − qiS , and V ar[X̂] =
1

2

2

e2µi +δi (eδi − 1).
The descriptive parameters for one meter’s interval usage data is illustrated in Fig.
7.3 using a Cullen and Frey Graph that plots kurtosis against skewness [173]. While
Kurtosis is a measure of how heavy-tailed the distribution of a given data is, Skewness is
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Figure 7.3: Skewness vs. Kurtosis for the data of one meter.

a measure of its symmetry. For example, the PDF of an ideal normally distributed data
has a Skewness of 0 and a Kurtosis of 3. It can be seen from the figure that the PDF of
the considered dataset, denoted by a blue colored filled circle, is likely to show a fit for
lognormal distribution denoted by the dotted line. A similar Kurtosis-Skewness plot was
obtained for data from majority of the other meters. It was further deduced that data from
all meters were within the shaded region, implying they were all likely to show a fit for
beta distribution. These observations are again evident in the PDF of the data shown in
the top-left of Fig. 7.4.
The Quantile-Quantile (Q-Q) and Probability-Probability (P-P) plots shown in the
top and bottom right of the same figure illustrate the agreement between the theoretical and empirical quantiles and probabilities, respectively. The empirical data is drawn
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Figure 7.4: Fitting meter data to a lognormal distribution using MLE.
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from the sample observations while the theoretical data belongs to the known lognormal
distribution. While Q-Q plot compares the quantiles, P-P plot compares the Cumulative
Distribution Functions (CDFs), which is affirmed by the agreement between the theoretical and empirical CDFs shown in the bottom-left of Fig. 7.4. It can be concluded both
mathematically as well statistically that lognormal distribution can be viewed as the most
likely fit for the smart meter interval data.

7.6

Results and Discussion

In order to implement the proposed DIFETD, real-world data from 103 AMI smart meters was collected from an electric utility in Florida, for the month of May, 2013. The
interval data was recorded every one hour, annotated with timestamp. It is to be noted
that the sample of 103 meters was chosen to demonstrate the feasibility of the proposed
framework alone, and that in the future, the number of meters would be scaled to validate
the framework against real-world test cases.

Data Preprocessing
Raw data was available as DAT Header files containing values separated by semicolon
delimiters (;). Appropriate preprocessing steps were implemented since the data was in
a non-numeric format and contained non-intuitive header format. The resulting dataset
was structured, time-series and multivariate in nature. In order to maintain privacy of the
consumers, original meter IDs were renamed M eter1 through M eter103.

Theft Scenario Construction
This subsection considers the different electricity theft scenarios that will be used to
demonstrate the feasibility of the proposed framework. It is to be noted that, while the at-
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tbp]

Figure 7.5: An example of the normal daily electricity usage and four theft scenarios.

tacks were synthetically generated, their distributions are randomized to ensure the exact
percolation of the attacks into the meter data is still unknown. This ensures a minimization of any inherent bias the proposed framework might have and keeps the overall data
structure intact (as would be the case in reality). Consider the electricity bill function as
E
B(q) = Bq, and the fine penalty as B(q) = P , with pD
imax = 0.5 and pimax = 0.3, ∀i ∈ N ,

and lmax = 0.7. Therefore, the Stackelberg equilibrium can be derived. Based on the
derived qiS in the game equilibrium, for each meter measurement xt , t = 1, .., 744, in the
dataset, four electricity theft scenarios can be formulated:
1. A1t = (qi − qiS )/qi × (xt );
2. A2t = (qi − qiS )/qi × (x744−t );
3. A3t = (qi − qiS )/qi × E[xt ];
4. A4t = [x1 , ..., xt1 , 0, ..., 0], where t1 is the earliest time satisfies

Pt1
1

xt ≥ qi − qiS .

One customer’s daily electricity usage and the four suspected scenarios of electricity theft
are shown in Fig. 7.5.
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Benford’s Analysis
To validate the data’s adherence to Benford’s Law, several Goodness of Fit (GoF) tests
have been proposed in the literature. Of them, Pearson’s Chi-Square test and Euclidian distance are two of the widely considered methods to test for significance. These tests
assume a null hypothesis (H0 ) of the data conforming to the Law, and an alternate hypothesis (H1 ) representing the conclusion otherwise. As the sample size grows larger, as is
the case in this study, the significance level represented by p-value decreases substantially,
approaching zero. Furthermore, threshold of significance, denoted by α is arbitrarily set
to a value of 0.05 in most studies. However, even a slight difference between the mean
of the two groups of data becomes statistically significant for such a large sample size.
Hence, it is necessary to justify hypothesis testing with a measure of how big the effect
of size is. Cohen’s distance is used as an effect of size measure to evaluate the difference between the mean of two groups. Here, group 1 comprises the Fibonacci series that
precisely conforms to the Benford’s Law curve. It is used as the baseline, while group 2
comprises different types of meter data: normal, and those subject to Attacks 1 through
4 as described in Section 7.6. Illustrated by Fig. 7.6, it can be seen that the difference
in mean between Normal and the baseline is 0, implying that there is no effect of size
between the two. However, the Cohen’s d-value increases relatively significantly when
the data is subject to the Attacks 1 through 4. Greater the d-value, more obvious is the difference between the normal and abnormal datasets. The small d-values implicitly suggest
that the four attacks considered are quite intelligent, probably perpetrated by an attacker
who is aware of typical electricity usage profiles.
Benford’s Analysis for normal data against that compromised by the four attacks is
depicted by Fig. 7.7. It can be seen that the PDFs of the leading significant digits of data
manipulated by Attacks 1 through 4 (colored orange, yellow, green and blue, respectively)
show significant deviations from the expected PDF represented by the normal data (col-
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Figure 7.6: Cohen’s distance showing effect of size measure for normal and tampered
data against ideal dataset.
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Figure 7.7: Benford analysis for normal and tampered data against ideal dataset.
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Figure 7.8: The LRT between normal daily electricity usage and Attack 1.

ored red). This deviation signifies the comparison step shown in Fig. 7.1. This, hence,
illustrates the power of Benford’s Analysis in determining whether the data is potentially
tampered with in some form. However, this analysis fails to pin-point specific meters that
are manipulated. Thus, this analysis provides a crucial preliminary high-level picture for
the operators and analysts to study the meter data of N consumers and decipher anomalies in them for the next stage. If flagged by this analysis, the data is sent to the next stage
of the proposed DIFETD.

Likelihood Ratio Test
The lognormal PDF of a normal customer and a thief was trained using normal electricity
usage and attack patterns, respectively. Figure 7.8 gives one normal customer’s lognormal
PDF and corresponding malicious lognormal PDF. Figure 7.9 shows the Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve of the LRT for different levels of stealing by thieves,
where q S /q = 30%, ..., 70%. In this figure, it can be seen that, with increase of the percent of electricity being stole, the LRT test exhibits better performance. For instance,

156

Figure 7.9: The ROC Curve (probability of successful detection versus false alarm probability) of the LRT for different levels of stealing by thieves.

when q S /q = 30%, the probability of successful detection probability pD is close to the
false alarm probability pE . However, when q S /q = 70%, the probability of successful
detection probability pD is close to 1, which is much larger than pE .

7.7

Summary

Electricity theft is a major concern for utilities all over the world, since it accounts for
billions of dollars in losses every year. Considering crucial power system applications
such as demand response and state estimation utilize smart meter data, undetected thefts
such as FDI could pose serious threats to the reliable operation of smart grid distribution network, raising resiliency concerns. Thus, electricity theft can be considered a very
key precursor to the issue of resiliency in smart grid. To address this growing concern,
DIFETD is proposed in this chapter to detect electricity theft in smart meters using Ben-
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ford’s Analysis for preliminary diagnostics and Stackelberg game for strategic interactions between one utility and multiple thieves. The game equilibrium provides optimal
sampling rate and threshold value for LRT. The capability of the proposed framework
was validated against four intelligent theft scenarios with real usage data. For each smart
meter, the successful detection rate is achieved more than 95% and the false alarm is controlled beyond 10%, if the electricity is stolen in 50%. In the future, more sophisticated
types of theft scenarios on a community of more number of smart meters will be used to
evaluate the performance of the proposed work. Here, realistic attack data will be used to
validate the framework, and the number of meter samples drawn will be further increased
to demonstrate the real-world complexity and how the proposed framework handles it.
Further, the uncertainty in theft detection will be considered in the adversary model formulation, in order to detect specific fraudulent meters.
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CHAPTER 8
Conclusion and Future Work

8.1

Conclusion

Security and resilience issues that arise in the smart grid constitute a pivotal concern in
modern critical infrastructures. In this dissertation, we have discussed new mathematical
methods and analytical tools for addressing the reliability and resilience aspects of the
smart grid. Regarding the smart grid reliability, statistical analysis techniques were introduced in [27, 28] to analyze the relationship between the number of power interruptions
on electric distribution networks and common weather parameters, such as temperature,
wind, air pressure, and lightning. The number of power interruptions was predicted based
on the total sum of the statistical model of each weather parameter. However, the power
interruptions related with common weather conditions are essentially the result of combined action of many factors. The power interruption prediction only based on statistical
models might be compromising due to the various effects of different weather parameters.
Chapter 3 has presented a MLP based framework to forecast the daily numbers of
sustained and momentary interruptions in smart grid distribution networks using time series of common weather data. Essentially, compared with traditional statistical models,
the proposed framework reduced MSE by 8.77% and 61.37% for sustained and momentary interruption forecasting, respectively. A modified ELM based learning algorithm was
proposed to train, validate, and test the formulated framework, whose convergence was
proved. In addition, we derived the sensitivity of each common weather parameter with
respect to the daily numbers of power interruptions based on the formulated framework.
For the utility management area in Florida, we can find that the lightning strike was the
most important common weather parameter impacting the reliability performance of the
smart grid distribution networks, while the heating day had the least impact.
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Appropriate implementation of this framework leads to save time by predicting the
number of power interruptions. Whenever the number of interruptions is forecasted based
on historical weather data, power system equipment failure rates, and aging of distribution
network components, the utilities can prevent a major percent of these events by establishing preventive maintenance programs. Hence, the number of interruptions will be reduced
considerably because they are not unexpected and the system operator is equipped to face
such problems and solve them immediately and without any delay. This awareness of
the power distribution network situation helps to achieve an acceptable level of reliability
and the improvement of reliability is one of the main objectives of moving to smart grid.
The proposed method is implementable on the future power system. In the proposed approach, the variable weather conditions are also considered. The capability of considering
the weather conditions in the reliability calculations in terms of interruption prediction is
one of the significant breakthroughs of Chapter 3.
A comprehensive overview on the applications of noncooperative game theory for
analyzing the cyber-physical security of the smart grid has been presented in Chapter 4.
The smart grid analysis was carefully drawn from a broad range of cyber and physical
security issues spanning key elements such as network infrastructure, AMI, and state
estimation. In each zone, we have identified the main cyber-physical security threats and
presented an elaborate discussion on how noncooperative game theory can be applied to
address these challenges. Moreover, we proposed several future directions for extending
these approaches and adopting advanced game theoretic techniques, so as to reduce the
gap between theoretical models and practical implementations of future smart grids. From
the surveyed works, we can clearly see that game theory has strong potential to provide
solutions for pertinent cyber-physical security problems in the smart grid but also faces
many design challenges. However, we also note that many of the existing works have
focused on classical static noncooperative games. Hence, in future work, it is of interest to
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investigate dynamic game models (both in cooperative and noncooperative settings) and
their applications in smart grid systems. In this context, dynamic game theory could be a
cornerstone for capturing these parameters and designing better algorithms for improving
the cyber and physical aspects of the future smart grid.
In Chapter 5, we proposed a novel game-theoretic approach for the risk assessment
of coordinated cyber-physical attacks against power grids, while considering the finite
budget owned by the attacker and defender that will have an important influence on the
assessment. We have formulated a two-player zero-sum stochastic game between the
attacker and defender in which each player seeks to maximize its respective minimum
rewards under the opponent’s optimal strategy. In order to quantify their rewards, the
optimal load shedding technology was introduced to determine the minimum cost of shed
load. Using these quantified rewards as inputs, the attacker and defender’s Nash equilibrium strategies about its budget allocation were derived by solving the proposed stochastic
game. At the Nash equilibrium of the game, the optimal attack and defense budget allocation strategies can be obtained, in terms of attacking/protecting the critical elements of
the grid. The probability of successful attacks and corresponding physical impacts on the
grid can be used to assess the risk for various states of the power grid, and the optimal
defense budget allocation is formulated in terms of the corresponding risk. The IEEE
9-bus grid wasis used as the test system, and simulation results have shown that different
risks are derived as we vary the attack/defense budget. In addition, compared with the
traditional static game models, the proposed stochastic game-theoretic approach can reduce the test system risk by more than 30% for each system state. This proposed game
theoretic framework provided a way for the optimal management of the shared critical
infrastructure resources be resilient to failures in any of the power system.
In Chapter 6, we introduced a novel DER cyber attack detection framework that
integrates spare feature learning and spatiotemporal correlation analysis. First, a two-
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layer SAE architecture was formulated to extract the abstract representations from largevolume DER measurement datasets. The MRelief feature selection was then developed
to provide the feature ranking for both original measurements and extracted representations. Furthermore, we combined the SAE architecture and MRelief with a decision
tree-based ensemble classifier for identifying the abnormal events in the DER measurement dataset. The normal, fault, and cyber attack system scenarios simulated by the IEEE
34-bus test distribution system are utilized for training the proposed ensemble classifier.
Compared with existing detection methods such as decision tree, quadratic discriminant
analysis, logistic regression classifier, SVM, and nearest neighbor classifier, the proposed
DER anomaly detection framework achieved the best performance of 99.48% DR, 99.69%
Acc, 99.69% F1 , and only 0.1% FAR. Finally, a spatiotemporal correlation sphere is developed for PV farm in the test distribution system for classifying the fault scenarios and
the potential cyber attacks in the generated abnormal event list.
In Chapter 7, to address this growing concern for electricity theft, DIFETD was proposed in this paper to detect electricity theft in smart meters using Benford’s Analysis
for preliminary diagnostics and Stackelberg game for strategic interactions between one
utility and multiple thieves. The game equilibrium provides optimal sampling rate and
threshold value for LRT. The capability of the proposed framework was validated against
four intelligent theft scenarios with real usage data. For each smart meter, the successful
detection rate is achieved more than 95% and the false alarm is controlled beyond 10%, if
the electricity is stolen in 50%. Electricity theft is a major concern for utilities all over the
world, since it accounts for billions of dollars in losses every year. Considering crucial
power system applications such as demand response and state estimation utilize smart
meter data, undetected thefts such as FDIA could pose serious threats to the reliable operation of smart grid distribution network, raising resiliency concerns. Thus, electricity
theft can be considered a very key precursor to the issue of resiliency in smart grid. The
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proposed DIFETD provided a model to investigate distributor monitoring choices when
customers are strategic, and a known fraction of consumers engages in stealing.

8.2

Recommendations for Future Work

The reliable power system operation is a major goal for electric utilities, which requires
the accurate reliability forecasting to minimize the duration of power interruptions. The
weather conditions, including both common weather parameters and extreme weather
events, are usually the leading causes for power interruptions in the smart grid, especially
for its distribution networks. However, the proposed hybrid power distribution reliability
forecasting model in Chapter 3 only investigated the combined effect of common weather
parameters on the reliability performance of distribution networks. Due to essential needs
for understanding and recognizing the power system reliability performance under extreme weather events such as hurricanes and windstorms, it is recommended to consider
the extreme weather condition based power system reliability forecasting as the future
work. Specially, a Bidirectional LSTM based framework can be proposed to forecast the
numbers of sustained and momentary power interruptions in one distribution management
area under extreme weather events.
The stochastic game theoretic framework proposed in Chapter 5 can be used as a basis
to analyze the coordinated cyber-physical attacks targeted at the smart grid. However, the
proposed framework can be extended by considering the bounded rationality of the players and the coordination between the cyber attackers. In fact, several future opportunities
for extending this work can be explored:
• Introducing additional players and strategies into the game that enables analyzing
the cyber-physical attack targeted at multiple smart grid elements simultaneously;
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• Analyzing the impact of both the attacker’s and defender’s information sets on the
optimal attack and defense strategy selections;
• Proposing a practical implementation that can be used as a smart grid testbed to
evaluate the defender’s Nash equilibrium strategies against the data confidentiality
attacks.
Regarding the DER cyber attack detection mechanism in Chapter 6 and theft detection
framework in Chapter 7, the simulated attack scenarios are implemented for evaluating
the performance of the proposed work. However, in the future work, realistic attack data
can be used to validate the framework. Further, the operation and information technology support personnel at utility command and control centers constantly detect suspicious
events and/or extreme conditions across the smart grid. Already overwhelmed by routine
mandatory tasks such as guidelines compliance and patching that if ignored could incur penalties, they have little time to understand the large volumes of machine-generated
data associated with the events, generated by intrusion detection systems, firewalls, and
other security tools. Lack of powerful classification and anomaly detection tools, and
non-contextual visualization of such critical but inadequately processed data, reduces the
situational awareness, thereby increasing the likelihood of erroneous or sub-optimal decisions that could prove opportunities to well-evolved attackers. The future work focuses
on proposing a tri-modular framework which shifts low-performance processing speed
and data contextualization from users to high-performance processing using software,
thereby providing users with actionable information. The framework provides three modules, Data Module (DM): Kafka, Spark, and R to ingest streams of heterogeneous data;
Classification Module (CM): a Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) model to classify processed data at each time-step; and Action Module (AM): naturalistic and rational models
for time-critical and non-time-critical decision-making, respectively.
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